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1 
Introduction  
Introducing the state 
 
In reality, it is tautological to argue that Western models of government are universal,  
since of all political orders, only the state proclaims itself universal,  
and it does so with a postulate it cannot divest itself of  
since that postulate is perceived by everyone as  
constitutive of its definition. 
Bertrand Badie (2000:49) 
 
While anthropologists from the time of A. R. Radcliffe-Brown renouncing the state as an 
object of study (Trouillot 2001:126) continued for long to avoid discussing the state, theories 
about the state have come and gone in political science and related social science disciplines, 
including everything from modernisation- and dependency theories and other state-oriented 
schools arguing for the state as the critical and direct agent of socioeconomic- and political 
change (Migdal 2001), to the more recent globalisation discussions of the 1990s making the 
state more or less irrelevant (Hardt and Negri 2001). As no longer seen as separate from 
culture or society, nor believed to be extinct as a social or economical force (Aretxaga 2003), 
seeing the state as a relevant object of study has indeed gained momentum also in 
anthropology.1 The state is the subject of this thesis and the context is South Asia. To better 
place the anthropology of the state, let me first make some general observations about the 
state.  
 
The universal and sovereign state 
 
Theorising about the state there are two things to consider: first, the universality of the state, 
and second, its sovereign position. According to Bertrand Badie, science played an important 
role providing universal status to the rational-legal state model of the West through works of 
scholars such as Weber (The Protestant Ethic) and Durkheim (Division of Labor in Society). 
                                                
1 See Gupta (1995), Trouillot (2001), Hansen and Stepputat (2001, 2005), Fuller and Bénéï (2001), Ferguson and 
Gupta (2002), Aretxaga (2003), Krohn-Hansen and Nustad (2005), Kapferer (1988, 1997, 2004, 2005).  
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By presenting “Western culture as the chosen culture that draws its exceptional status from its 
exclusive capacity to attain the level of reason”, Weber apparently discounted the validity of 
comparing political systems based on the concept of culture (Badie 2000:50). What he did do 
was to ask: why, in other histories, the modern state could not form. The answer, he found in 
the exceptionality of Western rationality and the structure of behaviour (autonomous action 
spheres, see chapter 5). To Weber, there was a connection between cultures or forms of 
rationalities and state systems. Similarly, Durkheim, analysing the retreat of religion and the 
progressive triumph of a secularised state, appears to assume Western modernity as universal 
saying that, “the force of the cultural explanation [prevailed in Formes élémentaires] fades 
before an analysis in terms of the universal” (ibid:51). Thus, both Weber and Durkheim seem 
to assume a universal convergence between a particular kind of rationalisation of society and 
the modern state.  
 
As a political and philosophical project going back to Hobbes’ Leviathan (1651), the state can 
claim nothing short of universality, and there can be no source of authority outside the state. 
This functional requirement is satisfied by the  
 
covenant of every man with every man, in such manner as if every man should say to 
every man: I authorise and give up my right of governing myself to this man, or to this 
assembly of men, on this condition; that thou give up, thy right to him, and authorise all 
his actions in like manner.  
 
And this done, 
 
the multitude so united in one person is called a COMMONWEALTH; in Latin, 
CIVITAS. This is the generation of that great LEVIATHAN, or rather, to speak more 
reverently, of that mortal god to which we owe, under the immortal God, our peace and 
defence. For by this authority, given him by every particular man in the 
Commonwealth, he hath the use of so much power and strength conferred on him that, 
by terror thereof, he is enabled to form the wills of them all, to peace at home, and 
mutual aid against their enemies abroad. And in him consisteth the essence of the 
Commonwealth; which, to define it, is: one person, of whose acts a great multitude, by 
mutual covenants one with another, have made themselves every one the author, to the 
end he may use the strength and means of them all as he shall think expedient for their 
peace and common defence (Hobbes [1651] 2007). 
 
The result is the modern state consisting of a differentiated political sphere and individualised 
social relations (with the impoverishment of communal structures), or as Weber put it: “the 
disenchantment of the world”; pointing to the combination of rationalisation and 
intellectualisation where power and authority is limited to certain spheres (Weber [1948] 
Chapter1: Introduction 
 
 5 
1997:155). While both were talking about a contractual relationship between state and society 
(exchange of liberty for security), Weber was not referring to the universal state. Realising the 
difficulties of generalising from what the state do, Weber focused on how, defining the state 
as “a human community that (successfully) claims the monopoly of the legitimate use of 
physical force within a given territory” (ibid:78), acknowledging the possibility and reality of 
variations (‘successfully’ in parentheses). Hobbes, on the other hand, left no doubt as to what 
was the role of the state: the complete control of the means of violence or force in the interest 
of peace as the condition of society.   
 
Rather than confirming the Hobbesian ‘pact’, Badie argues, sociological analysis “shows the 
variety of social pacts, including as many individualist formulas as communal ones”. 
Moreover,  
 
Far from disappearing, the latter are recomposing and redeploying, whereas actors 
seeking political effectiveness must seek to integrate rather than efface them. More 
precisely, non-Western models, and in particular the example of China, suggest that 
individualism and communitarianism can either complement each other or alternate 
with each other according to different political regimes, as in communist China (op. cit. 
Badie p. 55).  
 
According to Badie, in Chinese imperial history, to install its power, each dynasty depended 
on a ‘pact’ or agreement between the new political centre and rural familial communities, 
which usually meant preservation of local autonomy and an imperial centre depending on 
communal structures. According to Yves Chevrier, the arrangement coming closest to the 
‘Hobbesian pact’, the construction of a differentiated and sovereign political space and the 
individual’s direct allegiance to the political centre in the formation of a complex 
bureaucracy, “did not definitively succeed” (ibid:55). Especially under the Maoist system, 
depending on peasant mobilisation, constructing a differentiated and sovereign system seems 
like a contradiction. However, even a communist leader such as Deng Xiaoping, Secretary 
General of the Communist Party of China between 1956 and 1967, clearly relied on the 
modern state system. “Unless one considers these manifestations as residues of tradition that, 
as such, should be dismantled by modernization,” says Badie, “one has to admit that they 
form a competing model of allegiances not integrated into the Hobbesian construct and whose 
deficiency constitutes a direct attack on the legitimacy of the political system” (ibid:55). In the 
Hobbesian ‘pact’, state power is universal, sovereign and thus unchallengeable.  
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Culture, complexity and variation 
 
Against the above, Badie is arguing for the need to consider cultural aspects in situations of 
what he calls importation-exportation of the Western state claiming that “the logic of 
exportation finds its limits in the logic of importation at work within the importing societies” 
(ibid:86).2 According to him, exportation of the Western state model has depended on the 
following: the diffusion of the principle of territoriality, the diffusion of a normative system 
strongly marked by the Western conception of law, and finally, the diffusion of international 
rules of conduct. However, all three have been limited by two series of factors: the persistence 
of communal cultures that continuously challenge or alter the system; and second, conceptual 
differences at work within various cultures assigning different meaning to ideas developed 
and exported by Western culture (ibid:60) In other words, seeing the importance of culture in 
relation to state formation.  
 
Also, the successful implementation of the Western model of political order has depended on 
a postulate of universality that could structure the concept of civil society. Historically, this 
included:  
 
the differentiation of private social spaces from the political space; the individualization 
of social relations that thus confers precedence on citizenship; and the presence of 
horizontal relations within society that gives preference to associative logic over 
communal structures and that, consequently, marginalize particularist identification in 
favour of identification with the state (ibid:83).  
 
Realisation depends on the ‘importer’ whose already existing logic of order, which does not 
necessarily mean either clear-cut or in singularity, makes a difference for the resulting order. 
“Forced Westernisation”, he concludes, “generates both order and entropy: it imposes 
universal rules without being able to make them work; it enunciates a unification of worlds 
without unifying meaning” (ibid:234). The state is thus seen as an invention and the creation 
of a very particular history that does not easily translate because of cultural differences. While 
his point about cultural variations enables him to go beyond simple oppositions between states 
and non-states, the approach assumes a clear-cut separation between the modern and the 
traditional (see chapter 6).  
                                                
2 See also George Steinmetz (1999) arguing for seeing states as effects of cultural processes, and Bruce Kapferer 
underlining the cultural formation of nation-states (1988). 
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Similarly, in State in Society (2001) Joel S. Migdal approaches the state as an invention and 
the result of a particular historical process. Dismissing both system- and state theories for 
favouring ideal type perspectives of the state, Migdal argues for a more context based 
approach. According to him, the way popular and academic discourses have presented the 
state, as a “coherent, integrated, and goaloriented body” (Migdal 2001:12), have made it 
difficult to talk about limitations. Migdal warns against uncritical use of the Weberian ideal 
type state that monopolize legitimate force and rule through rational law as it “gives scholars 
precious few ways to talk about real-life states that do not meet this ideal”.3 From this view, 
actual states can be nothing but deviations from the ideal or corrupted versions of the ideal 
(ibid:14). While Weber both recognised and expected variations4, taking his definition of the 
state as point of departure means that real states can be conceptualised and measured only as 
distance from the ideal type, undermining a cultural understanding of the state. Migdal says: 
 
If real states fell short of the standard, as they were bound to do, all sorts of words had 
to be invented to express the gap between actual practice and the ideal. Terms such as 
corruption, weakness, and relative capacity implied that the ways things really worked 
were somehow exogenous to the normative model of what the state and its relations to 
society are, or should be. Comparison comes in specifying and measuring deviation 
from the norm or the ideal (ibid:15).  
 
Migdal points out the problematic in assuming that only states create and enforces rules as it 
minimises and trivialises the rich negotiation, interaction, and resistance that occurs in every 
human society among ‘multiple systems of rules’: “It provides no way to theorize about 
arenas of competing sets of rules, other than to cast these in the negative, as failures or weak 
states or even as non-states” (ibid:15). Stressing the importance of recognising states as 
products of specific historical processes, Migdal brings to the attention the role of cultural 
differences in forming and informing states, but fails to shed much light on the enduring 
nature of the state-society duality, except for perhaps in theory.  
 
Rather than taking the entity of the state for granted, presuming a certain state-society 
relationship, or ruling out the state altogether, an anthropology of the state ethnographically 
                                                
3 Ideal type is “a methodologically overstated and one-sided abstraction presenting a specific analytical aspect in 
artificial purity” (Kantowsky 1986:179).  
4 Weber’s concrete historical analyses from Germany, for example, show in detail, and from various standpoints, 
how an actual state differ sharply from the proposed model (Badie and Birnbaum 1983).  
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explores state realities in their proper contexts. There are several examples of how this has 
been done. Since my concern is with the South Asian state, I will in the following concentrate 
on the works of Gupta (1995), and Ferguson and Gupta (2002). 
 
Akhil Gupta made an early contribution to the anthropology of the state with an article 
published in 1995 where he examines the discourses of corruption in contemporary India. By 
ethnographically exploring everyday encounters with the state at the local level, Gupta argues 
for the blurred boundaries between the state and society. In his account, the ethnography of 
the state poses an interesting challenge to Western notions of the state because of its cultural 
constitution, which is why it is “imperative that we constantly contextualize the construction 
of the state within particular historical and cultural conjunctures” (Gupta 1995:389). Although 
concerned with the historical, his interest in history appears to have more to do with historical 
moments (in a Foucauldian sense) than with continuity. While this kind of constructivist 
perspective can contribute towards a richer understanding of the state-society relationship than 
has been possible within the neo-statist paradigm, it tends to overlook structures, i.e. the 
circumstances under which negotiations occurs in the first place (see methodology this chapter 
and chapter 3).  
 
Similarly, in another article published together with James Ferguson in 2002, the state is 
explored as a cultural construct. Looking at a maternal health project in India, the authors’ 
shows how the state is produced through routine bureaucratic practices arguing for the micro-
politics of state production.5 While agreeing with the emphasis on practices for a richer 
understanding of the state, bringing in the past can help shedding light on collective practices 
otherwise ‘silent’ or taken-for-granted and therefore not captured by the cultural struggle 
perspective (Sharma and Gupta 2006).  
 
To avoid the structuralist trap, locating ‘structuring structures’ in the unconscious mind 
leaving no scope for human strategising or the unintended historical consequences of 
conscious human action (Gledhill 1994), concepts such as habitus (Bourdieu 1977) and bio-
power (Foucault [1976] 1978) can help explain meaning of the past for present practices 
(reproduction of practices). The significance of these perspectives will be developed in later 
chapters. In my view, the state is more than a particular moment in history and its 
                                                
5 I will come back to the implications of seeing the state as a cultural construct in the section on methodology. 
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manifestations are many. To explain its many faces, accounting for the possibility of both 
reproduction and change, I depend on different theories supported by various approaches.  
 
Contrary to studies of the state arguing either for culture as produced by the state (Weberian 
accounts, cf. Steinmetz 1999), or for the cultural constitution of the state (Gupta et al 1995, 
2002, 2006), I aim to show the different structures of the state manifested in different 
contexts. Following scholars that do not take the state as given, a distinct, fixed and unitary 
entity that defines the terrain in which other institutions function, I seek to bring together the 
ideological and material aspects of the state, and understand how the state comes into being, 
how it is differentiated from other institutional forms, and what effects this construction has 
on the operation and diffusion of power throughout society, as well as how it is itself affected. 
As the success of my argument depends on the convergence between approach and empirical 
evidence, I shall have to make clear my methodological position, which I will come back to 
after an introduction of the field sites, and notes on theme, method and key figures.  
 
Context of the study6 
 
Fieldwork for the thesis was conducted mainly in two places: Chittagong, located to the 
south-east, and Dinajpur, located in the north-western part of Bangladesh. The reason behind 
this choice of field sites I will explain later, limiting the following to more factual and 
historical information.  
 
Chittagong 
 
Chittagong Division, with an area of 33771.13 sq km, is bounded by Dhaka and Sylhet 
divisions and Tripura state of India on the north; Bay of Bengal and Arakan (Myanmar) on the 
south; Mizoram, Tripura states of India and chin state of Myanmar on the east; and Bay of 
Bengal, Barisal and Dhaka divisions on the west. As the rest of the country, Chittagong is 
divided by rivers, with the main being: Meghna, Matamuhuri, Titas, Dakatia, Gumti, Feni, 
Karnafuli, and Sangu. The islands Sandwip, Hatiya, Kutubdia, Maheshkhali and St. Martins, 
                                                
6 Information gathered mainly from Banglapedia: http://banglapedia.org/english/index.htm, April 2007.  
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and the three hill districts of Rangamati, Khagrachhari, Bandarban (Hill Tracts, established in 
1860), are also administered as part of Chittagong Division.  
 
The division further consists of a city corporation, 11 districts, 34 municipalities, six thanas, 
97 upazilas, 923 union parishads, 7550 mouzas, 346 wards, 903 mahallas, and 14967 villages 
(ten different administrative levels). The districts are Chittagong, Cox’s Bazar, Rangamati, 
Bandarban, Khagrachhari, Feni, Lakshmipur, Comilla, Noakhali, Brahmanbaria, Chandpur.  
 
Chittagong District (with an area of 5282.98 sq km) was established in 1666 and borders to 
Feni district and Tripura (Indian state) on the north; Cox’s Bazar district on the south; 
Bandarban, Rangamati and Khagrachari districts on the east; and Noakhali district and the 
Bay of Bengal on the west. The district consists of a city corporation, seven municipalities, six 
thanas, 20 upazilas, 197 union parishads and 1,319 villages. The upazilas are Anwara, 
Banshkhali, Boalkhali, Chandanaish, Fatikchari, Hathazari, Lohagara, Mirsharai, Patiya, 
Rangunia, Raozan, Sandwip, Satkania and Sitakunda. The thanas are Chandgaon, Badar 
Thana (Chittagong Port), Double Mooring, Kotwali, Pahartali and Panchlaish. Due to its hills, 
rivers, sea, forests and valleys, Chittagong is quite different from other districts.   
 
Chittagong City consists of six thanas, 68 wards and 236 mahallas. It has an area of 209.66 sq 
km and a population of 3,202,710. Chittagong is also called the commercial capital of 
Bangladesh and the main seaport is located at the estuary of the Karnafuli river. Chittagong 
City is not only the principal city of the district of Chittagong, but also the second largest city 
of Bangladesh. Historians have given various explanations as to the origin of the name 
Chittagong. According to the East Pakistan District Gazetteers, the British named the district 
Chittagong when they took possession of it in 1760 from Mir Qasim Ali Khan, Nawab of 
Bengal. Before that, the district was known as Islamabad, a name given to it by the Mughals 
after they had conquered the area in 1666 by defeating the Arakanese (Government of East 
Pakistan, 1970). Bernoli, in Description Historique et Geographic de L'Inde (1786), explains 
that the name Chittagong came from the Arabic word Shat (delta) prefixed to Ganga 
(Ganges), indicating the city at the mouth of the Ganges. 
 
Being a port city from early times, Chittagong attracted people from various regions of the 
world. These international contacts left a lasting impact on the language, religion and culture 
of the city. Al Idrisi, writing in 1154, states that Arab merchants from Baghdad and Basrah 
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frequently visited an area near the mouth of the Meghna, which is now generally believed to 
be Chittagong. Other travellers and historians have recorded Arab contacts with Chittagong as 
far back as the ninth century. Apart from the merchants, many sufis and saints also visited and 
settled in Chittagong. The conquest of Bengal by Bakhtiyar Khalji in 1204 led to large-scale 
Muslim settlement in Chittagong.  
 
The vast majority of the people of Chittagong today are Muslims, with a small percentage of 
Hindus and Christians also living in the city. In addition to places and people having Arabic 
names, there are a good number of Arabic words in the dialect spoken in Chittagong. Names 
of places like Alkaran (Al-qarn), or Sulek Bahar (Sulukul Bakulia) are of Arab derivation. 
Apart from Arabic words certain Arakanese, Portuguese, Pali and Hindi words are also found 
in the Chittagonian dialect, generally known as Chatgaiyan Buli, which the majority of the 
people in Bangladesh do not understand. Though the Chittagonians’ spoken Bangla is 
different, their written Bangla is the same as in the rest of Bangladesh. 
 
Of the Europeans, descendants of the Portuguese are still to be seen in Chittagong. Most of 
them married local women and are known as Kala Firinghis or Matia (earth coloured) 
Firinghis (foreigners). They are mostly Roman Catholic Christians. During the British period 
they enjoyed certain privileges and were given preference in appointments in certain 
institutions like the port and the railway, and to clerical posts in government offices. An area 
in the city known as Firingi Bazar is believed to be named after them. The most significant 
contribution of the Portuguese is the presence of many Portuguese words in the Bengali 
language that are still in daily use. A few examples are - anaros (pineapple), pepe (papaya), 
padri (clergyman), fita (ribbon), alpin (pin), botam (button), chabi (key) etc. 
 
The early history of Chittagong is not very clear. Burmese chronicles speak of a long line of 
kings over the region of Arakan, which included Chittagong in the sixth and seventh century. 
The names of these kings invariably ended with the title Chandra. Historian Lama Taranath 
mentions a Buddhist king Gopichandra who had his capital at Chittagong in the tenth century. 
According to Tibetan traditions, Chittagong was the birthplace of the Buddhist Tantric 
Tilayogi, who lived and worked in the tenth century. Whatever might have been its early 
history, Chittagong’s history becomes clear with the advent of the Muslims to the region.  
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Ghiyasuddin Tughlaq divided Bengal into three administrative units – Lakhnauti, Satgaon and 
Sonargaon. In 1338, Fakhruddin Mubarak Shah captured power at Sonargaon and soon after 
occupied Chittagong. He constructed a highway from Chandpur to Chittagong and adorned 
Chittagong with mosques and tombs. In 1538, the Arakanese regained possession of 
Chittagong after the fall of Sultan Ghiyasuddin Mahmud Shah at the hands of Sher Shah, but 
was conquered by the Mughals in 1666. During the period from 1538 to 1666, the Portuguese 
made inroads into Chittagong and virtually ruled it. In the period of Portuguese occupation, 
Chittagong city and port acquired great fame as centre of business and trade. With the gradual 
rise and development of Calcutta in the 18th and 19th century, due mainly to the trading 
activities of the East India Company (see chapter 2), Chittagong lost its importance in the 
region. 
 
Chittagong once again came into prominence after the Partition of Bengal in 1905 and the 
creation of the new province of Eastern Bengal and Assam. Due to the construction of the 
Assam Bengal Railway, which connected the port of Chittagong with its natural hinterland, 
Chittagong as a whole received a great boost and much of the development of the city in the 
first quarter of the twentieth century can be attributed to it.  
 
The history of Chittagong shows repeated attempts by the people to free themselves from the 
colonial rule of the British. At the time of the Sepoy Revolt in 1857 (cf. chapter two), the 2nd, 
3rd and 4th companies of the 34th Bengal Infantry Regiment were stationed at Chittagong. On 
the night of November 18, the three above-named companies rose in rebellion and after 
releasing all the prisoners from jail, the Sepoys left Chittagong carrying with them three 
government elephants, ammunition, and treasure. They marched along the borders of Hill 
Tippera into Sylhet and Cachar, but were either killed or captured by the Kuki scouts and the 
Sylhet Light Infantry, later known as the 10th Gurkha Rifles.   
 
The Khilafat7 and Non-Cooperation movements were strongly supported by the people of 
Chittagong. Communal riots and massacre of Muslims in Calcutta and other parts of India in 
1925, however, led the people of Chittagong to lend support to the Muslim leaders of Bengal 
who were fighting to uphold the interests of the Muslims. 
                                                
7 The Khilafat Movement (1919-1924) was a political campaign launched mainly by Muslims in India to 
influence the British government and to protect the Ottoman Empire during the aftermath of World War I. 
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By 1923, Surya Sen, a prominent Hindu Bengali freedom fighter and the chief architect of 
anti-British freedom movement in Chittagong, had established a number of hardliner patriotic 
organisations (including Jugantar) in different parts of Chittagong district. Aware of the 
limited equipment and other resources of the freedom fighters, he was convinced of the need 
for secret guerrilla warfare against the colonial government. One of his early successful 
undertakings was a broad day robbery at the treasury office of the Assam-Bengal Railway at 
Chittagong. His subsequent major success in the anti-British revolutionary violence was the 
Chittagong Armoury Raid in 1930. On the night of April 18, 700 youths divided themselves 
into several groups and at a fixed time attacked the Armoury and the Magazine House of the 
Auxiliary Corps, occupied the telephone- and telegraphs offices, and removed railway 
fishplates at Dhoom, disconnecting all communications.  
 
As a fugitive after the raid, Sen was hiding at a house near Patiya. A police and military force 
under Captain Cameron surrounded the house on 13 June 1932. Cameron was shot dead while 
ascending the staircase and Surya Sen along with Pritilata Waddedar (the first woman member 
of Surya Sen’s revolutionary group) and Kalpana Datta (another female member of Sen’s 
group) escaped to safety. Ultimately a villager revealed the hiding place of Sen and in the 
early hours of 17 February 1933, a Gurkha contingent surrounded the hideout and a soldier 
seized Sen while he was trying to break the cordon. Sentenced to death in August 1933, Surya 
Sen was hanged in the Chittagong Jail on 8 January 1934.  
 
During the Second World War, the British used Chittagong as an important military base. 
Consequently it became the target of Japanese attacks. The aerodrome at Patenga was 
bombarded for two successive days in April 1942 and again on the 20 and 24 December 1942. 
As a result, Chittagong was declared a non-family area and the head-quarter of the Divisional 
Commissioner was shifted to Comilla, and that of the Assam Bengal Railway to Dhaka. All 
valuable government documents were shifted to Mymensingh.  
 
The City of Chittagong also played a significant role in the War of Liberation of Bangladesh 
in 1971. It was from Chittagong that the first public announcement was made over the radio 
declaring Independence and the start of the War of Liberation. The people of Chittagong 
denied the occupation army of Pakistan access to the sea and the facilities for reinforcement of 
troops and replenishment of arms. The valiant freedom fighters sank a good number of ships 
in the channel of the Karnafuli River and thus totally blocked the port so that the Pakistani 
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Occupation Army could not use it. Consequently, Chittagong suffered enormous losses in 
terms of people and properties during the War of Liberation. 
 
After the liberation of Bangladesh and the surrender of Pakistani troops, Chittagong needed a 
massive rehabilitation and reconstruction programme. This was carried out on a high priority 
basis, as the major outlet to the sea could not be allowed to remain out of commission for 
long. Within a couple of years after liberation, Chittagong became generally operational both 
as a city and as a port. 
 
Present-day administrative functions of Chittagong are carried out by a melange of 
organisations. The City Corporation of Chittagong consisting of a mayor and several ward 
commissioners is the only elected body. Chief Executive Officer is a senior government 
official deputed by the government. There is no de jure focal point of control and coordination 
at the city level. Various agencies have respective lines of control, coordination, policy 
determination, and finance terminating in various ministries in Dhaka. The Mayor being the 
seniormost elected official at the city level occasionally operates as a de facto centre of 
coordination on some operational matters. 
 
The City Corporation has a rather limited mandate and budget for carrying out the 
responsibilities of managing some basic civic services like street-lighting, conservancy, 
sewerage, city beautification, maintenance of city roads and mosquito eradication, and so on. 
Principal source of finance is municipal taxes and conservancy charges collected by the City 
Corporation. Other public functions are organised as follows: 
 
• Maintenance of Law and order in the city is the responsibility of the Metropolitan 
Police Commissioner and the Chief Metropolitan Magistrate, both controlled and 
coordinated by the Ministry of Home Affairs.  
• The District and Sessions Judge is the head of the judicial administration at the city 
level. Trials relating to serious public offences and all the civil offences are carried out 
in the court of the District and Sessions Judge, controlled and coordinated by the 
Supreme Court.  
• The office of the Deputy Commissioner maintains land records and collects land 
revenue on behalf of Ministry of Land.  
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• The Power Development Board, The Titas Gas Co Ltd and the oil companies are 
responsible for the supply of electricity, gas, and fuel oil to the city, respectively. All 
these agencies come under the control and coordination of the Ministry of Power, 
Energy and Mineral Resources.  
• The Department of Fire Brigade and Civil Defence, controlled by the Ministry of 
Home Affairs, provides fire fighting and emergency rescue services in the city.  
• The Telephone and Telecommunication Department, controlled by Ministry of Post 
and Telecommunication, provides telecommunication services. A number of private 
telephone companies are also serving the area.  
• Health services are mainly provided by hospitals run by the Health Ministry. The City 
Corporation has its own health services and hospitals which supplement the services 
provided by the government and the NGOs. There are a number of NGO-run clinics in 
addition to mushrooming private clinics, which are run on a commercial basis. 
• The Ministry of Education, supplemented by services provided by the City 
Corporation, NGOs, and the private sector, substantially provides educational facilities 
in the city.  
• Chittagong Port falls within the limits of the city of Chittagong. Hence all the basic 
civic services of the port fall within the responsibility of the City Corporation and 
various other governmental agencies serving in the area. 
 
Dinajpur 
 
Dinajpur District (Rajshahi division) with an area of 3437.98 sq km, is bounded by 
Thakurgaon and Panchagarh districts on the north; Gaibandha and Joypurhat districts on the 
south; Nilphamari and Rangpur districts on the east; and the Indian state of West Bengal on 
the south-west. Main rivers are Dhepa, Punarbhaba, Kanchan and Atrai. 
 
Population of Dinajpur is 2,617,942. Compared to other districts, Dinajpur have a relatively 
large Hindu population of approx. twenty percent (little more than ten percent nationally). In 
addition, there are several Santal and Oraon (tribal) settlements in the region. Dinajpur 
consists of six municipalities, 57 wards, 200 mahallas, 13 upazilas, 101 union parishads and 
2142 villages. The upazilas are Birampur, Birganj, Biral, Bochaganj, Chirirbandar, Phulbari, 
Ghoraghat, Hakimpur, Kaharole, Khansama, Dinajpur Sadar, Nawabganj, Parbatipur. 
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Dinajpur District was established in 1786. Its previous name was Ghoraghat district. 
According to the Bangladesh District Gazetteers, the theory generally advanced and accepted 
is that the name ‘Dinajpur’ is derived from the name of some local chieftain or king of the 
name of Dinaj or Danuj. Raja Ganesh, the Chieftain of North Bengal, who became the King 
of Gaur in the early part of the fifteenth century, assumed the title of Danujamardanadeva and 
it is assumed that the name Dinajpur has been derived from his title.  
 
According to Sir Jadunath Sarkar, Ganesh was a baron of Dinajpur who had an 
independent and hereditary source of strength in his large ancestral estate and personal 
contingent of troops not in the Sultan’s pay. In the end Ganesh usurped the throne 
(Government of the People’s Republic of Bangladesh (henceforth GoB) 1972:30).  
 
Dinajpur was once a part of the ancient state of Pundrabardhwan. Since then, the district has 
been through periods of Guptas, Palas, Senas, Shahs, and Mughals; all the way to the British 
period from the eighteenth century (see chapter 2 for the general history of the British period). 
The area of the district was formerly much bigger than it was at the time of Independence and 
partition of Bengal in 1947, including as it did greater portion of the districts of Bogra and 
Maldah (India), as well as considerable tracts now included in Rajshahi, Rangpur, and Purnea 
(India).  
 
When Dinajpur first came under British rule in 1765, it was known for the lawlessness 
of its inhabitants, and the ordinary district staff failed to cope successfully with the 
dacoits and the river pirates with which this large tract of country was infested. The 
area was, therefore, gradually reduced with the objects of improving the administration. 
During the year 1800-01, a large number of estates, hitherto included in Dinajpur, were 
made over to Purnea (India), Rangpur and Rajshahi. From 1833-1870, a large portion of 
the district was transferred to Bogra and Maldah (India). Finally, in 1897-98, the whole 
thana of Mahadebpur in the south of the district was transferred to Rajshahi (GoB:35). 
 
As far as modern political agitation is concerned, people of the district mobilised for and 
against on the question of the first partition of Bengal in 1905, with Hindus opposing and 
Muslims supporting the partition.8 They also participated in a non-violent peasant movement 
                                                
8 On the 8th July, 1905, a report was published informing that the Secretary of State had given his assent to the 
Government of India’s new scheme of partition of Bengal into two parts to form a new province of East Bengal 
and Assam. This move of creating a new province where the Muslims formed a majority was strongly opposed 
by the Hindus of the district in meetings held on the 21st July, 1905. When the Hindus opposed the partition, the 
Muslims of Dinajpur called meetings in its support. Partition was proclaimed in September 1905, but was 
annulled in 1911. 
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in 1920 launched against oppression by the zamindar (landlord) in various forms9, arranged 
hartals (general strikes) against government policies and the arrest of Ghandi in 1930, causing 
Dinajpur to continue to figure in government reports as a troubled district, and took part in the 
Tebhaga Movement.10 The district also contributed significantly to the War of Liberation 
(1971), to mention some important events. 
 
Regarding the economy, there were several indigo factories in the district in the early part of 
the nineteenth century, but the business does not seem to have ever been a very paying one, 
and the factories disappeared. Main occupation continues to be agriculture (42.85%), with 
paddy, wheat, sugarcane, jute, potato, vegetables, onion, garlic, and oil seed as the main crops, 
but with the majority of farmers being either landless (40%), or small farmers (30%), most 
people are poor and struggling to make ends meet. In addition to being an exporter of 
agricultural products, the district is also know for- and profiting from its mangos, litchis, and 
jackfruits.  
 
In today’s administration, deputy commissioner (DC) is the chief administrative and revenue 
officer of a district. The office of deputy commissioner traces its origin to the district collector 
system of the early phase of British rule. A district supervisor was appointed with limited 
functions in 1769 and Warren Hastings (first governor general of Bengal, cf. chapter 2) 
introduced the district collector system in 1772. The system was repealed the following year, 
but restored again in 1787 vesting the collector with the powers of a judge and magistrate, in 
addition to some authority over the police. With introduction of the permanent settlement in 
Bengal of 1793 (see chapter 2), the collector was stripped of all judicial and police powers, 
but by 1831 he was reinvested with judicial powers. Since then, the collector was known as 
district magistrate and collector, or just district magistrate.  
 
After 1960, the district magistrate and collector came to be known throughout the country as 
deputy commissioner. During the early years, deputy commissioner’s office was concerned 
with internal security and revenue administration. Over time, the office became increasingly 
occupied with the general welfare of the people in the district. To that end, deputy 
                                                
9 Muslims and Hindus of the district took jointly part in the Khilafat Movement. 
10 The Tebhaga Movement was a militant campaign initiated in Bengal by the Kisan Sabha (peasants’ front of 
Communist Party of India) in 1946. At that time, share-cropping peasants had to give half of their harvest to 
landlords. The demand of the Tebhaga (sharing by thirds) movement was to reduce the share given to landlords 
to one third. 
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commissioner’s role was conceived of as the general controlling authority for all other 
activities in the district. The universality of deputy commissioner’s role since the early 20th 
century came to be affected by the introduction of elected legislatures and creation of 
specialised departments having their own officers in the districts. A deputy commissioner still 
function as the eyes and ears of the government in such areas as development, law and order, 
land administration, disaster management, and elections.  
 
The deputy commissioner works under the general guidance and supervision of the divisional 
commissioner. Both are under the administrative control of the cabinet division, although the 
Ministry of Establishment makes postings and transfers. The deputy commissioner is drawn 
from the senior scale officers of the Bangladesh Civil Service (administration) cadre. He is the 
coordinator between local and central government and is assisted by five additional deputy 
commissioners (ADC literacy and development; ADC general; ADC revenue; ADC land; and 
ADC magistrate). Thus, the office of DC is the central government office of the district and 
his position the most senior one. I will return to the role of the DC in subsequent chapters, 
particularly in chapters 3 and 4. 
 
Below deputy commissioner is the upazila nirbahi officer (UNO), who is the chief executive 
of an upazila (sub-district). Under pressure from the donor community, who felt that under 
General Ershad’s ‘autocratic and corrupt regime’ a decentralisation effort was the only way to 
reach out to the vast majority of people living in the rural areas (Siddiqui 2000), the military 
government of Ershad (1982-1990) in 1982 constituted a committee for administrative 
reorganisation and reform. A major recommendation of the committee was to have a 
representative body called upazila parishad (sub-district council) under a directly elected 
chairman. The government accepted the recommendation and accordingly a post, designated 
first as thana nirbahi officer (executive officer) but later renamed as upazila nirbahi officer, 
was created in each of the existing thanas (later upgraded and renamed as upazila) outside the 
metropolitan areas. About the same time, all existing subdivisions were converted into 
districts. Responsibilities for all development activities at local level were transferred to the 
upazila parishad. It was also decided that the UNO should continue to act as chairman of 
upazila parishad till such time an elected chairman takes office. Till present, though, the only 
level of local government with elected members in the districts is that of Union Parishad. The 
role of the UNO will also be discussed in more detail later. 
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Dinajpur thana was established in 1899 and turned into a upazila in 1983. The upazila consists 
of 14 union parishads, 291 mouzas and 205 villages. As in the case of Chittagong, the system 
is highly centralised and most functions are financed and controlled by respective ministries 
in Dhaka. 
 
Notes on theme, method and key figures 
 
Theme 
 
When I was identifying a theme for a doctoral project, the main interest fell on corruption and 
the question of what defines corrupt practices. The challenge was to find a way to approach 
the theme without right from the start directing or silencing the conversations. Even if I do not 
believe in universal opinions per se, the negative conception of ‘corruption’ as a result of 
global discourses appears to have made its impact invariably, whether in Norway or in 
Bangladesh. The difference, I thought, would be in terms of how or where to draw the line 
between corrupt and non-corrupt practices. Later I realised how limiting this appeared (cf. 
earlier discussion with reference to Migdal) and the necessity of rethinking my approach 
regarding the whole state-society relationship.  
 
As point of departure, the study was to focus on actors trying to access resources within the 
field of education, selecting bureaucrats, teachers, parents, and students as main sources of 
information. The plan was to return to the same location as before and work with contacts 
from the previous fieldwork conducted over a period of eight months in Dinajpur in 1996. 
How the partly change of field site came about and how it affected the work I will discuss 
shortly. For now, let me just say that this choice also impacted on my general approach ending 
up focusing more on state and bureaucracy than families and educational institutions.  
 
In the field, I decided not to present my study interest in terms of corruption because of its 
immediate negative connotations. The focus was rather presented as being on ways of 
accessing resources within the field of education, which was what it was really about anyway. 
Whether or not corruption would be a theme was a question of definition that I wanted to 
leave open. From earlier experiences, though, I knew corruption to be a popular 
A State of Corruption? 
 20 
conversational theme among friends, generally talking about bureaucrats and politicians as 
corrupt. Whenever bringing up the character of a particular bureaucrat or politician, reference 
to his or her financial situation is always made. A lavish lifestyle usually indicates dishonesty 
in office, which is – in conversations at least – condemned. At the same time, insisting too 
much on the differentiation of private social spaces from official ones does not necessarily go 
home well either. Corruption as a discourse about morality ultimately extends to many other 
concerns as well, which I find more interesting than merely considering the legal aspects of 
state processes.  
 
Thus, during the course of fieldwork, I found myself more interested in bureaucrats and 
bureaucratic processes in relation to the environment in which they have to function than 
merely the more technical question of access to resources. Admittedly, the question 
functioned as an entry point into the field: people’s concerns about children’s education 
makes them more than willing to talk about their experiences on the issue. It was also a way 
of remaining focused allowing me to follow up on a limited set of issues, but it was not 
enough to answer the much larger question of how the state works in Bangladesh. To 
approach this latter question I decided not to follow the flow of resources as such, but rather 
to focus on situations in which the state was emerging. Thus, this thesis is a result of wanting 
to understand the modern state and its powers and manifestations beyond the question of 
corruption as merely a legal matter.  
 
Method 
 
Fieldwork for this thesis was conducted over a period of about a year and mainly in two 
phases between 2001 and 2003. The plan was to leave for the field in August 2001, but being 
listed as a member of the Norwegian Resource Bank for Democracy and Human Rights 
(Nordem), I was asked to observe the parliamentary elections planned for early October 2001 
as a long-term observer (cf. Sissener 2001).  
 
Arriving in Dhaka in August 2001, the two Norwegian long-term observers (LTOs) expected 
to join the European Union Election Observation Mission (EU EOM), but in the absence of an 
agreement between Norway and EU regarding election observation at the time, the EU EOM 
to Bangladesh 2001 refused to include the two observers belonging to a non-EU member state 
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in the mission. Instead, the United Nations Electoral Assistance Secretariat (UNEAS), 
established to offer logistical and administrative services to the international electoral 
observers but without intentions of carrying out any observation activities of its own, assumed 
responsibility for the two Norwegian observers. In practice this meant that we were, together 
with the EU observers, briefed by the EU EOM, but not being included in the mission we 
were not assigned by them. UNEAS decided to deploy us separately (observers usually works 
in teams of two), and to give us the chance to choose area of responsibility. My choice fell on 
Chittagong, which I had never before visited, and after being assigned assistant and car with a 
driver this is where I was heading. Being the only LTOs coordinated by UNEAS, our tasks 
were only vaguely defined except for being as visible as possible, which meant to cover as 
much ground as possible. 
 
Over the next few weeks, I travelled all around Chittagong, including the three hill districts, 
meeting with election officers at every level. As is common for states arranging elections, 
organising the elections in the districts is the responsibility of civil servants. At the national 
level, the Election Commission (an independent constitutional body), assisted by a secretariat, 
is the controlling and coordinating body. At divisional level, divisional commissioner is 
responsible for the electoral process. At district level, deputy commissioner represents the 
election commission, and the upazila nirbahi officer at sub-district level.  
 
The government had ordered all electoral authorities, including those responsible for security 
(superintendent of police for the districts and police commissioner in the city), to cooperate 
with and assist the international observers in their work. As a certified election observer, I 
therefore had easy access to everyone from divisional commissioner to the last polling station 
officer. Knowing bureaucratic hierarchy as rather rigid in Bangladesh I started at the top 
meeting the divisional commissioner, police commissioner, superintendents of police, and 
deputy commissioners working my way down the hierarchy and getting acquainted with all 
levels of the system. It was due to this experience that I decided to return to Chittagong also 
for thesis work.  
 
The decision certainly had its pros and cons. On the positive side, I had already established a 
large network of important contacts, including deputy commissioners, superintendents of 
police, a police commissioner, district officers, and so on, who welcomed me back more or 
less like a friend. I could visit them in their offices any time and was invited to their homes for 
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dinner. Being senior officers, meetings and appointments with officials anywhere in the 
hierarchy was usually only a phone call away and all I had to do was to list the people I 
wanted to meet. Seen as a friend of this or that higher official I was never asked to explain 
anything either. People were curious to know about me, but they never really questioned my 
presence, which allowed me to ask for invitations and freely participate in meetings and 
events. As time passed, and I came to be known also as “the foreign researcher interested in 
Bangladeshi culture”, I was frequently requested to join in meetings and social gatherings. My 
language skills in Bangla, which I had acquired during my first fieldwork in Dinajpur, was an 
additional advantage in getting accepted, but in practical terms not as useful because people 
here spoke a locale dialect incomprehensible to outsiders (cf. above). Then again, English was 
in frequent use being the second largest city of Bangladesh. Besides, the government transfer 
system (see chapter 4) meant that most of my contacts were not themselves from Chittagong 
and did not speak the local dialect either.   
 
Chittagong being a city and the centre of divisional and district administration all at once, 
allowed me to simultaneously work with different levels of administration. The fact that it 
was a large city also had its advantages in terms of greater social space and the opportunity to 
move between different social groups and classes. During the first phase of fieldwork I stayed 
alone in an apartment in a middle class area spending the time outside bureaucracy mostly 
with middle class families. On my next visit, I stayed with a Norwegian couple in a large and 
luxurious apartment in the posh area of the city getting to know also upper-class and noble 
families.11  
 
Drawbacks of working in a large city were first of all distances in terms of availability – 
geographically, professionally, and socially. Little is within walking distance and meetings 
usually take place according to appointments. Even if South Asians are generally more 
relaxed in that regard, city people here as elsewhere maintain a much busier schedule and 
chances of finding them in showing up unannounced is less than in the districts. Besides, 
locating people who are out of office is of course more difficult in a large city. Conducting 
fieldwork in the city also means more ‘bits and pieces’ information instead of the more 
‘complete’ picture. The reason being that number of people, localities, and happenings are 
                                                
11 This second arrangement actually worked out better because I was then the niece of this couple instead of this 
strange foreign lady living on her own.   
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much higher than in smaller settings where the same people tend to be involved in the same 
events. 
 
To fill in the ‘blanks’, I made frequent visits to Dinajpur staying with the same family as 
before (during my first fieldwork in 1996), in the same village taking part in everyday village 
life. 
 
Key figures 
 
Following anthropological convention, names of persons and more specific places throughout 
the thesis are pseudonyms, but some background information of key figures is necessary.  
 
In Dinajpur, I stayed in an ethnically and religiously mixed village consisting of both tribals 
(mostly Santal and Oraon) and Bengalis; Muslims and Christians. Most families can be 
defined as lower to middle class engaged either in agricultural or social service work (mostly 
with the NGOs). The family I stayed with, and whose members (father or eldest son) used to 
accompany me to different events there, is a Christian tribal family. The father is a bachelor 
degree holder from a local university who all his professional life has worked with 
development within different NGOs. As both tribal and Christian, he holds twice a minority 
status, and as employed in the informal sector, he is regarded not particularly well off socially 
or economically. In this area where mainly politicians and civil servants enjoy high status in 
terms of occupation, differentiations appear primarily between office holders and non-office 
holders, as well as between higher and lower ranking officers, which is why both father and 
son whenever accompanying me to public ceremonies went for a place in the back and not up 
front among the more important guests (see chapter 3). 
 
In Chittagong, as in Dinajpur, I had no regular assistant, but was accompanied and assisted by 
friends whenever needed. For instance, travelling to the Chittagong Hill Tracts to visit a 
deputy commissioner (DC) to learn more about his work, a Chakma (largest tribal group of 
the Hill Tracts) friend of mine who is from the area offered to accompany me. As a close 
relation of the Chakma Chief, and employed in one of the largest international private textile 
companies of Chittagong, my friend was more than familiar enough with relating to powerful 
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people, but not so much with those of the state, which may explain his reactions vis-à-vis the 
DC (see chapter 4).  
 
Mr. GO, figuring mainly in chapter 3, is of a middle class religious family who was early told 
by his father to work hard and leave the rest with Allah. As his father, Mr. GO had joined a 
government job shortly after graduating from the university and as his father he too had 
believed in the integrity of the system. It was as a middle-level ranked civil servant I first met 
him. He was married with two children and lived in his father’s house. After several years in 
the civil service, Mr. GO continued to work hard, but experiencing disillusions about aim and 
purpose of the system talked about leaving the civil service for a job in the private sector. He 
kept staying on in the service though.  
 
I should also mention Alam, whom I interacted perhaps most regularly with in Chittagong. 
After completing a master’s degree in accounting, Alam worked for an international company 
for a few months, but resigned after a quarrel with his boss. According to himself, there were 
several other private companies interested in hiring him at the time, but coming from a middle 
class family and with a father who used to be a civil servant before retiring, the family urged 
him to join a government job. When there was an opening with the Ministry of Education he 
applied and more than ten years later he was still in the same position. He was married, the 
father of two boys and living with his family in his father’s house. On his government salary, 
Alam could barely support wife and children and depended on his father for economic 
support. Working for the government meant for him frequent travels, high work pressure and 
long working hours, meagre salaries and few perks (see chapter 4), which he often 
complained about. Alam too experienced disillusions regarding functioning of the services 
and on more than one occasion he talked about resigning, but instead of trying for something 
else he continued to work hard to maintain his government job properly (see chapter 4 and 5).   
 
Several other characters’ figuring in this thesis seemed to share a disillusion about the system 
(see Ahmed in chapter 4, the chairman and the professor in chapter 5), but some perhaps more 
than others. The reasons behind the disillusions will be discussed later, but that there are 
similarities between officials mentioned here and the way of experiencing the system seems 
clear from the different cases appearing in various chapters.   
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Methodology and structure of the thesis 
 
In the introduction to the anthropology of the state (2006), Sharma and Gupta argues that an 
anthropological perspective allows us to pay careful attention to the cultural constitution of 
the state: how people perceive the state, how their understandings are shaped by their 
particular locations and intimate and embodied encounters with state processes and officials, 
and how the state manifests itself in their lives. They say:  
 
Analyzing these cultural processes through which “the state” is instantiated and 
experienced also enables us to see that the illusion of cohesion and unitariness created 
by states is always contested and fragile, and is the result of hegemonic processes that 
should not be taken for granted” (Sharma and Gupta 2006:11).  
 
Instead of assuming the entity of the state or a certain state-society relationship, then, 
anthropological analyses of the state begin with the counter-intuitive notion that states that are 
structurally similar may nonetheless be profoundly different from each other in terms of the 
meanings they have for their populations. According to Sharma and Gupta, it is cultural 
struggles that determine what a state means to its people, how it is instantiated in their daily 
lives, and where its boundaries are drawn. By paying attention to these cultural struggles, 
waged in the sphere of representation and in the domain of the everyday practices of state 
agencies, the cultural constitution of the state will emerge. While Gupta in particular is well 
known for this everyday practices approach to the state (see earlier references), his concept of 
representation has been rather limiting focusing mainly on the mass media (Gupta 1995). In 
their introduction, though, Sharma and Gupta acknowledge the many ways of knowing the 
state: 
 
People learn about particular state agencies and officers at local and national levels 
through newspapers… they read government reports about topics such as population 
control… they discuss their experiences of particular bureaucracies and officials in 
different forums; they watch election-related propaganda on television or listen to 
speeches by elected officials at public rallies; they observe military parades, activities, 
and violence… and they participate in other ceremonial rituals staged by state officials 
(Sharma and Gupta 2006:18).  
 
Employees of various bureaucratic institutions also come to understand the entity they work 
for as well as their place in it through the representational sphere. To illustrate, Sharma and 
Gupta mentions what they call “banal techniques of representation” such as official 
letterheads, seals, memos, images of official buildings, special uniforms, spatial arrangements 
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of offices, monitoring and surveillance visits by senior officials, cars with government license 
plates and official motorcades, personnel files and procedures for promotion, and 
organisational charts, which they claim play a key role in presenting “the state” and its 
organisational hierarchy to its functionaries.  
 
The public circulation and dissemination of such images of “the state” and of state 
leaders and their actions enable people at different levels of the bureaucracy, as well as 
those outside these institutions, to imagine what the state is, what it is supposed to do, 
where its boundaries lie, and what their place is in relation to state institutions (ibid:18).  
 
The argument that Sharma and Gupta develops in relation to their approach is one that sees 
states as ‘cultural artefacts and effects’, which reflects a postmodern argument tending to 
overlook structures in the flow, processes, and indeterminism of the human action described 
(Kapferer 1995). To become employees of the state, for instance, officials are systematically 
tested and trained before even considered for service. Such preparations are important means 
for the state to disseminate certain attitudes among its candidates. The cultural struggle 
perspective of Gupta seems rather more useful for explaining change than for explaining 
reproduction, as it captures the state as contested (diversity of positions) but appears to have 
less to say about the consented state (collective practices).  
 
That the state is revealed and renders itself available to anthropological analysis through 
events of representation is a major point in Don Handelman’s work on public events (1998, 
2004), but from a different position. Rather than neglecting structures, Handelman seeks to 
approach structures through events. Although influenced by the Manchester School and 
situational analysis, his interest in the complexity and difficulty encountered by human beings 
in constructing, establishing, and securing their social realities prevents him from falling into 
the pitfall of the subjectivism associated with Victor Turner (Kapferer op. cit.). In Nationalism 
and the Israeli State (2004), Handelman approaches the question of nationalism by exploring 
state ceremonies arguing for a mirroring relationship between public events and social order. 
Both underlying logic and historical contingency play a role here and it is this underlying 
logic, which he calls ‘bureaucratic’, communicated in public events that forms and informs 
the modern state social order, as well as nationalist sentiments. Focusing on routine activities 
and events of practice, Handelman suggests states forming social order and not the other way 
around, i.e. culture forming states as argued by Gupta et al.  
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In this thesis, I draw on anthropological perspectives for the ethnographic exploration of the 
state and for an understanding of state power and its manifestations. As pointed out already, 
my own position is that the state must be approached as a variety of structures and practices 
manifested differently in different contexts. In chapter 2, the state is explored as a historical 
project stressing transitions that have taken place going from the establishment of a trading 
company to the emergence of a powerful system of control: the modern state. It is a long and 
detailed chapter, with importance for subsequent chapters laying in the analysis of 
circumstances for state formation and its achievements. With reference to Max Weber (1978), 
the state can be understood as the development of an organisation growing larger and stronger 
because of its rational character. Approaching the state as manifested in the organisation of its 
system of control, which for modern states means bureaucracy, power of the state is seen to 
depend on form of rationalisation. The more rationalised the society in terms of a “rational 
matter-of-factness”, he claims, the more dominating the state. In case of the East Indian 
Company discussed in chapter 2, the advance of a rational bureaucratic structure did indeed 
have far-reaching consequences. How dominant this machinery became and what role it could 
continue- and continues to play is explored in this theses.  
 
Focusing on public events in Victorian India, the approach of Bernard S. Cohn (1983) helps to 
understand the state as representation of power manifested in public ceremonies. Inspired by 
this approach (cf. chapter 2), which is similar to that of Handelman (see above), chapter 3 
examines the state as events of representational practices manifested in public ceremonies. 
While Cohn seems to concentrate on the ideological (ability to present itself), I will be 
concerned also with its material aspects (ability to reproduce itself).  
 
This representation of power perspective is also present in chapter 4 focusing on bureaucratic 
processes, but here the emphasis is more on the state as routine operations. Approaching the 
state as a system of power, the perspectives of Weber and Foucault are found useful for 
framing the discussion. While Weber argues for power as the institutionalised possibility of 
commanding others, Foucault is more concerned about power as embedded in persons and 
expressed in relations. To understand the meaning and dynamics of bureaucracy, bureaucratic 
processes as manifestations of power structures are explored.  
 
While the major part of this thesis is concerned with state power and its manifestations, 
chapter 5 is more about its challenges. Following the micro-level approach of Gupta and 
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others, the presence of state rationality in habitual practices of everyday life can be explored. 
Looking at both familial and official routine practices, such as raising children and arranging 
marriages in the first instance, and dealing with requests for public services in the second, 
enables me to say something about rationalities at work and their cultural constitution.  
 
Chapter 6 aims to draw it all together not in a conclusion, but in closing, as there are probably 
many questions left unexplored. What I hope to achieve, though, is to develop some 
perspectives that makes it possible to talk about dynamic social processes without having to 
choose between treating human beings as either free agents creating structures through 
interaction or automata merely enacting a program.  
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2 
Emergence of the modern state 
 
Modern societies are characterized by the emergence of exclusive legal domination, which is revealed 
chiefly though the formation and development of an institutionalized bureaucracy,  
literally the instrument of the contemporary state.  
(Badie 1983:20) 
 
According to Max Weber, the modern state is characterised by the way it is organised and its 
rational-legal bureaucracy representing the answer to efficient organisation. Sociologists still 
discuss (and disagree on) the role of bureaucracy and of its personnel in the development of 
the state. A common answer is that construction of the modern state, as an organisation of 
autonomous and adaptable political institutions, is greatly assisted by the development of a 
bureaucracy (Badie 1983). While I will argue that in the case of South Asia, state formation 
and development of bureaucracy have to be seen together, as two inseparable events. 
Establishing the order or impact of things at the outset thus seems less relevant. As events 
unfold, these processes appear to have reinforced each other to a point where it was no longer 
possible to do or think the one without the other, but exactly how remains to be seen.12 
Emergence of the South Asian state is the focus of this chapter. Since so much of academic 
thinking about the state has been, and continues to be, heavily influenced by Max Weber’s 
rationality thesis, the chapter will start with some of his more general observations on form 
and function of modern bureaucracies before moving on to events of South Asian state 
formation.  
 
Following Weber, modern bureaucracies are goal-oriented organisations designed according 
to rational (calculable and passionless) principles in order to attain their goals efficiently. 
Offices are ranked in a hierarchical order, with information flowing up the chain of command, 
directives flowing down. Operations of the organisations are characterised by impersonal 
rules explicitly stating duties, responsibilities, standardised procedures and conduct of full-
                                                
12 As noted by Badie in the case of China: “the Chinese empire, despite the existence of a unified and coherent 
bureaucracy, exhibited little differentiation in its political and cultural systems. Among other things, this meant 
that there was only limited autonomy in the recruitment of officials and that a classical education counted for 
more than professional competence” (1983:46).  
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time working office holders. Offices are highly specialised and appointments to these offices 
are made according to specialised qualifications rather than ascribed criteria (Weber 1978).  
 
This particular form of officialdom affects the position of the official in a number of ways. 
His job appears to him as the exercise of a profession linked to a specific body of knowledge 
achieved through specialised training. Office holding is neither in fact or in principle the 
source of fees or dividends, nor is it the object of a contract whereby the employee hires out 
his manpower. The particular character of the job implies that, in return for a secure existence, 
the functionary accepts the specific duty of loyalty to the job; he is at the service, not of a 
person, but of an objective and impersonal goal. This goal is built into the organisation to 
which he is linked; the state, church, community, party or enterprise and realises certain 
cultural values. Thus, an official in the service of a functional purpose appears at once 
impersonalised and ideologically sanctified. Stability of employment is normally assured, but 
a legal or actual life-tenure is not recognised as a proprietary right of the official as a 
possession. Protecting the official against discretionary dismissal or transfer is to serve the 
purpose of guaranteeing a strictly impersonal discharge of specific office duties. The official 
normally receives remuneration in the form of a salary determined by the nature of the job 
and, eventually, by the years of his service in the organisation. Within the hierarchy, officers 
move from lower ranking, less important paid positions to higher ones and the aim is for 
promotions to take place as mechanically as possible (ibid, Lefort 1986).  
 
Subsequently, hierarchy and rank is instrumental for the effective working of the organisation 
and its rationality is limited to organisational operations. Officers are linked in a chain of 
instrumental commands with no bearings other than contributing to the realisation of the 
overall objectives of the organisation and with relationships of superior-inferior existing only 
in terms of official duties. Whether the work of managers, or the work of those who carry out 
orders, hierarchy and officers’ place within it is relevant only in relation to the 
implementation of tasks of universal significance performed in a system indifferent to every 
other aspect of social reality.  
 
Weber’s interest in bureaucracy and bureaucratic behaviour was part of a larger project 
searching for the connection between modernity and rationalisation of social and political 
interaction. The image of the ‘iron cage’ is an expression of a particular development where 
zweckrationalität or formal rationality (calculability of means and procedures) as a value in 
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itself comes to dominate every aspect of social life. Just as capitalism can be seen as the 
rational form of economic activity; the passionless calculation of inputs and profits, the use of 
predictable procedures and accounting systems, the adoption of standard prices, the 
systematic ploughing back of profits for increased future production and so on, modern 
bureaucracy, founded on similar principles, is considered the rational form of administration. 
As Brubaker has pointed out, Weber is not justifying or defending a social order from a 
particular value standpoint, but is simply calling attention to social, structural and 
psychological ‘mechanisms’ enhancing the calculability of action. “Such purely formal 
rationality”, Brubaker says, “is an objective property of the social structure of modern 
society” (Brubaker 1984:37). Neither is Weber trying to make predictions:  
 
One must in every individual historical case analyze in which of the special directions 
bureaucratization has there developed … it must also remain an open question whether 
the power of bureaucracy is increasing in the modern states in which it is spreading. 
The fact that bureaucratic organization is technically the most highly developed power 
instrument in the hands of its controller does not determine the weight that bureaucracy 
as such is capable of procuring for its own opinions in a particular social structure 
(Weber 1978:991).  
 
To Weber, bureaucracy works as “a concomitant of the rationalisation of society in the shift 
away from a gemeinschaft type of society, where social administration is informed by 
considerations of status, local custom, and patronage” (Stewart 1996:677).13  
 
Modern South Asian bureaucracy was foreshadowed in the trading company of British 
colonial and imperial expansion in India from the seventeenth century onward. Starting as a 
monopolistic trading body chartered by the British Crown, and after securing lucrative trade 
and commerce rights from local rulers, the East Indian Company (henceforth the Company) 
pursued as a reckless plunderer of the country’s resources. In this plundering mood, company 
servants became busier enriching themselves than taking any organisational responsibility for 
the future of the Company, whose governance remained unattended by parliament until the 
enactment of the Regulating Act of 1773. Circumstances like the holocaust caused by the 
Great Famine (1769-70), rampant corruption among company officials, breakdown of civil 
authorities, collapse of the Bengal economy, and most importantly, near bankruptcy of the 
Company after territorial acquisitions forced parliament to intervene. Brought first within the 
                                                
13 See also chapter 5. 
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regulative control of the Board of Control, and later the Crown, the organisation was changing 
in form, structure and aim. How this happened and with what consequences is the focus of 
this chapter.  
 
For this purpose, events commencing with a trading company that became involved in politics 
and acted as an agent of British imperialism in India from the early eighteenth century to the 
mid-nineteenth century and ending in state formations in the twentieth century will be 
explored. For the early period, that is, before independence and separation of India and 
Pakistan, the focus will be on Bengal and Calcutta in particular because of its historical 
importance as administrative centre. After separation, first of India and Pakistan, and later of 
West and East Pakistan, focus will shift to the two wings of Pakistan and conclude with the 
independent state of Bangladesh.   
 
Trade and politics 
 
The first British contacts with India were in the final decades of the sixteenth century when a 
few merchant adventurers, interested in establishing trade connections, were successful in 
reaching India and returning home. On 31 December 1600, the British Crown granted a group 
of merchants a monopoly over the trade in Eastern Waters. Forming the East India Company, 
the merchants’ first two expeditions took them to Sumatra, Java, and the Moluccas. A ship of 
the third expedition, between 1607 and 1608, under William Hawkins, went to Surat, the most 
important Mughal port on the West Coasts of India. Having arrived in Surat, Hawkins decided 
to go overland to Agra and to the Court of Jahangir and ask his permission for the company to 
trade in his domain, which he was granted. Thus, for the first one hundred and fifty years 
thereafter the British took little direct interest in India’s political affairs. Company owners 
were for the most part merchants and traders interested only in securing the trade and their 
servants were commercial agents (Cohn 1966:87).14  
 
                                                
14 According to Cohn (1966:88), “When in 1617 the East India Company raised £1,600,000 from 954 
individuals, the owners of the stock included 313 merchants, 214 tradesmen, twenty-five foreign merchants, 
fifteen dukes and earls, eighty-two knights, twenty-six doctors of divinity and medicine, thirteen “ladies of title”, 
eighty “widows and virgins”, and 248 others”.  
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The Court of Directors in London, the governing body of the East India Company, appointed 
company servants and applicants were either accepted or rejected depending on proven 
accounting skills. Company business was conducted through Indian intermediaries or brokers 
(banyan), who collected from Indian cultivators or farmers the goods and raw materials that 
were shipped to England. Banyans also disposed of the English trade goods in the Indian 
markets. “Not only was the trade of the company carried on through banyans,” Bernard S. 
Cohn reports, “but each civil servant had his Indian broker to conduct his own private trading 
operation” (ibid:91). Salaries of company servants were modest and the company allowed 
them to engage in private trade to earn a better living.  
 
Until the 1740s, territorial rights were acquired as part of the company’s commercial activities 
and engagements in military and political activities were part of safeguarding business. 
Company servants’ diplomatic and military roles were secondary to their other roles. Within 
their limited territories, the Company servants acted as municipal judges and local 
administrators. Interactions with Indians were restricted to trading partners, with whom they 
maintained a purely contractual relationship.  
 
The Europeans discovered their commercial activities could be furthered through trade 
monopolies by intervening in Indian politics and military affairs. In the early eighteenth 
century, Nawab15 Alivardi Khan established Bengal as an independent state with Calcutta as 
its centre. Alivardi granted the English East India Company, henceforth the Company, 
favourable commercial access through tax exemptions. Alivardi’s grandson and successor, 
Siraj-ud-daula, resented the growing influence of the British presence and decided in 1756 to 
have them removed by conquering Calcutta and imprisoning the representatives of the 
Company, which forced the British to flee Calcutta. For the Indian merchants and 
zamindars,16 this expulsion could not be borne long; their own interests had become far too 
closely intertwined with the fate of the Europeans who imported silver and bought their 
products and trade goods. The British and the alienated Bengali factions therefore plotted the 
nawab’s overthrow. From Madras, the British sent a relatively small company army led by 
Captain Robert Clive and with the help of the ruler’s uncle and commander of his forces Mir 
Jafar, were able to resume their position. After the battle at Plassey in 1757, Mir Jafar was 
                                                
15 Nawab is a Mughal title that translates as ruler or governor.  
16 Zamindar is the Persian word for “landholder” (Stein 2002).  
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installed as ruler as a reward for his support to the British. “This battle”, Burton Stein writes, 
“is often considered the true beginning of the British Empire in India, since it resulted in 
enormous properties falling into Company ownership” (2002:207). “Plassey indeed”, 
comments B. B. Misra, “put the Company’s trade on the road to politics without political 
awareness. The Company had not yet become a territorial power, although it had, even as a 
pure commercial body, set up an organizational framework which was capable of being 
transformed into an administrative instrument” (1977:41).  
 
In the following years, the British gradually strengthened their position in the province by 
playing the game of several actors competing for influence with rulers constantly overthrown. 
By 1760, Clive had personally secured the position as diwan or tax collector placing him in a 
powerful position in relation to zamindars or landholders and earning him vast fortunes. In 
describing the personal payments he received, Clive made the following defence of his 
actions before Parliament.  
 
Am I not rather deserving of praise for the moderation which marked my proceedings? 
Consider the situation in which I found myself after the victory of Plassey. A great 
Prince was dependent upon my pleasure; an oppulant city lay at my mercy; its richest 
bankers bid against each other for my smiles; I walked through vaults which were 
thrown open to me alone, piled on each hand with gold and jewels! Mr. Chairman, at 
this moment I stand astonished at my own moderation (quoted in Cohn 1966:94).  
 
Five years later, Clive returned to England. The consequence of frequent encounters was the 
establishment of the British colonial state of Fort William in Bengal in 1765 under the 
camouflage of the acquisition of the Diwani of Bengal by the Company.  
 
Bengal, which had probably been the wealthiest province of Mughal India17, proved an 
extraordinary prize for the British. The massive land revenues secured by good natural 
irrigation could be used to pay for the Company’s fast expanding army, in addition to putting 
the Company and its servants at an enormous advantage in dealings with all other states and 
economies in India. From 1772, the Company also assumed governorship of Bengal.  
 
                                                
17 Mughals refers to an empire that ruled greater parts of India between sixteenth and eighteenth century and is 
by many considered to be the precursor for, and in a sense the cause of, the rise of the successor empire of the 
British colonialist (Stein 2002).  
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The first British administrators were drawn from merchants and factors (mercantile agents) of 
the Company, applying the technique of the ledger, of profit over loss, to the management of 
cities and provinces. As a result of the company’s affairs in India gaining in scope and 
complexity by mid-seventeenth century, recognition of varying levels of responsibility and 
seniority among company servants in India emerged. Assistants or writers were responsible 
for routine work, while factors were of a more senior rank and responsibility. At first, writers 
and factors sent out from Leadenhall Street in the City of London were reluctant to take on the 
actual task of administration. Ten years after Plassey, Clive wrote to the directors of the 
Company, urging a policy of non-intervention: “To do any act by an exertion of the English 
power which can be equally done by the nabob, would be throwing off the mask and declaring 
the Company soubah [governor] of the province” (Tinker 1966:23). According to Hugh 
Tinker, the servants of the Company were sent out into the districts as collectors of the 
revenue and, incidentally, as the “guardians of the public good” because of the failure of all 
attempts to rule Bengal by indirect means more than from any positive impulse. Still, for 
some decades, the outlook of the Company and its servants was determined by the ethos of 
trade.  
 
Government in the making 
 
From 1714, applications for company appointments had to be accompanied by endorsement 
of a member of the Court of Directors. It was then laid down in a Court of Directors minute 
“that in future all petitions for employments in the Company service, either at home or 
abroad, be presented by some gentleman in the Direction, and that they speak to the same” 
(Sir William Foster 1926, quoted in Cohn 1966:92). However, it was not until after 1750 that 
positions in India became highly sought after: “The East Indies were not ’til of late years, 
considered a quick road to wealth; formerly, appointments in the Company’s service were not 
objects of general solicitation” (ibid:94). Outright purchase, although a spectacular indication 
of the demand, appears to have been comparatively rare, but all manner of personal influence 
and connections were used to try to secure appointments in the East. The Court of Directors 
developed a system for dividing the patronage among themselves (Cohn 1966). According to 
Tinker, concerns about the power generated by the cornucopia of Indian patronage becoming 
the means of dominating the political life of England, motivated reforms (Tinker 1966).  
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Company servants of the early eighteenth century were traders and businessmen dealing both 
for the Company and privately, but such private engagements were soon to be regarded as 
opposed to the political responsibilities acquired by the Company. Besides, as individuals 
were making fortunes for themselves, the Company itself was in dire financial straits. The 
financial problems of the Company came to public prominence in Britain in the 1770s when 
the Company first, defaulted on payments for use of British armed services, and then had to 
ask the British government for a one million pound loan to keep the Company going. Many in 
Britain were incensed that so many company servants were coming back incredibly wealthy 
while the Company needed bailing out by the British government.18 The Company was 
important to Britain because of its trading monopoly in India and many influential people 
were shareholders. The loan was granted to the Company in 1773, but it had strict provisions 
that directly involved the British government in company affairs. A Supreme Court was 
established in Calcutta and the Crown appointed four members to Supreme Council to advise 
the newly created post of Governor General of Bengal. Warren Hastings was the first 
incumbent (1773-1785). The Governor General, Councillors and Judges were to receive fixed 
salaries and were prohibited from receiving gifts, presents, or any other pecuniary advantages. 
 
As a consequence of the Regulating Act of 1773, Governor General Warren Hastings 
established ‘the Covenanted Service’ forbidding company servants appointed for justice and 
revenue administration to engage in private trade and to accept gifts or presents. Trade was 
thus separated from the function of governance and the old practice of private trade was 
restricted to those who carried out the Company’s commercial business. However, the 
measures did not immediately stop company servants from engaging in both private trade and 
gift taking. Three years after his retirement, Hastings was himself impeached for corruption 
and violation of rights of prominent Indians. 
 
A second important step to regulate the affairs of the Company in India was taken by the 
British Parliament by appointing members, selected from the cabinet, to a Board of Control 
under Pitt’s India Bill of 1784. Until then, the Court of Proprietors (shareholders of the 
company) had exercised considerable powers over the Court of Directors, whose members 
were elected annually by the Court of Proprietors. Such control by profit-seeking shareholders 
                                                
18 The Bengal famine of 1769-70, in which up to a quarter of the population perished and many of the survivors 
were made vagrant, severely diminished production and therefore also abridged revenues.   
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became politically unacceptable under the company’s increasing administrative 
responsibilities. Under the Regulating Act and Pitt’s India Act, parliament curtailed the 
powers of shareholders over the Court of Directors by shifting their controlling authorities to 
the Board of Control. The proprietors could now only discuss the policies of the directors, but 
could in no way annul or amend them. Under Pitt’s India Act, the Court of Directors became 
the representative agency via the Board of Control. No revenue or political resolutions were to 
be taken without the express consent of the Board of Control. The Court could however, 
retain the privileges of patronage in spite of the recent changes. Recruitment of members to 
the covenanted service remained the absolute privilege of the Court of Directors until the 
Charter Act of 1853 when the privilege was abolished and a new system of recruiting civilians 
by competitive examinations introduced (Islam 2006).  
 
More specifically, Pitt’s India Act extended the authority of the governor general of Bengal 
over the other two presidencies, Bombay and Madras, provided for definite scales of pay and 
emoluments, laid down the principle of promotion by seniority, and fixed the age of 
admission to the service of writers or military cadets at fifteen to eighteen years. The renewal 
of the company’s charter in 1793 further defined the position: to members of the covenanted 
service were reserved the principal civil offices of India below the rank of member of council. 
Appointments made by the Court of Directors in London went frequently to “the sons of 
deserving servants of the company” (Tinker 1966:26). The 1784 Act vested in the court the 
nomination to the offices of governor general, governor, and high military command; but in 
practice, these nominations were usually made by the British government of the day (Tinker 
1966).  
 
As governor general from 1786 to 1793, Charles Cornwallis, further professionalized, 
bureaucratised, and Europeanised (Europeans in all responsible positions) the Company. Lord 
Cornwallis arrived in India with strong backing from the Court of Directors and Parliament to 
establish “an efficient and honest administration for the company’s territories” (Cohn 
1966:96). He outlawed private trade by all company employees, separated commercial and 
administrative functions, and remunerated company servants with generous graduated 
salaries. All levels of administration were reorganised. A Board of Revenue endowed with   
wide ranging powers and with one of the members of the Council as its president, was set up 
to lead his reform programme. District officials were placed under direct supervision and 
control of the Board of Revenue. A new authority, called the Board of Trade, was established 
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to look after trading activities of the Company independent of civil administration. 
Implementation of reforms was the result of an administration attempting to discipline itself 
and in the process British authority was extended to include areas that had formerly enjoyed 
some autonomy, such as management of law and order.  
 
Lord Cornwallis attached highest priority to the administration of justice and police. A four-
tiered judiciary was established beginning with the Munsef Adalat at the lowest level and the 
Sadar Adalat at the top. The two intermediate tiers were zila adalat and the court of circuit. 
Every court had two wings: diwani adalat (civil court) and nizamat adalat (criminal court). 
The highest court was the Sadar Adalat with its two divisions, Sadar Diwani Adalat and 
Sadar Nizamat Adalat. A regular police system was developed to help the judiciary in 
administering justice and to maintain law and order in the country.  
 
The High Court originated historically from the High Courts Act of 1861. During Company 
rule, the Supreme Court in Calcutta represented the British Crown with jurisdiction over 
Europeans living in Bengal, in addition to native citizens of Calcutta. The Sadar Adalat 
represented the Company and judges were the members of the Covenanted Civil Service. 
Though judges of the Adalat consisted of Europeans, laws they administered were essentially 
Indian. The Sadar Adalat had no jurisdiction over the Europeans, nor did the Supreme Court 
over natives outside of Calcutta. Such a duality of jurisdiction was abolished, together with 
the Company, in 1858 when the Crown assumed responsibility for governing British India.  
 
Cornwallis’ efforts to reform and restructure various branches of the administration were 
influenced by one abiding consideration: making administration efficient and corruption free. 
Believing both Anglo-Indians and natives to be corrupt; the latter group incorrigibly so, 
Cornwallis found it prudent to exclude natives from all responsible positions in the interest of 
establishing honesty and efficiency in the administration. The fact that hitherto, all rulers had 
shared powers and privileges with the local elite was ignored. Even during early British rule, 
native participation in administration was quite extensive. Cornwallis resolved to keep 
administration an all-white affair making civil service the exclusive preserve of Europeans. 
Local people were left with only ministerial and semi-ministerial jobs.19  
 
                                                
19 Sources: Stein (2002), Zaman (1980), Misra (1977), Sirajul Islam (2006).  
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Cornwallis’ underlying assumption that Indians were dishonest and hence incapable of ruling 
in their own best interests, “combined with the orientation of an English Whig, led him to try 
to build a government ‘reduced to the minimal functions of justice and protection from 
violence’” (Cohn 1966:96). Through his land policies in Bengal, he hoped to develop an 
Indian landed aristocracy to stabilise the country. The system in vogue when the British were 
granted the diwani of Bengal was that of zamindari or tax farming. The peasant paid a share 
of his produce, in cash or kind, to the zamindar and the zamindar paid the ruling power. The 
general rule was for the peasant to pay one-third of his gross produce and for the zamindar to 
pay nine-tenths of what he received, but it could be more or less. This right to collect taxes 
was a hereditary right and on succession, a fine or fee was paid to the ruler. Failure to pay the 
full assessment could be met by fines, imprisonments, or floggings, but never by confiscation. 
The zamindars of Bengal formed a provincial aristocracy as revenue collectors, magistrates, 
local magnates, and men of substance, but they were not landowners or a landed aristocracy in 
the British sense. The zamindari system had its own checks and balances. The zamindar was 
too close to the peasant to be deceived about his capacity to pay, but if a zamindar was too 
rapacious, the peasant could leave the estate for another, or band together against extortion. 
Severe repression would ruin the zamindar as he had only his own levies to rely upon (Stein 
2002).  
 
The uncertainty with regard to land tenures prevailing in Bengal was unbearable for British 
administrators desiring predictability. Hastings’ report to the Court of Directors on the affairs 
of the Company as early as 1772 provides testimony to the felt urgency for reforms towards a 
more “uniform and regular Establishment”:   
 
Though 7 Years had elapsed since the company became possessed of the Dewanny, yet 
no regular Process had ever been formed for conducting the Business of the Revenue. 
Every Zemindaree and every Taluk was left to its own peculiar Customs. These indeed 
were not inviolably adhered to. The Novelty of the Business to those who were 
appointed to superintend it, the chicanery of the people whom they were obliged to 
employ as their agents, the accidental Exigencies of each District, and not unfrequently, 
the just Discernment of the Collector, occasioned many changes. Every change added 
to the confusion which involved the whole, and few were either authorised or known by 
the presiding Members of the Government. The Articles which composed the Revenue 
– the Form of keeping Accounts, the Computation of time, even the Technical Terms, 
which ever form the greatest part of the obscurity of every science – differed as much 
as the soil and productions of the Province. This confusion had its origin in the Nature 
of the Former Government (Hunter 1897:382).  
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Under the Permanent Settlement of 1793, landlords were awarded permanent ownership 
rights on the condition that they punctiliously paid a fixed revenue demand. In a single 
enactment, a small group of landowners, still called ‘zamindars’, was created and the rights of 
other cultivators on the land that they tilled were abrogated. The zamindars were expected to 
see that the agrarian resources they owned were maintained and improved and were liable to 
dispossession if revenue obligations were not fulfilled. The role of the district collector was 
stabilised into an office whose responsibility was overseeing the collection of revenue due 
from the landholders. As the revenue obligation of the landowner was permanently fixed, the 
job of collector was assumed a supervisory one. 
 
Lord Cornwallis introduced the Permanent Settlement in the hope that the new system would 
impel zamindars to become improving landlords like their counterparts in England. It was 
expected that in their own interest the zamindars would encourage agriculture and uphold the 
interests of raiyats (agriculturalists). Cornwallis hoped that the operation of Permanent 
Settlement would finally lead to industrial revolution via an inevitable agricultural 
transformation in the country. Such a transformation never occurred and the countryside 
remained as neglected and poor as ever before (Sirajul Islam 2006).  
 
Reforms initiated by Cornwallis set the development of the colonial state in British India for 
the next generation. Almost everywhere, a rural elite was consolidated or attempts were made 
to create one. Company policy was stability and the Permanent Settlement was primarily a 
device for guaranteeing revenue and military stability in times of war. From 1793 and until 
annexation of Oudh in 1856, company territory grew extensively until covering three-fifths of 
pre-partition India. According to Cohn, Cornwallis’ hope of a minimal government proved 
illusory: “The assessment and collection of taxes alone led to the development of an extensive 
bureaucracy, and these tax duties, combined with the administration of justice, accounted for 
much of the work of civil servants” (Cohn 1966:98).  
 
As indicated above, ultimate supervision, control, and what was in effect the legislative 
function of the governing system were all centred in London, where there was dual control 
exercised by the Company and by the Board of Control. Company shareholders could attend 
meetings of the General Court of Proprietors and, depending on shares in the capital stock, 
were entitled to votes. At the beginning of the nineteenth century, there were more than two 
thousand proprietors (ibid.). The major function of the proprietors was the election of the 
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twenty-four directors; collectively known as the Court of Directors (the executive and 
decision-making body of the company). According to Cohn: “The direction of the company 
was essentially a self-perpetuating oligarchy. To be elected the first time was an expensive 
and arduous task, but once elected a man served for life” (ibid:99). Cohn argues for a strong 
connectedness between directors, who he says “formed a tight society, bound by culture, 
economic interests, and social relations” (ibid:109).  
 
Committees did the work of the Company after Court of Directors had made their decisions. 
Chairman and deputy chairman, serving one-year terms, were the court’s most important 
positions. The court and company was further served by a secretariat in which the higher 
posts were significant for making policy on administration in India. As government of India 
was carried out by correspondence, the crucial office was that of the Examiner of Indian 
Correspondence where “all non-secret reports, minutes, and letters from India were read and 
digested for the members of the Court of Directors. In this office, dispatches which approved, 
disapproved, commented on, or innovated new policies were drawn up to be sent to India in 
the name of the Court of Directors” (ibid.).  
 
Cohn says that there was a theoretical possibility of adversarial relations between the Board of 
Control and the Court of Directors due to the formers superior position, but that in practice 
this was not a problem.  
 
When disputes arose between the two bodies, policy appears to have been determined 
by compromise, “just as in the matter of appointments [governor generals, governors of 
Presidencies, chiefs of army commands] both sides had in effect a power of veto. So 
also, in discussion about policy, neither body cared to provoke the other over much 
save in exceptional circumstances” (quote from H. H. Dodwell 1929, in Cohn 
1966:100).  
 
The reason, he suggests, was that many of the influential shareholders and directors of the 
company were also important in politics. In parliament, a number of members had served as 
king’s officer or in company service in India, and there were those in parliament who had 
financial interests in the company. “Given the kind of political interconnections existing 
between Parliament and the company, it is not difficult to see that compromises could usually 
be worked out if there were any conflicts between the two. Commissioners on the Board of 
Control frequently had extensive Indian experience” (ibid:101).  
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A civil servant at the district level in the first half of the nineteenth century had a large but 
somewhat attenuated formal superstructure over him. His actions were subjected to questions 
and revisions at any of the following levels: regional, provincial, at the presidency, and in 
London at the Court of Directors and the Board of Control and ultimately in parliament. 
Policy affecting a civil servant’s actions could be set at any one of these levels, but in reality 
servants in the field enjoyed considerable autonomy due to distance and difficulties of 
communication: “it often took two or three years for matters originating in a district to be 
commented on in London” (ibid.).  
 
Thus, British establishment in India commenced with a few merchant adventurers succeeding 
in establishing trade connections in India, and the Company was formed as a result of being 
granted monopoly over trade in the Eastern Waters. For the first one hundred and fifty years, 
the Company’s major concern was to secure trading rights and run a profitable business. Until 
the mid-eighteenth century, engagements in military and political activities were limited to 
safeguarding merchant interests of the Company rather than any positive impulse to direct 
political developments in India. As pointed out by Bruce Kapferer: “They acted like predatory 
states with virtually no moral obligations except to make money. In this they were much like 
modern corporations” (2005:290). As a result of company affairs in India gaining in scope 
and complexity, the organisation was changing into a rational bureaucracy in the Weberian 
sense; ever more differentiated and accountable to a public body (parliament in London).   
 
The first initiative to rationalise came under Hastings when the function of trade was 
separated from the function of governance by forbidding company servants appointed for 
justice and revenue administration to engage in trade. Under Lord Cornwallis, administration 
both at the centre as well as at district level was reorganised. For the rational administration of 
justice and police, a four-tiered judicial body was established. District officials dealing with 
revenue and trade were placed under the direct supervision and control of respective boards. 
Although set on keeping government to the minimum, administration of taxes and justice 
alone required extensive resources. Rationalisation of company functions was costly requiring 
a regular flow of capital to be secured through systematic taxation facilitated by permanent 
settlements. To keep company servants employed to perform administrative functions from 
engaging in private trade or gift taking, they were remunerated with generous salaries thus 
divorcing public money and equipment from the private property of the official, which is an 
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important point in Weber for the rational functioning of a modern administration (see Weber 
1978).  
 
At the central level in London changes also occurred through the shifting of powers over the 
Court of Directors from shareholders to the newly established Board of Control, whose 
members were appointed by the cabinet. The governor general position of Bengal was 
strengthened, while made accountable to a supreme council established in Calcutta by the 
Crown. The governor general, councillors and judges were also to receive fixed salaries and 
prohibited from engaging in private dealings.  
 
Appointments were still by patronage and controlled by the Court of Directors, but those 
selected for service had every possibility of pursuing a line of career, which was mainly 
determined in India. According to Cohn, no adequate work has been done on the career lines 
of civil servants, but the impression that “connections did help, especially in relation to first 
and second postings, does not seem unwarranted” (1966:102). Cohn finds a close connection 
between Company postings and relations with India. By 1854, “the Court of Directors became 
entirely Anglo-Indian” (H. Morse Stephens, 1900, quoted in Cohn p. 106) and the number of 
civil servants appointed from families with Indian experience was high.20 In addition to 
providing posts for relatives, political considerations were important in the allocation of 
patronage, both in maintaining friendly relations with government and in getting members of 
the Court of Directors elected to the House of Commons (ibid.). Thus, once appointed, 
aspiring company servants in India could look forward to directorship in the Court of 
Directors, or even a career in politics as Member of Parliament. “From 1784 to 1834,” Cohn 
observes, “forty-five of the 110 directors served in the House of Commons” (ibid.).  
 
Although extracting resources by ensuring exclusive rights to trade and territories was still the 
main objective of the Company, governing came to play an increasing role. As the British 
government became more involved and politics came to play an increasing role in company 
affairs, it could no longer operate as the independent freebooting trading company of the past. 
The main aim was still to make money but, brought within regulative control of the Board of 
                                                
20 “Anglo-Indian” was used in the nineteenth-century sense as a Britisher who had lived and worked in India 
rather than in the twentieth-century sense as the offspring of a European and Indian marriage (Cohn 1966).  
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Control, the Company assumed a clearer bureaucratic form (cf. Kapferer 2005). With such a 
powerful instrument at hand, political ambitions increased.  
 
Imagining sovereign power 
 
In a famous dispatch to the Court of Directors in 1800, Cornwallis’ successor, Lord Wellesley 
(1798-1805), expressed the changed reality of the functions of company servants in India, 
who were no longer commercial agents, but governors expected:  
 
To dispense justice to millions of people of various languages, manners, usages, and 
religions; to administer a vast and complicated system of revenue throughout districts 
equal in extent to some of the most considerable Kingdoms in Europe; to maintain civil 
order in one of the most populous and litigious regions of the world (Cohn 1966:111).  
 
Sir John Shore, immediate successor to Cornwallis, followed a policy of non-intervention in 
the affairs of native states, which resulted in the Nizam (ruler of Hyderabad) employing 
French officers to train his army. The Marathas and Tipu Sultan also sought the help of the 
French, thus decreasing English influence. Shore looked after company affairs until 1798 
when he was recalled due to failure in tackling army trouble after the mutiny of Bengal army 
officers in 1785.  
 
Lord Wellesley was educated at Harrow, Eton and Christchurch, Oxford and well versed in 
classical languages. A Member of Parliament for several years and of the Board of Control 
from 1795, he was appointed Governor General of Bengal on 18 May 1798. His seven-year 
tenure is an important period in the development of British power in India. His policy was to 
remove all kinds of French influence from India and to make the British the paramount power 
of the subcontinent, which he implemented through wars as well as by more peaceful 
annexations. Wellesley reversed his predecessors’ policy of non-intervention and adopted a 
policy of Subsidiary Alliance, forcing Indian powers under British protection by suspending 
non-British European officers, maintaining a contingent of British troops within their states, 
and surrendering foreign affairs to the British. In return, the Company guaranteed internal 
freedom of the states and promised to protect them against foreign attacks (Mohsin 2006).  
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In theory, the governor general of Bengal was by this time under supervision and control of 
the Supreme Council in Calcutta and Board of Control in London, but with Wellesley in 
office, the governor general was the Indian government, effectively taking policy decisions 
and managing administration. Lord Wellesley never received backing from home authorities 
for his aggressive policy in India, or for his thorough reorganisation of government, but he 
achieved much through patronage and reorganisations in Calcutta. Through his brother 
Arthur, Commander of the British Indian Army, and a loyal Commander-in-Chief, Gerard 
Lake, he laid a firm hand on the army. He kept control of the administrative services through 
his private secretary, who happened to be his other brother Henry, and circumvented the 
Court of Directors in London by appointing his own men creating his own private governor 
general office. To direct training and appointments for the whole of the British Indian civil 
service, he founded Fort William College in Calcutta.  
 
Wellesley reasoned that to carry on their work in the judicial, revenue, political, and financial 
departments, company servants needed a new range of skills in languages and law in addition 
to a broad education to help them develop standards of judgement. Under the system in use at 
Wellesley’s time, young civilians, who were mostly between fifteen and seventeen years of 
age, were posted to districts without receiving any institutional training in local history, 
languages, or the art of administration. Wellesley held these civilians to be incompetent for 
the tasks required and set about a remedy by establishing a college of Fort William in 
Calcutta, arguing that the necessary education for service in the East did not exist anywhere in 
England. The idea of making a permanent institutional arrangement for the regular training 
and higher education of civil servants was expressed in his Minute of 10 June 1800: “Duty, 
policy and honour require that [the Indian empire] should not be administered as a temporary 
adventure and extended by fortunate accident … it must be considered as a sacred trust and a 
permanent possession”. The answer as to how this should be accomplished was not in “the 
instruments by which kingdoms are overthrown, revolutions are accomplished, or, wars 
conducted”, but in a civil service capable of “an inexhaustible supply of useful knowledge, 
cultivated talents and disciplined morals” (quoted in Misra 1977:66). In his notes to the Court 
of Directors in July 1800, Wellesley explained the need for a college as follows:  
 
Their education should be founded in a general knowledge of those branches of 
literature and science, which form the basis of the education of persons destined to 
similar occupations in Europe; to this foundation should be added an intimate 
acquaintance with the history, languages, customs and manners of the people of India; 
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with the Mohammedan and Hindoo codes of law and religion… their early habits 
should be so formed, as to establish in their minds such solid foundations of industry, 
prudence, integrity and religion, as should effectually guard them against those 
temptations, with which the nature of this climate, and peculiar depravity of the people 
of India, will surround and assail them in every station, especially upon their first 
arrival in India (Cohn 1966:112).21 
 
A department was established for each of the major languages: Sanskrit, Persian, Hindustani, 
Bengali and Arabic, and for each department there was a professor and assistant teachers. 
Distinguished scholars and Orientalists were appointed to the faculty. In addition to language 
work, there were courses in Hindu and Mohammedan law, jurisprudence, English law and the 
regulations of the Company. For general education, students received instruction in political 
economy, geography, mathematics, Latin and Greek and modern European languages, and 
European and Indian history. Students were required to spend three years at the college, 
during which time they were examined regularly, before being posted. “Civil servants for all 
three Presidencies were to be trained at the college, and successful completion of the course 
was to be a prerequisite for civil appointments” (ibid:113).  
 
The departments employed a number of pundits (Sanskrit teachers), maulavis (Arabic 
teachers), and munshis (Persian, Bengali and Hindustani teachers), making up the native 
element of the college staff. The staff pay scale was inequitable; while European faculty 
members received salaries from 1500 to 3000 rupees a month, their Indian colleagues, who 
were their language tutors and assistants, received salaries ranging from 40 to 200 rupees. A 
college council consisting of faculty professors administered the college. Matters of discipline 
were entrusted to two Church of England clergymen; the provost and the vice-provost. At the 
apex of the college administration was the governor general himself. Members of the 
Supreme Council and judges of the Sadar Diwani Adalat functioned as governors of the 
college. The governor general made faculty appointments while higher civil administrators 
managed the college. Wellesley, himself a classical scholar, had a dream that “his college 
would be so productive in the cultivation of arts and sciences that someday it should flower 
into the ‘Oxford of the East’, as he put it metaphorically” (Sirajul Islam 2006). Even though 
Wellesley’s early plan did not succeed, “it did give an added professionalism to the service, 
and it would appear that there was some correlation between success in the language school 
and in service” (ibid:114). Among those who had achieved top honours at Fort William in the 
                                                
21 From “Extracts from the Governor-General Notes for and official despatch, to be forwarded to the Court of 
Directors, with Respect to the Foundation of a College at Fort William”. 
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first eight years of the college, several rose to administrative high-level positions thus 
rewarding professionalism.  
 
Before him, Lord Cornwallis had excluded Indians from responsible administrative positions 
believing them to be “incorrigibly corrupt” and incapable of honest behaviour. According to 
the Evangelists, India’s problems stemmed from its “wickedness and immorality” holding 
Christianity as its only salvation (Cohn op. cit.). Wellesley, as a man of science, resorted to 
education. Through education, servants of the company were to learn “the power and dignity 
of the state, the morality of conquest and British racial superiority” (Bayly 1988:81). 
Wellesley’s expansionist activities, combined with educational efforts, arguably represent the 
beginning of an attitudinal change from seeing Indians as autonomous trading partners to 
subjects of British rationality. Not only were company servants to be instructed in how to 
rationally carry out work in the judicial, revenue, political, and financial departments, they 
were also to be taught “the art of government” (Foucault 1991:87), motivated by a belief in 
the superiority of British morals. The task of creating morally responsible individuals 
Wellesley left to clergymen such as Claudius Buchanan, an Evangelical chaplain in Calcutta, 
who thought of Indians as follows: “Their general character is imbecility of body and 
imbecility of mind. Their moral powers are, and have been for ages in a profound stupor… 
The Hindoo mind seems at present to be bound by a Satanic spell” (Hugh Pearson 1834 as 
cited in Cohn 1966:113). Through “useful knowledge, cultivated talents and disciplined 
morals” (Misra op. cit.), British possessions in India were to expand. Wellesley’s political 
ambitions were not only high but, according to C. A. Bayly, absolute.  
 
All the same, for Wellesley and his supporters it was essential that the Company and 
particularly the governor-general should stand forth as sovereigns in dealing both with 
Indian powers and their own servants. The governor-general ‘should have the power of 
summoning a privy council and should act in it as the King or the Lord-Lieutenant of 
Ireland’. The ancient corporate nature of the Company councils with their near equality 
between members should be dispensed with for these ‘had the character of an 
aristocratic republic rather than a monarchy’. It is notable that though Wellesley’s 
successors discountenanced the semi-royal character of the governor-generalship, they 
nevertheless stressed the need for the Company to be seen as an Indian sovereign in 
matters such as public ritual and the creation of irrigation works, kingship’s traditional 
duties (Bayly 1988:82).  
 
Although sovereign in Bengal, in India the Company was still competing with other rulers for 
authority; appearing like “a national power within the state system” (Cohn 1983:170).  
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Rather than deposing the Mughal and proclaiming themselves rulers of India in 
succession to the Mughal empire, the British were content, on the instructions of Lord 
Wellesley, their governor general, to offer the Mughal ‘every demonstration of 
reverence, respect, and attention’ (ibid:170).  
 
The Weberian bureaucracy model is useful for understanding processes of rationalisation 
towards a more effective organisation, but has less to say about power struggles and 
conflicting situations arising as a result of individual ambitions. In the Weberian thesis, 
political ambitions are external to the development of a rational organisation. “The 
bureaucracy”, Claude Lefort observes, “is essentially indifferent to the interests and values 
defended by a political regime. It is an organ at the service of dominant groups” (1986:98). In 
India, I would argue, political ambitions originated in the very development of a powerful 
apparatus. Thus, British increasing influence in India must be seen in connection with the 
political beliefs and ambitions of individuals like Lord Wellesley taking advantage of his 
position to become ever more powerful and with little or no concern about home authorities 
(board of directors and parliament) and British official policies. 
 
Wellesley’s policy for further aggressions and annexations embarrassed the home authorities 
and he was recalled in 1805. Back in England, Wellesley was forced to defend his 
imperialistic (and expensive) employment of the British forces in India, but the fact that he 
had left the British in a military supreme position at the time of his home return was a 
situation to be followed up (by further strengthening the British position in India) rather than 
reversed. 
 
The political theory and practice of the Wellesley circle represented the first coherent imperial 
policy in British Indian history. Wellesley and his circle asserted Britain’s right to India by 
conquest, arguing that the Company “had saved Bengal by its military protection” (Bayly 
1988:81). A second order of legitimation found its reasoning in the view that “most 
contemporary Indian rulers were tyrannical usurpers of previous dynasties and rights, and 
could therefore be dispensed with at will so that ‘this ancient and highly cultivated people’ 
could be ‘restored to the full enjoyment of their religious and civil rights’” (ibid.). Truly, the 
Company refrained from intervening in peoples’ religious beliefs and missionaries were not 
allowed to use any state facilities in their Evangelical activities or even to operate freely in 
India. When this policy was lifted in 1833 allowing missionaries open access it was still 
without state support. Even if Indian religion was seen as contaminating for the exercise of 
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proper conduct, as expressed by Evangelical clergymen, preaching or religious conversions 
was not considered necessary for the establishment of social order. Rather, the British, with 
their “inexhaustible supply of useful knowledge, cultivated talents and disciplined morals”, 
assumed to guarantee freedom to a people suffering from lack of rational leadership. Indeed, 
such a schema recalls Hobbes political thought and theory about sovereign authority. In this 
view, the only way to guarantee peace, as the ultimate goal, under circumstances of the 
constant threat of competing powers overthrowing each other is by absolute authority. During 
Wellesley, administration thus acquired “its own dynamic and intrinsic goal” encompassing 
“the ultimate political and economic decisions in its sphere” (Lefort 1986:100). British 
rationality was to save Indians from their own corrupted and immoral nature.  
 
Fort William College was not in function for as long as Wellesley had intended. By 1805, 
“Wellesley was somewhat out of favour with the Court of Directors for his championing of 
private trade interests, his policy of military expansion, and his general attitude of superiority 
to his colleagues” (Cohn 1966:114). Eager to maintain influence, authority and patronage, the 
Court decided to establish an institution for the education and training of covenanted servants 
in England. In 1804, the Committee on Correspondence was given the responsibility of 
drawing up a plan for such an education and in 1806, six years after the establishment of Fort 
William College, a new college was opened in temporary quarters at Hertford Castle twenty 
miles from London. The college moved to its own buildings at Haileybury two miles away in 
1809. However, pattern of education introduced by Wellesley; language training and legal 
training with “good Christian overtones”, reappeared in the curriculum at Haileybury 
(ibid:116).  
 
Consolidation of British rationality 
 
At first, the Court of Directors wanted to abolish Fort William College, but it continued to 
function, essentially as a language training school, after Haileybury was established. Perhaps 
not exactly as intended by Wellesley, the college was in many ways moving towards 
becoming the “Oxford of the East”. In collaboration with the Asiatic Society of Bengal,22 
                                                
22 Asiatic Society (1784) was the first learned organisation in Bengal to study Asian civilisations scientifically. 
The idea of founding an association for pursuing systematic research on Asia in general and South Asia in 
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college staff well versed in oriental civilisations contributed significantly to the development 
of modern Indian languages and modern forms of scholarship in India. Students matriculating 
from the college became renowned Orientalists, such as W. W. Bird, Holt Mackenzie, Henry 
T. Prinsep, and C. Metcalfe. Although language teaching was under the direction of 
Europeans, distinguished Indian scholars functioned as tutors producing materials for the 
students. Among the most celebrated Bengali staff members of the College were Ramram 
Basu, Tarinicharan Mitra and Mrittunjoy Bidyalankar. With the help of these pundits, Fort 
William professors experimented with standardising and making authoritative what were 
thought to be ‘classics’ of Indian thought and literature. It was with the encouragement and 
co-operation of the College of Fort William that the technology of printing and publishing 
vernacular books began and collaborative learned institutions established. The Serampore 
Mission Press was launched in 1801, the Hindustani Press in 1802, the Persian Press in 1805, 
and the Sanskrit Press in 1807. These printing presses were the first visible mark of an 
intellectual and technological change in Bengal. Responsible for these innovations was the 
College of Fort William, which was indeed, fast becoming the ‘Oxford of the East’ (Sirajul 
Islam 2006). 
 
In the early days of the Permanent Settlement Act discussed earlier, a large volume of land 
rights were brought onto the market, as proprietors were unable to pay the high and inflexible 
revenue demand. The gainers were very much the sorts of people who had rapidly increased 
their wealth over the previous hundred years. Literate and high-caste servants of the older 
proprietors, particularly Brahmins and Kayasthas of the writer caste, bought up zamindari 
rights, as did banyans or merchants of the British. Pressure on the great estate owners, 
descending from the servants of the nawabs, led to the creation of many subordinate revenue 
rights. Though they were more likely to remain in the hands of one family, this was not a 
markedly different form of property and profit from the proliferating revenue farms from 
before the British. The effect on Bengal’s peasantry is seen as more obscure: “Certainly, the 
provisions of the Settlement gave few rights to tenants, concerned as it was to stabilise a land-
owning class. But the prosperity of the ordinary farmer continued to be determined more by 
ecology, price levels and population growth than by administrative fiat” (Bayly 1988:66-67). 
Bayly claims that despite administrative reformations, “social relations based upon share-
                                                                                                                                                   
particular first came from Sir William Jones (1746-1794), who joined the Calcutta Supreme Court as a Puisne 
Judge in 1783 (Sirajul Islam 2006). 
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cropping and control of credit, which were already well-established at the beginning of the 
eighteenth century, were perpetuated within the wider world of colonial trade” (ibid.). The 
creation of a wider market in land did not bring about the far-reaching changes the British had 
hoped for and political power, historical status, influence and other resources remained for the 
most part within the same lineages.  
 
Of greater impact on Bengal society was company demand for certified knowledge and 
standardisation of education arising from this demand. Fort William was established as a 
modern academic institution with the aim of transmitting specialised bodies of knowledge by 
own research, to prepare young persons to do such research, and to qualify them to practice a 
wide variety of professions. Indians continued to be excluded from the covenanted service for 
several decades, but in certain circles there was a growing interest in European education.  
 
According to Hugh Tinker, the Indian Civil Service was foreshadowed in the mansabdari 
imperial service of Akbar (1556-1605), the great Mughal Emperor.23 This was an aristocracy 
of service and not one of noble blood, or of feudal strength, and not even an indigenous 
aristocracy. Some 70 percent of Akbar’s chief officers were of central Asian origin: Turks, 
Afghans, and Persians, but alongside this Islamic elite there were Hindu leaders.  
 
Raja Todar Mal, architect of Akbar’s revenue system, was a Kayastha of the clerical 
caste. Of the 416 mansabdars of Akbar’s empire, forty-seven were Rajputs. Above 
them all, Raja Man Singh of Ambar had the supreme dignity of five thousand horses, 
was brother-in-law to the emperor, and was given the posts of greatest trust and danger 
– such as governor of Kabul and of Bengal (Tinker 1966:52).  
 
Entry into the covenanted services depending upon directors’ nominations, together with 
enforcement of a covenanted monopoly, virtually deprived Indians of any hope of either 
entering the service or rising to the higher levels of administration. This is also how it was 
more or less throughout company rule in India. With a British middle class civilian dominated 
administration, members of traditional official families became marginalised.  
 
                                                
23 Emperor Akbar instituted a strong centralised government and divided the empire into several subah, with 
Bengal constituting an important subah. His provincial government was organised on the model of the central 
government. Bengal was subdivided into 19 sarkars, and sarkars into parganas. Through the introduction of the 
Mansabdari system Akbar remodelled the army organisation. Under the system, every officer held a mansab 
(rank) and was to maintain a quota of horses, elephants, beasts of burden, carts etc. They were paid either in cash 
or land grants (Karim 2006). 
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Persian was the language of the courts and of administration throughout all areas which 
had come under Muslim rule. From the late 1830’s, Persian began to give way to 
English as the language of the courts, and it was generally abolished by 1845. On the 
revenue side of the administration, Persian was discarded in Madras and the North-
Western Provinces in favour of the vernaculars, and later Urdu and Bengali were 
substituted in Bihar and Bengal for Persian. Kayasthas and Brahmins of the official 
classes very soon acquired a knowledge of English, just as earlier they had mastered 
Persian, as a necessary qualification for employment. Muslims of the official classes 
clung to their Persian and Arabic as the foundation of their culture and so began that 
shift in the balance of strength among the official families, Hindu and Muslim, which 
was to have such incalculable consequences in the twentieth century (ibid:53).  
 
By the nineteenth century, the political destiny of Bengal as well as who would be in positions 
to manage that destiny was controlled by the British. According to S. N. Mukherjee, however, 
there was another area of collective activity engaging the Calcutta elite, beyond the control of 
British administrators: “In this area caste rules were important, particularly those rules 
concerning marriage, pollution and inheritance” (Mukherjee 1970:34). During the eighteenth 
century, matters related to caste were settled through “caste cutcherries” and leading families 
in Calcutta of high caste origins like Datta and Nubkissen competed to control such 
“cutcherries”. A century later, “cutcherries” were replaced by dals consisting of men of 
various origins who had made their fortunes through British presence. The most economically 
successful would use their newly acquired wealth to become dalapatis, i.e. leaders of dals. 
These men of fortune dominating upper and middle part of the social and economic pyramid 
of Indian society in Bengal of the nineteenth century were commonly referred to as 
bhadralok, which literally means big men.   
 
The bhadralok broke with the past by combining control of land in a capitalist property 
market with literacy and tenuous commercial connections to the world economy. By the 
beginning of the nineteenth century, a much more stratified society had emerged based on the 
control of landlords’ rents both within and outside the city. Some banyans had made money 
from the Permanent Settlement and become landlords in the districts adjoining Calcutta. Other 
families of middle-level literate estate servants had used landed property in the interior as a 
basis for invading the city in search of service in the expanding British administration. The 
rising value of land in Calcutta encouraged the development of an Indian urban landlord class. 
Magnates built large suburban palaces and became rack-renting landlords of the tenement 
buildings surrounding them.  
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One approach to understanding the events of the nineteenth century is to focus on economic 
and political changes as the result of a class interest. In his article Class, Caste and Politics in 
Calcutta, 1815-1838, Mukherjee argues that changes taking place in Bengal during that 
period were a consequence of a common interest “not only to protect the landed interest but 
also to press for the political and economic advancement of the class” (1970:78). According 
to him, “economic and administrative changes in Bengal brought about a social erosion” most 
significantly affecting Calcutta, “which witnessed the rise of a new urban class” (ibid:77). 
Bhadralok can be seen as a class struggling to secure economic and political interests with the 
British, but there were other issues and concerns beyond materialistic ones at stake as well. 
Interests of the bhadralok were much more diversified than can be accounted for by treating 
them as an economic class. 
 
Western education being the means to not only gain control of areas of power controlled by 
Indians in the British administration and for negotiating with the British for greater autonomy, 
but also a means to sociocultural influence, new institutions were starting to take form. 
Rammohun Roy took the first initiative in 1815 establishing the Atmiya Sabha (Society of 
Friends), a political organisation agitating for religious and social reforms. In the wake of this, 
many sabhas and samitis (societies) for educational reforms, literary discussions and political 
agitation were established. The Calcutta School Book Society of 1817 and the Calcutta 
School Society of 1818 played a prominent part reforming primary education by printing new 
textbooks and opening new schools following the English curriculum. Annual examinations 
were held in English, mathematics, geography, natural sciences, and English history. The 
most famous schools and institutions for higher English education established in the first part 
of nineteenth century were Bishops’ College, Hindu College, Oriental Seminary, Sanskrit 
College, and Calcutta Medical College. An Indian press both in English and in vernacular 
languages was also established.  
 
Rammohun Roy (1772/74-1833)24 was born into a conservative Brahmin family in 
Radhanagor, West Bengal and received the traditional education of his time.25 From early 
youth he showed proficiency in several oriental languages such as Sanskrit, Arabic, Persian, 
                                                
24 Information on Rammohun Roy is mainly gathered from A. F. Salahuddin Ahmed, Banglapedia (2006).  
25 Radhanagor is in the Hooghly District some twenty kilometres north of Kolkata. Hooghly is a small town 
located west of the Hooghly River and the region was one of the commanding posts of early colonial powers in 
the 17th century. Hooghly town was originally founded by the Portuguese in the year 1537. 
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besides Hindi and his mother tongue Bangla, and he was well versed in Hindu religious 
scriptures. Through close contact with Muslim scholars and officials of the revenue and 
judicial departments of the Company, he gained knowledge of Islamic theology and 
jurisprudence. He was also acquainted with the rudiments of ancient Greek philosophy and 
science. “A comparative study of Islamic and Hindu theological scriptures and acquaintance 
with the works of the sufi mystic poets of Persia, together with a knowledge of Aristotelian 
logic, had enabled him at an early age to develop a somewhat revolutionary approach towards 
the traditional religions” (Ahmed 2006, http://banglapedia.search.com.bd/HT/R_0232.htm).  
 
Rammohun was economically independent having acquired property and engaged in business 
enterprise. He remained in close contact with European officials and merchants and became 
acquainted with leading Indian scholars associated with Fort William College and the Sadar 
Diwani Adalat (court of appeal) in Calcutta. Rammohun had already learnt English and, 
through English friends, he learned about contemporary European thought. 
 
By the middle of 1814, Rammohun settled down in Calcutta and decided to devote his life to 
the cause of social and religious reform. Within a year of his arrival in Calcutta, he 
established the Atmiya Sabha, an association of like-minded individuals. The members met 
regularly at his residence to discuss religious and social problems of the day. Rammohun was 
soon able to gather around him a small but influential circle of friends, both Indian and 
European. Among his close Indian friends were Dwarkanath Tagore 26 and Prasanna Kumar 
Tagore, two leading and wealthy zamindars who had close commercial links with European 
traders. Although not fully sharing Rammohun’s radical views on religion, they supported his 
endeavours for promoting social reforms and Western education. 
 
Rammohun Roy is said to have inaugurated the age of Hindu reform. His religious views 
were to some extent influenced by Islam and Christianity denouncing idolatry and enjoining 
worship of one universal God. In 1828 he founded the Brahma Sabha (later Brahma Samaj) 
or Society of God, which emerged as a new sect of Hinduism. In 1821 he brought out a 
Bangla newspaper, Sangbad Kaumudi, and in 1822 a Persian newspaper, Mirat-ul-Akhbar, for 
the propagation of reformist and liberal views. Through public opinion, which he was able to 
                                                
26 Dwarkanath Tagore is also remembered for being the founder of the great Tagore family, which included the 
great Bengali poet Rabindranath Tagore (1861-1941).  
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arouse against the practice of sati (widow cremation), he influenced the government to decide 
against sati through special legislation in 1829. 
 
Rammohun contributed much to the growth of national consciousness in the subcontinent. In 
his political views, he was greatly influenced by the philosophy of Jeremy Bentham (English 
utilitarian philosopher). Rammohun and other Bengali leaders who followed him were loyal 
supporters of the British Raj believing that in course of time political privileges enjoyed by 
the British people would be extended to the people of British territories overseas. They 
strongly resented, however, the various kinds of discriminatory practices by the British 
government towards Indians. When, for instance, Governor General John Adam imposed 
restrictions on the Indian Press in 1823, Rammohun and his friends protested by submitting a 
memorial to the Privy Council. The memorial was rejected on the ground that a free press 
could not exist in a country that did not enjoy political freedom. At the initiative of 
Rammohun Roy and his friend Dwarkanath Tagore, a signed petition on behalf of the Hindu 
and Muslim citizens of Calcutta was sent to the British parliament protesting against certain 
discriminatory clauses of the Indian Jury Act of 1826.  
 
Rammohun and his friends submitted another petition on behalf of the zamindars of Bengal, 
Bihar, and Orissa to Governor General Lord William Bentinck in 1829 protesting against the 
revenue policy of the government adversely affecting their interests. In these public protests 
against the policies of an alien government, organised chiefly by Rammohun Roy, could be 
discerned the early manifestations of national consciousness. Rammohun watched with 
enthusiasm the progress of the reform movement in England and the liberal and nationalist 
revolutions in Europe. He confidently believed that “enemies to liberty and friends of 
despotism have never been and never will be successful”, as was revealed in his letter of 11 
August, 1822 to James Silk Buckingham, an English author and traveller who established the 
Calcutta Journal publishing papers critical of the Company.  
 
The bhadralok, represented among others by Rammohun Roy, were very active in public 
affairs in the first half of the nineteenth century applying the techniques of modern politics 
using press, public meetings, petitions, and associations to stir up public opinion for their 
demands. What this Western-educated middle class wanted was to obtain a more equal 
footing with the British middle class covenanted civilians. More specifically, their demands 
were to sit as jurors on the grand and petty juries, work as Justices of the Peace and to have 
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some saying in the running of local government in Calcutta, to be selected as collectors of 
revenue or to be promoted to similar high posts in the district headquarters or in the revenue 
and judicial departments. Through protest meetings and petitions, the bhadralok were 
successful in imposing many of their demands. In 1826, a Jury Act deemed “all good and 
sufficient persons resident within the limits of the several towns of Calcutta, Madras and 
Bombay… capable of serving as jurors on Grand and Petty Juries and upon all other inquests” 
(Mukherjee 1970:64). Indians were however, still prevented from sitting on grand and petty 
juries for the trial of Europeans. Recognising how closely their own interest were tied to the 
colonial set-up, that is, interest in working within the framework of the British-Indian 
administration, “no one wanted to rock the boat” (ibid:62).  
 
Just as important, though, was to position themselves amongst their own, which could be 
done through schools and school societies. Men active in educational and social reform 
controlled opportunities offered by the British administration. Thus, competition to gain 
control of schools and other societies was keen for several reasons. Within the bhadralok 
again there was rivalry between groups, which is often presented as a division between 
‘liberals’ led by Rammohun Roy and Dwarkanath Tagore in the Brahmo Samaj, and the 
‘conservatives’ led by Gopimohun Deb and his son, Radhakanta Deb.  
 
Radhakanta Deb (1784-1867), an accomplished scholar like Rammohun, was a strong 
upholder of social conservatism. He became leader of a party of orthodox Hindus opposing 
liberal-minded Hindus like Rammohun Roy. Although a loyal supporter of the British 
government, Radhakanta was opposed to any interference by the government in the social and 
religious life of the people. Although sati was not practised in his own family, he came 
forward to defend this custom when the government contemplated its abolition. When Lord 
William Bentinck’s government had finally abolished sati; Radhakanta Deb along with 
conservative Hindu friends formed a society called Dharma Sabha (Society of Devotion) to 
protest against this measure. A petition was presented to the governor general on behalf of the 
orthodox section of the Hindu community. However, like Rammohun, Radhakanta showed 
marked interest in promoting education, particularly English education among the Hindus. He 
played a leading part in the establishment of the Calcutta Hindu College in 1817, which he 
actively directed for over thirty years. Radhakanta took keen interest in promoting the cause 
of elementary education in Bengal; he was actively involved in the establishment and 
activities of the Calcutta School Book Society and the Calcutta School Society, in addition to 
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advocating female education. On the establishment of the British Indian Association in 1851, 
Radhakanta Deb was elected its president, a position he held until his death. Despite 
conflicting views on social and religious practices between ‘liberals’ and ‘conservatives’, 
collectively they welcomed and laid the foundations for a new educational system. 
 
As seen, British land laws and trade offered opportunities to men of various origins who used 
their wealth to become dalapatis or leaders of dals. From about the end of the eighteenth 
century, disputes concerning caste rules on pollution, marriage, status within the jatis (caste 
groups), and sometimes even disputes over inheritance of property, were settled at courts held 
in dalapatis’ houses. Through dals, economically leading men in Calcutta acquired social and 
political recognition. “While the British managed state affairs, the dalapatis ‘ruled the 
society’”, claims Mukherjee (op. cit. p. 71), but such interests were of course, not totally 
separated. Through forming associations such as the Brahmo Samaj and Dharma Sabha, 
organised according to principles of political organisation in the West and consisting of 
dalapatis and members of various dals, the Western-educated bhadralok functioned as arbiters 
between the British government and society on a number of issues of diverse character; 
political, religious, cultural, social, as well as economical.  
 
Installing sovereign power: the Empress of India 
 
On 2 August 1858, and less than a month after Lord Canning proclaimed the victory of British 
arms in the Sepoy Revolt27, parliament passed the Government of India Act transferring 
British power over India from the East India Company (whose ineptitude was primarily 
blamed for the mutiny) to the Crown, “vesting in their monarch the sovereignty of India” 
(Cohn 1983:165). The merchant company’s residual powers were vested in the Secretary of 
State for India, a minister of Great Britain’s Cabinet, who would preside over the India Office 
in London and be assisted and advised, especially in financial matters, by a Council of India. 
The Council consisted initially of fifteen Britons, seven of whom were elected from among 
the old company’s Court of Directors and eight of whom were appointed by the Crown. 
Though some of Britain’s most powerful political leaders became secretaries of state for India 
                                                
27 The Sepoy Revolt or Mutiny refers to the widespread military and civic revolt that spread through much of 
India between 1857 and 1858.  
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in the latter half of the nineteenth century, actual control over the government of India 
remained in the hands of British viceroys and their apparatus of approximately 1,500 Indian 
Civil Service (ICS) officials posted “on the spot” throughout British India (Encyclopædia 
Britannica 2003).  
 
The Cornwallisian covenanted civil service (CCS) was designed to administer the Company’s 
Bengal state, but the colonial state subsequently underwent dramatic changes. The vast 
territorial conquests from the time of Wellesley (1798-1805) to Lord Amherst (1823-1828), 
abolition of the company’s monopoly from 1813, abolition of the company’s trading right, the 
policy of liberalisation of the Bentinck administration (1828-1835), among other changes 
made the Cornwallisian bureaucracy most unworkable. What was needed was a clearer 
differentiation between politics and administration. 
 
Under the Charter Act of 1793, the Court of Directors enjoyed the privilege of recruiting 
members of the CCS, a privilege that came under severe public criticism after abolition of 
Company monopoly right in 1813. The system of patronage and apprenticeship was designed 
to run the affairs of the Company when it was only a commercial organisation, but this system 
was found inadequate for governing a state. Lord Wellesley reformed the recruitment and 
training system of the civil service, but in practice, the system of patronage continued until 
1853 when parliament decided to set up a five-member committee, headed by T. B. 
Macaulay, to make recommendations on the nature of future recruitment and training of 
civilians for the CCS (Sirajul Islam 2006).  
 
Queen Victoria’s promise of racial equality of opportunity in the selection of civil servants for 
the government of India in 1858 had theoretically thrown the ICS open to qualified Indians, 
but examinations for services were given only in Britain and only to male applicants between 
the ages of 17 and 22 (in 1878 the maximum age was further reduced to 19). Furthermore, 
examination syllabi focussed on European languages, literatures and histories, subjects in 
which Indian students were less proficient. It is hardly surprising, therefore, that by 1869 only 
one Indian candidate had managed to clear these obstacles to win a coveted admission to the 
ICS. Bureaucrats posted “on the spot”, fearful of losing privileges, subverted British royal 
promises of equality in actual implementation and Indians continued to be excluded from all 
high offices.  
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Most viceroys came to India with little knowledge of India or about the workings of the 
government of the colony. Below the viceroy, higher officials of the Raj rose through the 
ranks of the civil service, which meant twenty to thirty years of experience and well-
entrenched relationships throughout the bureaucracy, as well as, according to Cohn, “a highly 
developed capacity for political intrigue”: 
 
Viceroys complained bitterly about the frustrations in implementing their plans and 
policies, dictated by political position in England. It fell to the viceroy’s private 
secretary to articulate the viceroy’s office with the bureaucracy. Questions of 
appointments, promotions, postings and honours initially fell though his hands. 
Viceroys were dependent on the private secretary’s knowledge of personal relationships 
and factions within the bureaucracy, and their capacity to utilize viceregal power 
effectively in relation to the civil service (Cohn 1983:186).  
 
Brought firmly under control of government, the viceroy’s position became more constrained, 
which also appears to have affected his control and dealings with bureaucracy.  
 
As regards to recruitment to posts filled by Indians, the British attempted different strategies 
of competition and nomination with the main concern of promoting a support staff without 
risking competition for their own positions. Even if British attempts to promote men of a 
certain background in administration fell through, such as those of Viceroy Lord Lytton’s 
(1876-1880) to patronise the aristocracy by appointing to the civil service young men from 
wealthy and noble families regardless of educational and professional fitness, the open 
competition foisted a corps d’élite. Competing for admission and appointments required 
university degrees and diplomas available only to those with access to Western education.  
 
In Bengal, this generally meant the bhadralok referred to above, but at the end of nineteenth 
century Muslim leaders succeeded in persuading the government to offer special facilities for 
education and jobs for Muslims, also allowing a Muslim middle class to grow in Bengal. This 
growing Muslim middle class consisted mostly of peasants with substantial holdings that 
could not be cultivated solely by their own labour. By having the holdings cultivated by 
sharecroppers recruited from the ranks of impoverished peasants, more land could be 
acquired. These Muslim landholders, known as jotedars, could afford the cost of higher 
education for their sons and provide them with capital to invest in businesses. Even so, the 
urban population, the educated community, the landed interests, and the civil service of 
Bengal remained predominantly Hindu.  
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From the times of Hastings and Cornwallis, the Company mainly concerned itself with 
assuming a bureaucratic form for the rational administration of its mercantile interests. Lord 
Wellesley, as seen, aspiring more, initiated a more coherent imperial policy but settled for less 
than absolute power. Before the mutiny, policy was to stay on the good side of local rulers 
and avoid conflicts. On the event of British army successfully suppressing the mutiny in 1858 
and the transfer of British authority in India from the Company to the Crown, relationships 
between British rulers and individuals and groups in Indian society remained to be adjusted to 
the new situation. “In conceptual terms,” writes Cohn, “the British, who had started their rule 
as ‘outsiders’, became ‘insiders’ by vesting in their monarch the sovereignty of India” (Cohn 
1983:165). In her dispatch of November 8, 1858, Queen Victoria announced that “all would 
be done to stimulate ‘the peaceful industry of India, to promote works of public utility and 
improvement’, and that they ‘should enjoy that social advancement which can only be secured 
by internal peace and good government’” (ibid.). To justify the sovereign position, the British 
presented their rule as the solution to a divisive social and political situation rooted in an 
indigenous diversity in culture, society and religion, promising “equity and prosperity to the 
Indian people” in exchange for loyalty. The challenge was how to convince Indians to go 
along with it and subject themselves to imperial rule.  
 
In his illuminating article Representing Authority in Victorian India, Bernard S. Cohn 
explores the relationship between the British monarch, her Indian subjects and the native 
princes of India, its constitution and representations, by focusing on ritual events. “[I]n the 
first half of the nineteenth century”, he argues, “there was an incompleteness and 
contradiction in the cultural-symbolic constitution of India” (Cohn 1983:173). From the times 
of the Mughals, relations of authority were observed during durbars and enacted in the form 
of prestations. While the subordinate offered nazar (gold coins) and peshkash (valuables and 
precious objects), the superior presented a khelat (clothes, jewels, arms and shields, horses 
and elephants). What and how much was presented depended on rank and status of both giver 
and receiver thus positioning them and arranging the proper relationship between them. 
According to Cohn, these were acts of incorporation whose meaning was not just of 
demarcating positions of superior-inferior, but also of mutual recognition of each others’ 
interconnected position.  
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Those thus incorporated were not just servants of the king, but part of him, ‘just as the 
eye is the main function of sight, and the ear in the realm of hearing’. Nazar, the term 
applied to gold coins offered by the subordinate, comes from an Arabic and Persian 
word for ‘vow’. In its typical form it is offered in the coin of the ruler, and is the 
officer’s acknowledgement that the ruler is the source of wealth and well-being. The 
offering of nazar is the reciprocal of the receipt of the khelat and part of the act of 
incorporation. These acts, seen from the perspective of the giver of nazar and the 
acceptor of the khelats, were acts of obedience, pledges of loyalty, and the acceptance 
of the superiority of the giver of the khelats (ibid:168-69).  
 
During durbars, everything and everyone got their designated place according to one’s status 
and relationship with the ruler and “the closer one stood to the person of the royal figure, the 
more one shared his authority” (ibid.). Being robed by the ruler or one of his officials was to 
receive a right to a future share of his wealth and status, which was passed on from generation 
to generation. The British in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, on the other hand, 
tended to “misconstrue these acts by seeing them as economic in nature and function”, where 
nazar and peshkash were seen as paying for favours and khelats were construed to be 
“utilitarian goods which were part of their system of trade” (ibid.). Nazar being seen as 
bribery and peshkash as tribute, company servants of the late eighteenth century were not 
allowed to engage in durbars because of the exchanges made, defined as ‘corruption’, thus 
prohibiting them from “participating in rituals and constituting proper relationships with 
Indians who were their subordinates” (ibid:171). Realising that loyalty had to be symbolised 
to be effective, the British all the same engaged territorial rulers in the practice of presenting 
khelats and accepting nazar and peshkash in formal meetings that could be recognised as 
durbars. However, by keeping accounts of what was received and giving instructions on the 
value of what could be presented, the meaning of the ritual became contractual, symbolising 
ability to engage in economic exchanges.  
 
Mughal ritual might seem to have been retained but the meanings had been changed. 
What had been, under Indian rulers, a ritual of incorporation now became a ritual 
marking subordination, with no mystical bonding between royal figure and the chosen 
friend and servant who was becoming part of the ruler. By converting what was a form 
of present-giving and prestation into a kind of ‘economic exchange’, the relationship 
between British official and Indian subject or ruler became contractual (ibid:172).  
 
Interesting to note is how the British engaged in Indian rituals, but with other intentions, 
which is exactly Badie’s point about import-export discussed in the introduction. According 
to Cohn, contractual relations regulating economic and territorial rights and obligations thus 
marked British presence in India during the first half of nineteenth century, but with no means 
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to usurp or replace indigenous authority, they remained outsiders. Although presenting 
themselves as Indian rulers, authority remained unclear.  
 
The contradictions and difficulties in defining a symbolic-cultural constitution are 
traceable in the efforts made during the first half of the nineteenth century to construct 
a ritual idiom through and by which British authority was to be represented to Indians. 
The continued use of the Mughal idiom caused continuing difficulties, such as arduous 
negotiations between British officials and Indian subjects over questions of precedence, 
forms of address, the continued rights to use Mughal titles, the Mughal’s continued 
receipt of the nazar from both Indians and British officials, and his granting of khelats 
and issuance of sanads (royal charters) at the succession to the masnad in Indian states 
(ibid:176).  
 
These contradictions, he argues, were resolved by the mutiny of 1857/58, which led to the 
transformation of power to the Crown politically establishing Queen Victoria the monarch 
also of India in 1858. In the past, by participating in durbars, the British attempted to “fit in” 
and establish themselves within an existing social and political order defined by the Mughal 
emperor. As long as the Mughal emperor retained authority, however, British authority 
continued to be defined vis-à-vis the emperor. His defeat represented a fresh start to constitute 
a new order with the British monarch as the sovereign ruler. “This new order required a 
centre, required a means by which Indians now could relate to this centre, and the 
development of the ritual expression of British authority in India” (ibid:179). The British had 
already tried durbars the Mughal/Indian way28 without much success. To make the Imperial 
Assemblage of 1877 into a “ritual expression of British authority in India”, Indian sociology 
had to be sorted out first.   
 
The Indian princes now were Queen Victoria’s ‘loyal Indian Feudatories’, who owed 
deference and allegiance to her through her viceroy. The governor general and the 
viceroy, being the same person, was unequivocally the locus of authority in India, and 
all the British and Indians could be ranked in relation to him, whether it be by office 
held, or membership in various status groups. The British operated in India with an 
ordinal theory of hierarchy, in which individuals could be ranked by precedence – this 
precedence being based on fixed and known criteria, established by ascription and 
succession, or achievement and office (ibid:180).  
 
British taxonomies, established to decide how semi-autonomous rulers were to be ranked, 
included the size of a prince’s state, the amount of their revenue, the date at which they had 
become allies of the East India Company, the history of their families, their standing in 
                                                
28 Both Hindu and Muslim Indian rulers of the eighteenth century used durbars to establish authority relations.  
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relation to the Mughal empire and their acts of loyalty towards the British. Once rank of rulers 
had been established, their status was represented at durbars held by governors or lieutenant 
governors of the region, or when the viceroy-governor general went on a progress. Code of 
conduct and recommended appearance and behaviour for each and everyone attending had all 
been decided beforehand. Similarly, Indians under direct British rule, leading men of districts, 
Indian officials and employees of the imperial or provincial government, as well as the Indian 
masses were all ranked according to prescribed criteria. With the Queen of England as the 
‘fountain of honour’, titles and honours were organised and orders established for the purpose 
of rewarding respect for and loyalty to British royal power, which was a prerogative of the 
Crown. While honour and titles were “closely tied to the expressed goal of the new 
governmental order, ‘progress with stability’”, investiture and holding of chapters of an order 
“added an important European component to the ritual idiom which the British were 
establishing in India” (ibid:181).  
 
To mark the relationship between the Crown and India, representatives of the former started 
touring the country. Lord Canning, the first viceroy of India, undertook a series of extensive 
tours throughout North India to make manifest the new relationship proclaimed by the queen. 
Members of the royal family also went on royal tours to India, like those of the Duke of 
Edinburgh in 1869, and the Prince of Wales in 1876.  
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The Royal visit to India: Arrival of the Prince of Wales at Agra in 1876 (image source: Columbia University, 
New York).  
 
As a result of these latter tours, and reports of happy and loyal Indian subjects, Her Majesty 
“deemed it an appropriate time to make an addition to her Royal Style and Titles” (ibid:184). 
Prime Minister Disraeli was all for declaring the Queen, Empress of India, arguing that to 
govern a diverse country such as India, with little to hold it together except for “the 
integrating system of the imperial crown”; an imperial title would enable a clear and 
unequivocal hierarchic order. Together with Salisbury, Secretary of State for India and the 
newly appointed Viceroy Lord Lytton, Disraeli set out to design an assembly that could 
codify a ritual idiom “created to express, make manifest and compelling the British 
construction of their authority over India”, while at the same time avoiding questions of 
precedence or territorial claims potentially disturbing the image of orderly relations among 
and between princes and princely states and the imperial power.  
 
According to Cohn: choice of city, preparations of guest lists and invitations, classification 
and placement of everyone attending, organisation of camps, entrance procedures, seating 
arrangements, timing of events, granting of audiences, and prestations, were all carefully 
planned in a feudatory manner. The proclamation of the new title symbolising imperial power 
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and the viceroy representing imperial power were the centre of attention. Throughout, the role 
of Indians was to be present as “recipients of largesse and honour given them by their 
empress, and to be spectators to the British acting on her behalf as the Indian monarch” 
(ibid:202). In his speech stressing the empire’s role in bringing progress and stability to India, 
Lord Lytton made clear how this was to be achieved; namely through the “supreme 
supervision and direction of their administration by English officers’ who must ‘continue to 
form the most important practical channel through which the arts, the sciences and the culture 
of the West…may freely flow to the East’” (ibid:206), thus maintaining the political might of 
British rule in India.  
 
 
Imperial Assemblage of 1877 in Delhi (image source: www.hinduwisdom.info)  
 
In his conclusion, Cohn poses the question of what was achieved by the assemblage and says 
that, as an immediate effect, it kept being referred to by Indians and Europeans as “a kind of 
marker, a before and after the event” and that it “became the standard by which public 
ceremony was measured” (ibid:207-208). More generally, Cohn suggests that the ritual idiom 
used by Indians in their nationalist struggle was the same as that employed by the British and 
that, although interrupted by the First Non-Cooperation Movement of 1920s led by Ghandi 
and motivated by the full-fledged and widespread rejection of British authority, the British 
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idiom “may still be alive in various forms” (ibid:209). What role the new ideas and structures 
have come to play on South Asian realities is also an empirical question to be explored in 
subsequent chapters. For now, let me just continue on this historical exploration aiming to 
understand how, under what conditions, and in what form(s) the modern state was emerging 
in South Asia.  
 
Old structures – new aspirations 
 
British policy in India, though liberal and progressive on the whole, lacked until 1917 a 
sense of direction. Conditions which had made the establishment and continuance of 
British rule possible in India were fast changing – mainly as a result of that rule itself. 
There was, however, little conscious effort to direct these changes to a definite and 
preconceived goal. Concessions were made to the demands of Indian nationalists, but 
no attempt was made to think out and work out a policy of continuous advance. The 
reforms of 1892 and 1909 did not shift the foundations of British rule; they merely 
adjusted the machinery of British government to the changed circumstances in India. 
They aimed at associating Indians more closely with the administration and allowing 
them better opportunities of influencing it, while retaining intact its foreign and 
autocratic character (Mehrotra 1963:71).  
 
Indians continued to agitate for greater participation in government and the civil service, and 
in 1912 a royal commission recommended that Indians be allowed to take the competitive 
examination held in England. It also recommended that, “a fourth of the superior posts should 
be filled by Indians – partly by direct recruitment and partly by promotion – from the 
subordinate services, and the rest to be filled through the holding of competitive examinations 
in India” (Zaman 1980:7). The Montagu-Chelmsford Report29 of 1919 went even further 
recommending that one-third of the superior posts reserved for Europeans should be filled by 
Indians, and that the percentage should be increased yearly for a gradual Indianisation of the 
service. “These recommendations were not well received by the Europeans,” Zaman argues, 
“and a good number of them opted to retire from the Indian Civil Service” (ibid.). 
Recommendations of the report were embodied in the Government of India Act of 1919, also 
introducing partial responsible government in the provinces. 
 
                                                
29 Named after Edwin Samuel Montagu, Secretary of State for India (1917-1922), and Lord Chelmsford, Viceroy 
of India (1916-1921). The report was considered to be the first comprehensive study on the whole problem of 
Indian government. 
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These reforms represented the maximum concessions the British were prepared to make at 
that time. The franchise was extended, and increased authority was given to central and 
provincial legislative councils, but the viceroy remained responsible only to London. Changes 
at the provincial level were significant, as the provincial legislative councils contained a 
considerable majority of elected members. In a system called “dyarchy”, the institution-
building departments of government; agriculture, education, public works, and the like, were 
placed under ministers who were individually responsible to the legislature. Executive 
councillors, who were often British and responsible to the governor, retained the departments 
that made up the “steel frame” of British rule: finance, revenue, and home affairs. In 1921, 
another change recommended by the report was carried out when elected local councils were 
set up in rural areas. 
 
Meanwhile, the process of Indianisation in the Indian Civil Service (ICS) moved slowly, 
which in part was due to keen competition from the intellectual elite of British universities 
with Oxford maintaining the lead.30 By 1924, the entrance examination was the same for ICS 
as for the Home Civil Service, the Eastern Cadetship of the Colonial Service, and the Foreign 
Service, yet many of the best candidates chose the ICS. After raising the age of entry to 
between 21 and 23 in 1892, the Indian rate of success doubled. Even so, by 1909, only around 
five percent of ICS officers were Indians. According to Tinker, most Indians in the ICS found 
life on the executive side “frustrating and even humiliating” and many chose as a result to 
enter ‘judgee’ where they were “relatively aloof from the trammels of British higher 
officialdom” (Tinker 1966:61).  
 
After the First World War, new ICS recruits were needed, but changed Indian circumstances 
such as the introduction of dyarchy, the upheavals of Amritsar, and Gandhi’s first civil 
disobedience campaign negatively affected the number of interested British candidates. 
“There was no longer security and unchallenged dominion,” Tinker says, “but uncertainty and 
civil strife” (ibid.).  
 
During the period 1918-1923, 150 British candidates, most of whom were veterans of 
World War I, were selected by nomination. This was the first departure from 
competitive entry for almost sixty years. The regular examination was resumed, but 
British university candidates were few and of uneven quality… Also during the early 
                                                
30 In 1910, thirty-six of the fifty-eight successful candidates were Oxford men (Tinker 1966:60).  
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1920’s, some senior civilians claimed that the famous covenant between the secretary 
of state and the civilian had been breached by the introduction of dyarchy, so that there 
was no longer absolute security of tenure (ibid.).  
 
According to Tinker, the situation led to a number of premature retirements of senior British 
officials in the 1920s under provisions to retire prematurely on a pension proportionate to 
length of service. During the 1930s, competition among able young university graduates was 
again as intense as it had been in the great days of the 1880s and 1890s as professional 
opportunities, both in Britain and India, were severely limited from about 1929 with the onset 
of the depression.  
 
The principle of simultaneous examinations was at last accepted when, in 1922, the civil 
service commissioners, responsible for holding all British public service examinations, 
supervised the holding of the ICS examination in Allahabad. While Allahabad entrants were 
required to spend two years at a British university before taking up duty, London examinees 
were required only to spend one year at Oxford, Cambridge, or a London university, thus 
giving the London entrant a year’s head start as service senior (Tinker 1966).  
 
Against this backdrop in 1923, another royal commission, consisting of an equal number of 
Indian and British and chaired by Lord Lee, was appointed to make recommendations on the 
future of the services in India. Considering the racial composition of the superior Indian 
public services of the government of India, the Lee Commission proposed that forty percent 
of future entrants should be British, forty percent Indians directly recruited, and twenty 
percent Indians promoted from the provincial service. The effect of the proposals, it was 
calculated, would be to make the ICS half-Indian and half-British by 1939. Thereafter, the 
British component would wither away, but no terminal date was set for a complete 
Indianisation. These and other recommendations made by the Lee Commission were accepted 
in full by the secretary of state. By the date of independence in 1947, more than half the 
service of about one thousand members was Indians, many with long experience and holding 
higher positions (ibid.). 
 
Another important recommendation of the Lee Commission was for an independent public 
service commission to be created and entrusted with the task of recruitment for the higher 
civil services to safeguard against political and personal influences over the selection of civil 
servants.  
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The Commission expressed the view that wherever democratic institutions existed, 
experience showed that to secure an efficient civil service it was essential to protect it 
as far as possible from political and personal influences and to give it that position of 
stability and security which was vital to its successful working as the impartial and 
efficient instrument by which Government, of whatever political complexion, might 
give effect to their policies (Raheem and Husain 1980:312-13).  
 
In 1926, a Public Service Commission (PSC) consisting of five members detached from all 
political associations was set up. The responsibilities of the commission included recruitment 
of personnel for public services, establishment and maintenance of proper standards of 
qualification for admission to the public service, and quasi-judicial functions. The latter 
consisted of giving advice to governor general and secretary of state on appeals received by 
them from civil servants regarding discipline, recruitment, and conditions of service, and so 
forth (Mattoo 1980). In 1928, the PSC (India) held the ICS examination at Delhi (capital of 
British India from 1911) on behalf of the (British) Civil Service Commission. Renamed the 
Federal Public Service Commission in 1937, this body now took over responsibility for 
recruitment to the All-India Services for which entry was by examination (Tinker 1966).  
 
With the increasing momentum of the independence struggle, both violent and non-violent, 
the British were gradually giving in to the demands for more self-rule and “responsible 
government in India”. The Government of India Act of 1935 was a great leap in this direction. 
A federal system of Government was envisaged, with more powers to the provinces. The act 
made certain provisions relating to the services. It defined the rights and status of the all-India 
officers in the proposed federation and provinces, and guaranteed the existing privileges 
regarding pay, promotion, leave, pension, and so on. Providing for a federal public service 
commission and provisional service commission, it resembled the former division between 
the covenanted and uncovenanted services, which from 1892 were called the Indian Civil 
Service and the Provincial Civil Service.  
 
The Government of India Act of 1935 marked the beginning of the process of self-
government by Indians and transfer of power. Elections were held and governments with 
elected representatives were installed. Politically, the situation was tense because of 
differences between two major communities; Hindus and Muslims. Occasional confrontation 
also occurred between the elected governments and governors in the provinces, and at times 
with the federation. This was further complicated by the outbreak of the Second World War in 
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1939, during which time the struggle for independence intensified and culminated in the Quit 
India Movement in 1942. After the Second World War, the British Government decided to 
transfer power by agreeing to a partition of India conceding to the demands of the Muslims 
for a separate state. “In the circumstances”, writes Ramkrishna Mukherjee, “the Bengali 
Muslim middle class envisaged a quicker and easier way to further its interests by responding 
to the call of the All-India Muslim League, which was steadily gaining strength with the 
demand for a Muslim homeland. In this way it expected to secure a territory and government 
of its own, as well as its own market in goods and services” (Mukherjee 1973:497). With the 
Indian Independence Act of 1947, two states, the Indian dominion and Pakistan, were created 
with West Bengal awarded to the Indian Union and East Bengal to Pakistan. Both states 
adopted a constitution under the Government of India Act of 1935, which was federal in 
character and with a parliamentary system of government (Zaman 1980).  
 
By the time of independence, British rationality had indeed marked state and politics in India. 
ICS may have been “Indianised” in terms of personnel (Tinker 1966), but in terms of 
organisation it had been through several phases of bureaucratisation and appeared perhaps 
even more bureaucratic than other so-called ‘modern’ administrations, whether in Britain or in 
any other European country. Let me to some extent quote B. P. R. Vithal who points to 
exactly how rational the system was. 
 
After the ancient Chinese system, this was, perhaps, the first Civil Service to be 
deliberately and consciously constituted on the basis of recruitment by means of 
examination. The role conceived for this service was also unique because it heralded 
the transformation of the British administrator from ruler to guardian. When Indians 
were taken into the ICS, the initial screening and separation from their origins and their 
admission to a new culture was effected through the educational system and, 
subsequently, their training in the Oxbridge milieu. The Services succeeded, by and 
large, in building up a tradition of integrity and professional competence that helped to 
impart to it a unique aura (Vithal 1997:208).  
 
Instead of continuing to discuss developments in the state of India, the focus will now turn to 
what, as a result of partition, was first a wing of Pakistan and after 24 years, emerged as the 
independent state of Bangladesh. 
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New states emerging 
 
Pakistan came into existence as two entities; West and East Pakistan, and as a dominion 
within the Commonwealth in August 1947, with Mohammed Ali Jinnah as governor-general, 
and Liaquat Ali Khan as prime minister. In his inaugural speech to the Constituent Assembly 
of Pakistan, delivered on 11 August 1947, Jinnah announced his concept of the new nation.  
 
Work together in a spirit that every one of you, no matter to what community he 
belong… no matter what is his caste, colour or creed, is first, second and last a citizen 
of this State with equal rights, privileges, obligations… I cannot emphasize it too much. 
We should begin to work in that spirit and in course of time all these angularities of the 
majority and minority communities… will vanish… You may belong to any religion or 
caste or creed – that has nothing to do with the State. We are starting with the 
fundamental principle that we are all citizens, and equal citizens of one State… Today 
you might say with justice that [in Britain] Roman Catholics and Protestants do not 
exist: what exists now is that every man is a citizen, an equal citizen of Great Britain 
and they are all members of the nation. Now, I think that we should keep that in front of 
us as our ideal and you will find that in course of time Hindus would cease to be 
Hindus and Muslims would cease to be Muslims; not in the religious sense, because 
that is the personal faith of each individual; but in the political sense as citizens of the 
State (Tinker 1963:161).  
 
Only 13 months after independence, Jinnah died.  
 
Pakistan’s first Constituent Assembly was made up of members of the pre-partition Indian 
Constituent Assembly representing areas now within Pakistan. Leaders of the new Pakistan 
were mainly western educated lawyers with a strong commitment to parliamentary 
government. They had supported Jinnah and his Muslim League31 in the struggle against the 
Indian National Congress not so much because they desired an Islamic state, but because they 
had come to regard the Congress as synonymous with Hindu domination. Some adhered to 
Islam the basis of personal behaviour within a modern, democratic state. Others saw it as a 
tradition, the framework within which their forefathers had ruled India. Yet others held Islam 
as a total way of life. Thus from its inception, leaders of the new nation faced two overriding 
questions: the role of Islam in the new state, and the relations between East and West wings 
and the central government.  
 
                                                
31 The Muslim League, established in December 1906, initially led by Aga Khan and ultimately by Jinnah, was 
instrumental in creating public opinion in favour of Muslim nationalism and finally in achieving Pakistan in 
1947 (Banglapedia 2006). 
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Liaquat Ali Khan, Jinnah’s lieutenant, inherited the task of drafting a constitution. Having 
entered politics via a landlord party, Khan was a moderate subscribing to a parliamentary, 
democratic, secular state. Conscious about his own weak power base being a Muslim refugee 
form the United Provinces (the Indian heartland) Khan sought the support of religious 
spokesmen; the mullahs or the ulama (religiously learned men). He issued a resolution on the 
aims and objectives of the constitution holding Allah as the only sovereign and emphasising 
Islamic values. His leadership ended abruptly when he was assassinated in 1951 and into his 
place as prime minister stepped a Bengali aristocrat, Khawaja Nazimuddin. Nazimuddin had 
followed Jinnah as governor general under the interim constitution in 1948 and was succeeded 
as governor general by Ghulam Mohammad, a Punjabi from the civil service. The twin pillars 
of power thus represented the two main regional power bases in West and East Pakistan 
(Encyclopædia Britannica 2003).   
 
A constitution did not evolve until February 1956. Until then, the country was governed under 
the 1935 Government of India Act, somewhat amended and modified. Over the next two 
decades, regional feelings, political rivalries and intrigues created a state of instability in the 
government paving the way for army take-overs, martial law, and new constitutions. “None of 
the constitutions framed in Pakistan”, claims Zaman, “had the approval of the majority of the 
people of East Pakistan, and none of the administrations which were wholly controlled and 
dominated by the people of the West Pakistan gave a fair deal to the people of East Pakistan 
in administration, trade, commerce, and industry” (Zaman 1980:9). This view that Bengali 
Muslims were barred from top government is supported by Mukherjee who says that “Bengali 
Muslims were permitted rather easy access to the lower and middle ranges of economic 
activities, especially to the professions of lawyer, teacher, doctor, etc.; but the top 
governmental, commercial, and industrial positions became virtually the monopoly of West 
Pakistanis posted to Bengal from the center of gravity of Pakistan in Sind and West Punjab” 
(Mukherjee 1973:409). While Bengali Muslims filled the middle stratum of administrative 
and economic activities, mainly non-Bengali Muslims filled the upper stratum.  
 
The main features of the Constitution of Pakistan, 1956, were as follows: It had a lengthy 
preamble wherein it was declared that Pakistan would be an Islamic Republic where all 
authority was to be subject to the supreme power of Allah. The constitution laid down certain 
directive principles of state policy, but without the force of law. It contained a bill of rights 
embodying all rights as found in the constitution of western democracies. Government was 
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declared a federal one with the judiciary acting as guardian of the constitution. The Supreme 
Court of Pakistan was to interpret the constitution and uphold the fundamental rights of the 
citizens. Both Urdu and Bangla were declared state languages of Pakistan. The President, who 
had to be a Muslim, was to be head of state. A parliamentary form of government was 
provided for with the National Assembly as Parliament. It consisted of 300 members, 150 
members elected from East Pakistan and 150 members from West Pakistan for a period of 
five years. In addition, there should be 10 women members, 5 of whom should be from East 
Pakistan and 5 from West Pakistan. The Constitution provided for the Supreme Court of 
Pakistan and two High Courts for the two provinces. These courts were authorized to issue 
writs for the enforcement of fundamental rights. As guardian of the constitution, the Supreme 
Court could declare any act passed by the National Assembly ultra vires if violating the 
constitution. The nature of the provincial government provided for by the 1956 constitution 
was more or less similar to that of the central government, with a governor and a cabinet 
headed by a chief minister. Provincial Assembly was to consist of 300 members to be elected 
from single-member constituencies for a five-year term. In addition, there were 10 more seats 
reserved for women for a period of 10 years (Ahamed 2006).  
 
Operation of the 1956 constitution was characterised by political instability at the centre as 
well as in the provinces. On October 7, 1958, President Iskander Mirza abrogated the 
constitution by declaring martial law. The central and provincial governments were dismissed 
and all political parties were banned. General Mohammad Ayub Khan made himself Chief 
Martial Law Administrator. Mirza announced that the martial law period would be brief and 
that a new constitution would be drafted. On 27 October he swore in his new Cabinet. General 
Ayub became prime minister and three lieutenant generals were named to the Cabinet. The 
eight civilian members included businessmen and lawyers. On the same evening, the new 
military ministers called on the president, with contingents of armed soldiers, and informed 
him that he was to resign. Within three weeks of the proclamation of martial law, Mirza was 
removed from the office of president and General Ayub Khan assumed both presidency and 
the office of chief marital law administrator.  
 
In January 1951, Ayub Khan had succeeded General Sir Douglas Gracey as commander-in- 
chief of the Pakistan Army, becoming the first Pakistani in that position. Although Ayub 
Khan’s military career was not particularly brilliant and although he had not previously held a 
combat command, he was promoted over several senior officers with distinguished careers. 
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Ayub Khan was probably selected because of his reputation as an able administrator, his 
presumed lack of political ambition, and his lack of powerful group backing. Coming from a 
humble family of an obscure Pakhtun tribe, Ayub Khan also lacked affiliation with major 
internal power blocks and was, therefore, acceptable to all elements.   
 
Within a short time of his promotion, however, Ayub Khan became a powerful political 
figure. Perhaps more than any other Pakistani, Ayub Khan was responsible for seeking and 
securing military and economic assistance from the United States and for aligning Pakistan 
with it in international affairs. As army commander-in-chief and for a time as minister of 
defence in 1954, Ayub Khan was empowered to veto virtually any government policy that he 
felt inimical to the interests of the armed forces.  
 
Ayub Khan sought to retain certain aspects of his dominant authority in the 1962 
Constitution, which ended the period of martial law. The document created a presidential 
system in which he remained contemptuous of lawyer-politicians and handed over power to 
his fellow army officers. Ayub Khan used two main approaches to governing in his first few 
years. He concentrated on consolidating power and intimidating the opposition. He also aimed 
at establishing the groundwork for future stability through altering the economic, legal, and 
constitutional institutions.  
 
Efforts were made to popularise the regime while the opposition was muzzled. Ayub Khan 
maintained a high public profile, often taking trips expressly to “meet the people”. He was 
also aware of the need to address some of the acute grievances of East Pakistan. To the extent 
possible, only Bengali members of the civil service were posted in the East Wing. Previously, 
many of the officers had been from the West Wing, knowing neither the region nor the 
language. Dhaka was designated the legislative capital of Pakistan, while the newly created 
Islamabad became the administrative capital. Central government bodies, such as the planning 
commission, were instructed to hold regular sessions in Dhaka. Public investment in East 
Pakistan increased, although private investment remained heavily skewed in favour of West 
Pakistan. The Ayub Khan regime was so highly centralised, however, that in the absence of 
democratic institutions, the development that took place during his regime remained more or 
less a West Pakistan affair. 
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Pakistan remained under an authoritarian system of government from 1958 to 1962. With a 
view to restoring their own brand of democracy, the regime introduced a scheme of local self-
government known as Basic Democracies. When elections were held under the new system in 
January 1960, President Ayub Khan sought a vote of confidence from the 80,000 elected 
basic democrats, as they became known, securing a mandate to frame a new constitution. The 
President accordingly appointed a constitutional commission to examine parliamentary 
government in Pakistan and recommend measures for the future constitution. The commission 
submitted its report to the President in May 1961, and the President, after having the report 
discussed by different committees of the cabinet and examined at a governors’ conference, 
put it to a drafting committee. A new constitution was thus promulgated on 1 March 1962. 
 
President Khan did not see parliamentary democracy as suitable for Pakistan. Instead, the 
Basic Democracies, as the individual administrative units were called, were intended to 
initiate and educate a largely illiterate population in the working of government by giving 
them limited representation and associating them with decision-making at a “level 
commensurate with their ability”. Jurisdiction of Basic Democracies was limited to local 
government and rural development with the intention of providing a two-way channel of 
communication between the regime and the common people, allowing for gradual social 
change.  
 
The system of Basic Democracies did not have time to fulfil Khan’s intentions before he and 
his system fell in 1969. Whether a new class of political leaders equipped with some 
administrative experience could have emerged to replace those trained in British 
constitutional law was never discovered. Neither did the system provide for the mobilisation 
of the rural population around institutions of national integration. Its emphasis was on 
economic development and social welfare alone. Authority of the civil service was augmented 
in the Basic Democracies, and the power of landlords and big industrialists in the West Wing 
went unchallenged.  
 
In 1969, a mass movement against General Ayub Khan was on the rise. A situation of near 
civil war prevailed, the army once again stepped in, and Ayub Khan was removed from 
power. General Yahya Khan took over with the promise to hold elections in 1970 and to 
transfer power to elected representatives. The new administration formed a committee of 
deputy and provincial martial law administrators that functioned above the civil machinery of 
A State of Corruption? 
 76 
government. The generals held power and were no longer the supporting arm of the civilians, 
elected or bureaucratic, as they had been throughout much of the country’s history. In the 
past, every significant change of government had relied, in large part, on the allegiance of the 
military. However, Yahya Khan and his military advisers proved no more capable of 
overcoming the nation’s problems than their predecessors. The attempt to establish a military 
hierarchy running parallel to and supplanting the authority of the civilian administration 
inevitably ruptured the bureaucratic-military alliance, on which efficiency and stability 
depended.  
 
The first general election conducted in Pakistan based on one person, one vote, was held on 7 
December 1970; elections to provincial legislative assemblies followed three days later. 
Yahya Khan kept his promise of elections and voting was heavy. The Awami League won a 
massive victory in East Pakistan, for it was directly elected to 160 of the 162 seats and thus 
gained a majority in the National Assembly. The Pakistan People’s Party won a large majority 
in the West Wing, especially in Punjab and Sindh, but no seats in the East Wing. In the North-
West Frontier Province and Baluchistan, the National Awami Party won a plurality of the 
seats. The Muslim League and the Islamic parties did poorly in the west and were not 
represented in the east.  
 
Thus, any constitutional agreement depended on the consent of three persons: Sheikh Mujibur 
Rahman (Mujib), accredited leader of East Pakistan, Zulfikar Ali Bhutto of West Pakistan, 
and Yahya Khan, as the ultimate authenticator representing the military government. In his 
role as intermediary and head of state, Yahya Khan tried to persuade Bhutto and Mujib to 
come to some kind of accommodation. The effort proved unsuccessful as Mujib insisted on 
his right as leader of the majority to form a government, a stand at variance with Bhutto, who 
claimed “two majorities” in Pakistan. Bhutto declared that his party would not attend the 
inaugural session of the assembly, thereby making the establishment of civilian government 
difficult.  
 
On 1 March 1971, Yahya Khan, who earlier had referred to Mujib as the “future prime 
minister of Pakistan”, dissolved his civilian cabinet and declared an indefinite postponement 
of the National Assembly. In East Pakistan, the reaction was immediate. Strikes, 
demonstrations, and civil disobedience increased in tempo until there was open revolt. 
Directed by Mujib, Bengalis declared that they would pay no taxes and would ignore martial 
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law regulations on press and radio censorship. The writ of the central government all but 
ceased to exist in East Pakistan. As a reaction to Yahya’s act, Sheikh Mujibur Rahman 
declared virtual independence of East Pakistan at a mammoth gathering in Dhaka on 7 March 
1971. A civil disobedience movement was launched from the following day. 
 
Mujib, Bhutto, and Yahya Khan held negotiations in Dhaka in late March in a last-ditch 
attempt to defuse the growing crisis. Simultaneously, General Tikka Khan, commander of the 
Pakistani forces in East Pakistan, prepared a contingency plan for a military takeover and 
called for troop reinforcements to be flown in via Sri Lanka. In an atmosphere of distrust and 
suspicion, the talks broke down and on 25 March, Yahya Khan and Bhutto flew back to West 
Pakistan. Tikka Khan’s emergency plan went into operation. Roadblocks and barriers 
appeared all over Dhaka. Mujib was taken into custody and flown to the West Wing to stand 
trial for treason. A regime of genocide was launched on 25 March by attacking universities 
and other places of resistance and indiscriminately killing teachers, students, and political 
workers. The tempo of violence of the military crackdown during these first days soon 
developed into a full-blown War of Liberation resulting in the emergence of independent 
sovereign Bangladesh (Asha Islam 2006). 
 
After war broke out, the remaining Awami League (AL) leadership fled the country to form a 
government-in-exile in Calcutta. About 500 civilian government employees from the Civil 
Service of Pakistan (CSP), the Pakistan Police Service (PSP), the East Pakistan Civil Service 
(EPCS), and a number of lower ranking employees joined the government-in-exile for the 
duration of the nine-month war. When the Pakistani army surrendered to the joint command 
of the Indian Army and Mukti Bahini (Liberation Army), political leadership and 
administrative personnel could return to Dhaka. On independence, the Awami League formed 
the government and its charismatic leader, Sheikh Mujibur Rahman, assumed government 
leadership taking office as the country’s first prime minister. Ruhul Quddus, a senior civil 
servant, organised the administration as the first secretary general.  
 
According to Talukder Maniruzzaman, about six thousand government employees, including 
former CSP officers, lost their jobs on charges of “collaboration” with the Pakistani military 
regime. A quota of all new appointments was reserved for the members of the Mukti Bahini 
and a special civil service examination was held for the recruitment of freedom fighters. Other 
freedom fighters that could establish connections with AL leaders were recruited as hard-core 
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members of the Jatio Rakkhi Bahini (National Security Force) established by the government. 
“In the crude competition for scarce jobs”, claims Maniruzzaman, “many of the supporters of 
the Awami League managed to secure fake certificates of participation in the liberation war to 
take advantage of the quota system” (1979:48). Thus, Mujib’s government practiced a policy 
of favouring pro-AL officials serving the government-in-exile. The government also found it 
necessary to appoint business executives to manage the industrial and financial agencies 
nationalised during 1972-73 as part of Mujib’s attempt to create a socialist state. These 
appointments also followed party political lines.   
  
In 1972, the Administrative and Services Reorganisation Committee (ASRC) was set up to 
determine the policy regarding fresh recruitment to government services, and the principles of 
integration of the personnel of various services in a new structure. The Committee felt that the 
inherited structure of the services was neither adequate, nor appropriate for fulfilling the 
needs and aspirations of a country that was independent, socialist, and unitary. It 
recommended a single civil service structure covering all the services in ten grades stressing 
that: 1) there should be no reservation of posts, 2) all persons with proven talent should have 
equal opportunity for advancement to top positions, and 3) senior officers at the national 
headquarters should be periodically exposed to changing problems at field administration 
units. A National Pay Commission (NPC) was also appointed and asked to “suggest scales of 
pay in the light of the government’s declared objective of the establishment of a socialist 
society” (Maniruzzaman 1979:51). To match the ten service grades, the Pay Commission 
recommended ten national scales of pay.  
 
Recommendations of the ASRC and NPC were controversial causing no immediate action. 
What was acted upon, however, was the 1972 constitutional directive (Presidential order No. 
9). This denied the protection civil servants had enjoyed in the past, especially in Pakistan 
under the 1956 and 1962 constitutions. It provided for the dismissal of officials without right 
of appeal stipulating that, “the civil servants ‘shall hold office during the pleasure of the 
President’” and that “the decision thereon of the authority empowered to dismiss or remove 
such person or to reduce him in rank shall be final” (Ahamed 1980:153). Consequently, 
principles regulating recruitment and conditions of services incorporated in earlier 
constitutions were omitted. “As early as January, 1972”, states Emajuddin Ahamed, “53 
senior civil servants were removed from office. From July to November 30, 1974 over 300 
government officials were dismissed” (ibid:154).  
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Organisational factionalism 
 
According to Maniruzzaman, policies regarding appointments, promotions, and dismissals 
were generally contested creating conflicts, factionalism, and sectarian discontents within the 
civil service. One dimension of conflict was that between the “patriots” and the “non-
patriots”, i.e. recruitment of those involved in the liberation war. Another was “the jealousy 
and rivalry between the former members of the EPCS and former members of the CSP” 
(Maniruzzaman 1979:47). The CSP or Civil Service Pakistan was the all-Pakistan service at 
the helm of the national bureaucracy and the EPCS or East Pakistan Civil Service was the 
regional administrative service functioning in the area that became Bangladesh. The dispute 
was mainly about who should form the nucleus of the top administration. EPCS argued for 
length of service as criterion for promotions, while former CSP members emphasised merit 
arguing that, “EPCS men, having lost the competition in the Central Superior Service 
Examinations and having entered the provisional service, ‘were designed at most to reach 
certain levels in the government’” (ibid.). 
 
The EPCS men, however, found a lever in Syed Hossain, the newly appointed joint 
secretary of the Establishment Division – the Division directly under the Prime 
Minister and in charge of appointments, transfers, and promotions. Syed Hossain, a 
brother-in-law of Sheikh Mujib and a junior member of the old EPCS, was a section 
officer (higher grade clerk) at the time of independence. Within two years he was 
catapulted to the position of joint secretary. In the highly personalistic system 
developed by Sheikh Mujib, Syed Hossain, even before his appointment to the post of 
joint secretary, was more powerful than the secretary of the Establishment Division, 
and in proposing appointments to higher posts favoured his former fellow of the EPCS 
(ibid.).  
 
After the fall of the Mujib regime in 1975, the new regime first abolished Presidential Order 
No. 9 of 1972, which had provided for the dismissal of officials without showing cause.32 
Those who had lost their jobs under this order after liberation were allowed to appeal their 
cases and General Zia placed many such civil servants in key positions, while some pro-AL 
officers were either dismissed or demoted. By reinstating former CPS officers who had been 
removed from the service, General Zia sought to re-establish the bureaucratic order prevalent 
of pre-independent days Mujib had wanted to do away with. According to Ahamed, Mujib 
                                                
32 Mujib was killed in a coup and after a counter-coup; Major-General Ziaur Rahman (General Zia) emerged as 
the effective head of the government. 
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often became livid with anger when he denounced bureaucracy and Presidential Order No. 9 
testified to his lack of credence towards professionalism (Ahamed 1980).  
 
Another controversy, surfacing during Mujib but gaining momentum after the takeover of 
General Zia, was one between generalists and specialists. Specialists had for long been 
dissatisfied with the subordinate positions they occupied vis-à-vis generalists and indeed with 
the whole administrative system left behind by the British placing ‘all-rounders’ at the top. 
Former EPCS and CSP officers may have disagreed about the reorganisation of former 
provincial and national civil services, but maintained a united front whenever specialists tried 
to enter secretariat posts.  
 
A new Pay and Services Commission, with a similar mandate to that of earlier commissions, 
was appointed by General Zia’s military regime. The general position of the Commission was 
that “the generalist Indian Civil Service (ICS) was ‘the one great political invention of 
nineteenth century England’” (Maniruzzaman 1979:52). The Commission recognised the 
changed situation resulting in changing needs since the nineteenth century and that 
technocrats would necessarily form an important part of a modern administration, but 
expressed indifference to claims made by specialist groups that their function was more 
important than other functions. The Commission was also against earlier practices of 
reserving key posts to a single service holding that “all service groups, whether generalist or 
specialist, should have an opportunity to move up to general policy level positions, subject 
always to the paramount need of superior ability for the type of job in view” (ibid:53). The 
Commission was aware of tensions within the civil service and the main recommendation was 
of equal status and pay for the development of “a spirit of partnership and cooperation in the 
Civil Service” (ibid:54). However, the announcement of the new national grades and scales of 
pay only exacerbated the tensions because they were so much at variance with what had been 
expected based on the Commission’s recommendations. Instead of equal status and pay, the 
generalists’ predominance was assured in the shape of higher pay and grades. Protests were 
many, resulting in meetings, strikes and demonstrations. The generalists also organised 
themselves, disagreeing with the new grading system and arguing that generalist field officers 
had been downgraded vis-à-vis secretariat officers. Students at the universities also joined the 
protests, which went on for months, finally forcing the government to a retreat. The 
government responded with announcing new scales of pay and the abolition of the grading 
system.  
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Over the years, a number of commissions and committees have been appointed to study the 
public service and to recommend measures for improvements, but modifications have been 
minor. Whenever reports have been published, opposition from within the services has proved 
strong enough to shelve most of them and maintain the status quo. The system of a unified 
civil service was designed to create a ‘classless’ structure treating all services as equal, but in 
practice generalists continued to monopolize key positions at the expense of other services 
contributing to the sustenance of a distinct and privileged class of elite civil servants. The 
creation of a Senior Service Pool (SSP) in 1979 and that of Upazilas in 1983 only aggravated 
the situation further as neither improved the position of specialist. The SSP was to enable 
“competent and experienced officers of various service cadres … to participate at the highest 
policy-making level of the Government” (Zaman 1980:33). Members of the SSP would 
ultimately fill all posts in the secretariat, but selection criteria for the pool were in favour of 
members of services already dominating such posts. The new level of administration, Upazila, 
headed by the Upazila Nirbahir Officer (UNO) also favoured a structure of inequality between 
services. Agriculturalists, engineers and medical officers at the local level resented the 
executive role of a UNO appointed from a single service. Along with a demand for the 
withdrawal of the supremacy of one single service, the three services demanded equal 
opportunities for all services. A strike was again called, but was avoided when the 
government reached a mutual understanding with leaders of the specialists where the 
government promised to appoint another committee to look into the situation. The committee 
forwarded its recommendations, but the controversy continued with more strikes and appeals 
to the president.  
 
Politics and bureaucracy in postcolonial states 
 
Bangladesh was under military rule more or less continuously for 15 years. First under 
General Zia, and later under Lieutenant-General Hossain Mohammad Ershad (Ershad) who 
seized power in 1982 after the coup and murder of General Zia the previous year. Ershad 
appointed a number of martial law committees led by brigadiers and consisting for the main 
part of high-ranking army officers with mandate to recommend improvements in the 
organisational set up of ministries, divisions, directories, and statutory corporations. The 
outcome was mainly that of reducing numbers of organisational bodies and manpower in 
addition to fixing the lowest and highest salaries for officers and employees of government, 
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semi-government and autonomous bodies. A number of high-level committees and cabinet 
sub-committees were also constituted between 1985 and 1987 to review critical problems 
afflicting the functioning of the civil service. Membership of these committees was confined 
to cabinet ministers, top military brass, and senior civil servants although the President 
approved only a few of the recommendations. These included: 1) abolition of the SSP, 2) 
deputy secretaries and joint secretaries to be promoted based on quota reservation for various 
cadres, and 3) no quota reservation for any cadre to the posts of additional secretaries and 
secretaries (Khan 1998). Thus, the question of appointments and promotions to the top 
echelon of administration remained unresolved and continued to be a main issue.  
 
In 1990, Ershad was forced to step down and Khaleda Zia, widow of late President Zia, 
became prime minister in 1991 after her party, the Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP), won 
the majority of seats in the parliamentary elections held that year under the supervision of a 
caretaker government. Since then, the country has been democratic in form and the main 
contestants for the office of prime minister have been the two ladies, Sheik Hasina (AL) and 
Begum Khaleda Zia (BNP), a daughter and a wife of former heads of state. Neither of them 
have appeared particularly interested in administrative reforms with the result of few formal 
changes being made, but both have shown keen interest in taking charge of administration by 
selecting people for key positions. In 2006, Khaleda Zia ended her second term as prime 
minister after a cessation between 1996 and 2001 when Sheik Hasina was the prime minister. 
New elections, planned for January 2007, were postponed and it is uncertain when fresh 
elections will be held. In the meantime, a civilian emergency government runs the country.  
 
As seen, the gradual expansion of British dominion in India was followed by a proliferation of 
administrative tasks believed to require specialised agencies and a certain type of personnel to 
manage the various activities. A twofold service system was also established: covenanted and 
uncovenanted. The former was the higher administrative service recruited in England; the 
latter a lower executive service recruited in India. Indians already connected with the 
Company as brokers or factotums were employed in the low-ranking, poorly paid 
uncovenanted service and with no or few prospects for promotions, deprived of any authority 
and merely carrying out orders from British officers. Though appointed to respectable 
departments, such as revenue and judicial, Indians were not allowed to rise above subordinate 
positions. Requirements to those appointed were nevertheless very high in terms of education 
and skills, and total loyalty to the service expected. Officers to the covenanted service, on the 
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other hand, belonged to a world apart where appointments were personal, salaries and other 
perquisites were generous, and where promotions were certain. When in 1835, the British first 
provided for open competition, selection criteria continued to protect British interests as 
candidates had to go to England and pass the required examinations there. Age limits and 
educational requirements were effective measures for preventing Indians from actually 
competing for admission, as candidates had to be educated according to English educational 
standards and at that time should be no older than seventeen or eighteen years of age (see 
Misra 1977). This twofold principle of classification was retained throughout British rule. In 
1892, the services were renamed the Indian Civil Service (ICS) and the Provincial Civil 
Service (PCS).  
 
The gradual provisions of allowing Indians some responsibility and finally the opportunity to 
compete for higher positions came not as a result of a technical requirement within the 
organisation and certainly not because Indians at any point came to be recognised as equals. 
Increasing social segregation and the fact that British officers in India opted to resign at the 
prospect of having Indians as colleagues, or even worse as superiors, defy that notion. More 
likely, it came about as a result of mass agitation. To stay in control, the British depended on 
the support and cooperation of prominent Indians who in return demanded more equitable 
treatment. The opportunities open to Indians were controlled by a small group of people, 
referred to as bhadralok, whose interests were so much tied to the colonial set-up that in order 
to protect their own interests sought to draw support for the established order. As dalapatis or 
members of important dals, the bhadralok managed to take control of important areas of 
power, such as settling social disputes, granting them respect and authority to act as 
representatives of Indian interests. When the British left, public affairs in India were left in the 
hands of these very people.   
 
Hamza Alavi (1973) argued in the article The State in Postcolonial Societies for a relatively 
autonomous role played by bureaucracy in Pakistan after independence from India. Alavi 
raises questions primarily with reference to the Marxist thesis of the state, but finds the 
relationships between the state and social classes are found to be far more complex in 
postcolonial states than explained by Marxism and the hegemony of a single ruling class.  
 
[T]he state in the postcolonial society is not the instrument of a single class. It is 
relatively autonomous and it mediates the competing interests of the three propertied 
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classes – the metropolitan bourgeoisies, the indigenous bourgeoisies, and the landed 
classes – while at the same time acting on behalf of all of them in order to preserve the 
social order in which their interests are embedded, namely the institution of private 
property and the capitalist mode as the dominant mode of production” (Alavi 
1973:148).  
 
Interests at stake for the so-called “propertied classes” are identified as follows. First, Alavi 
suggests that capitalist development in Pakistan took place under the “corrupt patronage and 
close control of the bureaucracy” (ibid:157) as business opportunities were restricted to a 
privileged few who managed to establish the necessary relationship with the bureaucracy. In 
the absence of direct political representation through a political party, however, the influence 
of the business community on the conduct of public affairs is seen as primarily through such 
direct contact with and influence on the bureaucracy itself. Second, Alavi claims that through 
recruiting their senior officers largely from wealthy rural families, landowning classes are not 
only afforded a built-in position within the bureaucracy, but bureaucrats have a direct stake in 
the privileges of the landed classes. To reinforce this link, officers were granted land and 
thereby became substantial new landowners in their own right. To justify this claim, the 
exemption of agricultural income from income tax is mentioned as an example of how 
landowners have been able to pursue their interests effectively. “Nevertheless”, he says, 
“landlords as a class, despite their close and effective links with the bureaucracy and their 
dominant role in party politics, cannot be said to have command over the bureaucracy” 
(ibid:158). The price policy of raw cotton, which worked to the disadvantage of the 
landowners and to the benefit of the business magnates who owned textile mills, is provided 
as an example in which the interests of landowners have been subordinated to those of the 
indigenous bourgeoisies. Last is the question of metropolitan bourgeoisies’ interests and their 
achievements. Although foreign businessmen, reinforced by governmental pressure, managed 
to enforce policies in Pakistan in support of foreign business to the detriment of domestic 
interests, Alavi does not see the metropolitan bourgeoisies as in complete command of 
bureaucracy either.  
 
Bureaucracy is found to be relatively autonomous because the common commitment, uniting 
all the three competing propertied social classes, for the preservation of a social order based 
on the institution of private property situates bureaucracy within the matrix of a class society. 
Bureaucracy is described as relatively autonomous as no single class can be said to have 
exclusive command over it. The role of bureaucracy then is both to preserve a certain social 
order and to mediate between the competing demands of the three propertied classes. Whether 
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one goes along with Alavi’s claim for such a threefold class-based competition between major 
interests, his analysis nevertheless reveals an important aspect, namely close-knit relations 
between powerful social actors and bureaucracy, from which Bengalis were mainly excluded. 
Being excluded from important areas of social and economic life gave impetus to the Bengali 
movement for equitable treatment.  
 
As the Bengali movement progressed, reluctantly – but inevitably – the dominant 
Punjabi bureaucratic elite yielded some of the demands of the movement for a fair 
share of jobs and promotion. As a consequence, by the late 1960s, the provincial 
administration in East Bengal was almost wholly staffed by Bengali civil servants at all 
levels. Bengali progress was less remarkable in the central government. It was not until 
1969 that for the first time a few Bengali officers were installed as secretaries to the 
central government, at the head of some minor ministries. The bastions of power – the 
Ministries of Defence and Finance, the Planning Commission, and the Establishment 
Division – were still retained securely in trusted West Pakistani hands (ibid:168).  
 
When the war broke out, leaders of the Awami League leading the independence movement 
and a number of civil servants crossed the border to India to form a government-in-exile. 
According to Khan and Zafarullah, it was from this experience bureaucracy came to be 
“enmeshed in politics” (1991:657). As the politicians lacked prior administrative experience, 
the civil servants played a vital role in organising the civil administration and the activities of 
the government-in-exile. After the war, these civil servants, seen as patriots for their 
contribution to the independence movement, were rewarded with key positions in the new 
administration. Those who remained during the war and continued their work, irrespective of 
personal feelings toward the cause for independence or attitudes toward the Pakistani military 
regime, were seen as collaborators and dismissed from the services. Determined to keep the 
civil service under its control, a large number of senior civil servants were forcibly retired 
under a special presidential order that provided for dismissal of any officer without the right 
of appeal. Another move in this direction was the lateral induction of a large number of party 
supporters with little or no prior administrative experience to high ranks in the civil service. 
By the end of 1974, however, the growing economic crisis, the increasingly violent role of 
radical political parties, and the ineffectiveness of the Awami League due to factional strife 
made it difficult to maintain the popularity and support needed to stay in power. In an attempt 
to remedy the situation, the multiparty parliamentary system was replaced by a one-party 
presidential system concentrating all powers in the chief executive. To enforce the 
transformation, high-ranking civil servants were inducted into the highest policymaking 
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bodies of the party, appointed governors of administrative units at sub-national level, and 
selected for various political positions.  
 
For more than a decade after the fall of the Awami League regime, the country was either 
under military rule or its ‘civilianised’ version. Senior bureaucrats were appointed members 
of presidential advisory councils immediately after the two military takeovers in 1975 and 
1982. They also sat on important advisory committees and made members of reform planning 
bodies positioning them to influence almost all governmental decisions.  
 
By appointing a number of official groups to work out reform plans, successive governments 
since independence have shown commitment to bring about reforms in the administrative 
service. Certain basic changes to the structure were recommended and measures were outlined 
to develop an integrated public personnel management system encompassing a rational 
selection process based on merit, long-term career planning, coordination of institutionalised 
training, and a promotion system based on merit and seniority. To remove discrepancies 
among different services, uniform scales of pay were proposed along with equitable scope for 
advancement, and the creation of an elite cadre at the top of the hierarchy drawing on 
personnel from all over the civil service structure. While initiatives to work out reform plans 
have been plenty, implementation was modest, maintaining for the most part the status quo, 
which only intensified tendencies of rivalry within the service while making it more 
vulnerable to political interference.  
 
One aspect of this rivalry was that between the members of the Civil Service of Pakistan and 
the East Pakistan Civil Service, another between the generalists and the specialists. With the 
passing of time, the first dissolved into the second as the services were amalgamated into the 
Bangladesh Civil Service (BCS) and both were generalists with a common interest to counter 
the growing strength of specialist civil servants. From the time of the British, policymaking 
positions have been reserved for the members of small and distinct groups. Europeans 
subordinated Indians and West Pakistanis subordinated East Pakistanis. After independence, 
non-generalists envisioned that the erstwhile dominating tendency of one service group over 
other segments of the bureaucracy would end and that a system would emerge wherein equity 
for all civil servants in terms of their career advancement and prospects would be ensured. 
Reform planning bodies suggested reforms much along the same lines, but the generalists 
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have only consolidated their position and continued their domination over important public 
agencies.  
 
According to Hugh Tinker, as part of imperial legacy, the British left “the nucleus of a 
capable national Civil Service”. The problem was that India was not prepared to deal with the 
new political situation. He claims that  
 
the need to transform the public service from an imperial to a national elite (the process 
known in these days as “-ization”) was nowhere anticipated sufficiently early… 
Equally, however, it may be argued that nowhere in Southern Asia did Britain utterly 
fail to leave as part of the imperial legacy the nucleus of a capable national Civil 
Service… The clash between politicians and administrators is one of the most general 
features of the process of “decolonialization”. In some cases the main struggle came 
before, in some cases after, the formal transfer of power. British policy, although far 
from consistent, made a fairly general effort to provide a bridge between foreign 
“absolute” rule and national “popular” rule by a partial transfer of authority, both at the 
upper levels of power by some form of dyarchy, and at the lower levels by the gradual 
development of institutions of local self-government (1966:79-80). 
 
Under British rule bureaucracy, at least the Indian part of the civil service serving as it did 
foreign interests, was definitively separate from any individual social or political interests. 
While the British maintained, almost throughout, a system of patronage for appointments and 
promotions of their own, the natives were, as shown, carefully selected based on proven skills 
and expected to be one hundred percent loyal to the system. Seen from the Indian point of 
view during foreign rule, politics and bureaucracy were indeed differentiated in the most 
rational manner: the British made decisions, which Indians executed. To back its decisions, 
the British had built a strong and loyal army ready to execute government orders, of whatever 
political complexion. With the transfer of power, however, politics and administration no 
longer belonged in two different worlds.   
 
In the cases of both Pakistan and Bangladesh, there are long-standing traditions of proximity 
between the army and the civil service with both serving as the supporting arm of 
government. Throughout much of the continent’s history, every significant change in 
government has in large, relied on the allegiance of the armed forces. In Pakistan, attempts to 
establish a military hierarchy running parallel to and supplanting the authority of the civilian 
administration, as a result of army take-overs and martial rule, have inevitably ruptured the 
bureaucratic-military alliance. Bangladesh has managed, despite instances of army take-overs 
and martial rule, to maintain the alliance. The situation in Bangladesh has rather been one of 
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the army striving to retain some autonomy and bureaucracy struggling to balance politics and 
autonomy. 
 
Thus, the British initially established and developed an organisation with the purpose of 
serving British trade interests. As the Company grew and expanded its functions, phases of 
adjustments followed. In service to the British Crown and parliament, in place of merely 
commercial interests, the organisation became ever more bureaucratic. As long as serving 
foreign interests, politics, bureaucracy and native interests were necessarily separate. After 
partition, and with the emergence of independent states, the relationship between government, 
its support system, and society became more complex facing new challenges. What this 
means in present day Bangladesh will be the focus of subsequent chapters starting with a 
closer look at the state as an object of study. 
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3 
Encountering the State: ceremonies as manifestation of 
state power 
 
There was a farmer who used to drink a lot. Once when he was going back home he was so 
drunk that he had trouble walking. Coming out from the house where he had been drinking he 
asked where the road had gone. The people said not to worry because he was standing on it. 
But then he fell into the drain. Puzzled he asked, “From where the drain has come here?” For a 
long time he just lay there wondering. Passers-by started asking what he was doing there and 
he answered that “I am trying to find the way back home and I don’t know from where the 
drain has come”. After a while he stood up and started walking again. He then hit a tall pole. 
He fell down and, looking up at the pole, declared, “I never before saw such a tall man 
standing before me”. Again passers-by started asking what he was doing there and he 
answered, “I have never before seen such a tall man”. Then he said, “This is my problem and I 
cannot go from here without the answer”. The people answered, “Yeah, when you are sitting 
there the pole is much taller than you”. He got up and started walking again. After a while he 
saw a ladder standing against a wall with cow dung on top. Again he cried, “This is another 
problem in front of me” and his question was how any cow could leave dung on top of a 
ladder. “How big was the cow?” he wondered. He stood there thinking, but found no answer. 
Again passers-by started asking what he was doing there. And he said, “See here; there is cow 
dung on the top of the ladder, but how that is possible? How big was the cow?” The people 
answered that when a cow left this dung the ladder was on the ground. Later, a farmer came 
and put the ladder up against the wall and that was why. The explanation satisfied the drunken 
man who said that “Yeah, now I got the answer” and he started walking again. Then there was 
a king. He came along riding on an elephant. Seeing a man balancing on the road the king 
ordered him to get out of the way. “Give me way to pass”, the king shouted. “Who are you?” 
asked the farmer. “Can you not see that I am the king?” Imitating the king the farmer said, “I 
am the king and I don’t know you. I am the king”, he repeated. The king became very angry 
and told his servants to arrest the man and take him to the palace. And so they did. Later on, 
and after sobering up, the farmer was presented before the king. The king wanted to punish 
him and inquired, “Why you have done this? You were standing in front of me disobeying my 
order and refusing to give way”. The man answered that “The guy who was standing there in 
front of you, he has gone and this man now standing in front of you is another man. The 
former did not see and could not realise the situation”. The king laughed and was not able to 
punish him anymore. Instead he told the farmer to go home.33  
   
A friend, fond of using proverbs and anecdotes in his discussions, narrated the story. We were 
talking about how alcohol affects judgement and the potential dangers. In the story, a drunken 
farmer angered a king by refusing to recognise his position and the king had him arrested. 
Facing his prosecutor, the sobered up farmer made a providential escape by acknowledging 
the mistake and the king decided to accept the circumstances and let him go unpunished. The 
situation of a sovereign king in possession of an apparatus ready to execute orders by use of 
                                                
33 The story is written as it was told and without editing. 
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force makes him, according to classical theory, the state.34 That the question of the state is 
much more complex than merely the king’s power is what this chapter is about.  
 
“There is no such thing as the power of the State” A. R. Radcliffe-Brown declared over half a 
century ago, “there are only, in reality, powers of individuals – kings, prime ministers, 
magistrates, policemen, party bosses, and voters” (Radcliffe-Brown [1940] 1987:xxiii). To 
him, the idea of the state did nothing but create mystification, and he argued that “concepts of 
government and politics were all that are needed for an adequate grasp of the ‘political’” 
(Fuller and Harriss 2001:1). What Radcliffe-Brown and his contemporaries (see Fortes and 
Evans-Pritchard [1940] 1987) sought to escape was the idea of the state “as being an entity 
over and above the human individuals who make up a society” (Radcliffe-Brown op. cit.). 
The state was specifically rejected as an object of study. This ‘death by conceptualization’, as 
Michel-Rolph Trouillot (2001) aptly termed it, scarcely encouraged anthropologists to engage 
critically with the state. Several decades later, Philip Abrams took a similar stance towards the 
state noting that, “the state is not the reality which stands behind the mask of political 
practice. It is itself the mask which prevents our seeing political practice as it is” (Abrams 
1988:82). According to Abrams, there is a state-system and a state-idea, but that “[w]e are 
only making difficulties for ourselves in supposing that we have also to study the state – an 
entity, agent, function or relation over and above the state-system and the state-idea” (ibid.). 
Even after fifty years of asking what the state is, or taking it for granted as an object of 
political practice and political analysis, its nature has remained, he said, “quite spectacularly 
unclear” (ibid:59).  
 
In the previous chapter, the focus was on the emerging state as an organisation striving to 
establish itself as the stronger among competing powers and become sovereign. In this 
chapter, I will continue pursuing the question of what the state is and how it can be 
approached. As indicated by Abrams, although the state and theories about it have occupied 
centre stage for centuries already, attempts to arrive at an adequate definition are continuous. 
What most definitions about the state have in common, though, is the convergence with 
power, whether seen as that authority with the legitimate monopoly of physical force over 
                                                
34 Classical theory refers here to Weberian conceptualisation whereby the state is “an organization, composed of 
numerous agencies led and coordinated by the state’s leadership (executive authority) that has the ability or 
authority to make and implement the binding rules for all the people as well as the parameters of rule making for 
other social organizations in a given territory, using force if necessary to have its way” (Migdal 1988:19). See 
also Max Weber (1946:78).  
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defined territory (Weber); as a political force promoting capitalist interests (the Marxist vein); 
as an ideological project producing submissive subjects (Abrams op. cit.); or as a space 
composed of varied relations of power and the mentalities they embody (the Foucauldian 
perspective). Although difficult to define, as argued by Bruce Kapferer, “it is nonetheless a 
hard, if often different, shifting and uncertain, imagined and felt reality in the experience of 
most” (2005:286). So, if not merely an ideological superstructure, then what else and how can 
‘it’ (whatever it is) be approached? As in the colonial days, I argue, ceremonies are important 
for the constitution of state power, and as before, they are arenas for power struggles, which I 
will come back to later in this chapter.  
 
Drawing on anthropological perspectives discussed in the introduction (Gupta 1995, Ferguson 
& Gupta 2002, Sharma & Gupta 2006, Handelman 1998, 2004), the state can be explored as a 
ritual project seeing public ceremonies as manifestation of state power. As seen in chapter 2, 
the British in Victorian India used public events to visualise power and consolidate its 
sovereign position (Cohn 1983). This chapter will show how ceremonies are still used for 
arranging power. By engaging the past, changes and continuity in state order is discussed. 
Since my argument here rests on the notion that the state is all at once system and idea, real 
and illusory, process and structure, raised above, yet inseparable from society, it makes sense 
to begin with some general observations about theories of the state. 
 
Theories of the state 
 
To have a chance to really think a state which still thinks itself through those who attempt to think it, 
then, it is imperative to submit to radical questioning all the presuppositions inscribed  
in the reality to be thought and in the very thought of the analyst. 
Pierre Bourdieu et al. (1994:2) 
 
The analytical distinction between state-system and state-idea has played and continues to 
play a major role in scholarly thinking about the state. According to Abrams, one reason why 
political sociology seldom studies the state directly, or ends up explaining it away, is its 
‘commonsense nature’, that is: “the commonsense functions of the state – the determining and 
implementing of goals, the enforcement of law, the legitimation of order, the expropriation 
and allocation of resources, the integration of conflict” (1988:65), in other words; its rational 
intentions. This tendency has perhaps most evidently to do with taking the Weberian 
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definition of the modern state for granted, that is, as a rational organisation with “the ability or 
authority to make and implement the binding rules for all the people” (Migdal 1988:19). What 
were being studied were processes of grass-roots socialisation for political mobilisation. The 
result, Abrams says, was that “although a sense of the state was there the state was not treated 
effectively as part of the problem to be investigated” (Abrams op. cit:67). Even if the state has 
not been directly addressed, what such socialisation studies have done according to Abrams is 
to “establish the existence of a managed construction of belief about the state and to make 
clear the consequences and implications of that process for the binding of subjects into their 
own subjections”. And even if this binding process is not shown as a state effect, it proceeds 
in terms of the creation of certain sorts of perceptions of the state (ibid:68). The state thus 
emerges as ‘an ideological thing’ that can actually be shown to work like that because what is 
offered is “an account of political institutions in terms of cohesion, purpose, independence, 
common interest and morality without necessarily telling us anything about the actual nature, 
meaning or functions of political institutions. We are in the world of myth” (ibid.). From this 
Abrams concludes that one thing we can know about the state is that it is ideologically 
powerful, but is it more?   
 
The Marxist problem, claims Abrams, is that it remained trapped by reification of ‘the state’, 
as its authors “have both perceived the non-entity of the state and failed to cling to the logic of 
that perception” (ibid:69). Marx, Engels and Lenin are all listed as contributors to such an 
ambiguity, “assuring us that the state is somehow at one and the same time an illusion and ‘an 
organ superimposed on society’ in a non-illusory way; both a mere mask for class power and 
‘an organised political force’ in its own right” (ibid.). Marxist writers added to the list of 
authors contributing to this ‘distinctive Marxist ambiguity’ are Ralph Miliband and Nicos 
Poulantzas, although in more complex and ambiguous ways than most. Abrams suggests that 
the reason for such an ambiguity could be an “unresolved tension between marxist theory and 
marxist practice” (ibid:70), in which integration of class societies is explained by the 
existence of the state as an abstract-formal object, while Marxist practice needs the state as a 
real-concrete object as the immediate object of political struggle. More than an ambiguity, the 
problem with Marx is perhaps that he did not really take interest in the state as such treating it 
essentially as an instrument of class rule, i.e. a political power, which is what many of his 
successors seems to have done as well.  
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With a focus on the salient dimensions of contemporary political life, Miliband’s (1969) work 
demonstrates well how it is possible to study the cluster of institutions of political and 
executive control and their key personnel, as well as to trace their effects, but according to 
Abrams it does not explain how the state is constructed as an ‘illusory general interest’. 
Telling us that “‘the state’ has been the ‘main agent’ that has ‘helped to mitigate the form and 
content of class domination” the state “reappropriates a unity and volition which at the outset 
the author had been at pains to deny” (Abrams 1988:71). Instead of ‘unmasking’ the state and 
its ideological powers, the state is granted a type of existence beyond explanation.  
 
Like Miliband, Poulantzas (1973) proclaimed the unreality of the state saying that it is not a 
‘real, concrete singular’ object, not something that exists ‘in the strong sense of the term’. 
Rather, it is an abstraction, the conceptualisation of which is “a condition of knowledge of 
real-concrete objects” (Abrams 1988:72). Poulantzas goes far in recognising the state as an 
ideological project, attempting to uncover the structure hidden behind the concrete, but his 
insistence on the state as the cohesive factor within the overall unity of a social formation 
prevents him from going all the way. Seeing the state as the ‘cohesive factor’ implies a 
political function, but the nature of this function is rather inconsistently explained. According 
to Abrams, such a function has to involve the creation of ‘a place’ and the question is what 
sort of place it is; abstract-formal or real-concrete. Speaking of the actual political-juridical 
structures of ‘the state’, of ‘the political structures of the state’, ‘the institutional power of the 
state’, ‘the state as an organised political force’ and so forth, Poulantzas diverges from a 
consistent functionalism bringing the state back in as a real-concrete: “So function becomes 
place and place becomes agency and structure – the specific structures of the political”. If the 
state is nothing more than the name of the place and the agent of the function of maintaining 
unity in a situation of class struggle, Abrams questions “whether the centrality given to the 
state in that analysis is really a service to understanding” (ibid:73). The idea of a state with a 
political function of maintaining unity is in itself rather conventional, but to identify it as ‘the 
global role of the state’ is seen as a confusion between what the state does and what it is 
(confusing function with agency). Having recognised that “large parts of the process of 
cohesion, and of the condensation of contradictions, are not performed within 
commonsensically ‘political’ structures at all but are diffused ubiquitously through the social 
system” undermines any claim for the state as a unique constitution of functions. Furthermore, 
such a ‘global functionality’ suggests a global structural existence of the state, “a sense of its 
immanence in all structures perhaps” (ibid.). Thus, what prevents Poulantzas, and for that 
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matter Miliband, from going all the way, Abrams argues, is the failure to see the state as a 
historical ideological construction. 
 
Abrams’ suggestion, then, is for the attention to be directed to “the manner and means by 
which the idea of the existence of the state has been constituted, communicated and imposed” 
instead of clinging to the view, as many Marxist writers have done, that “the existence of the 
idea of the state does indicate the hidden existence of a substantial real structure of at least a 
state-like nature as well” (ibid:69). According to Abrams, internal and external relations of 
political and governmental institutions, the ‘state-system’, can be studied effectively without 
postulating the reality of the state. So in particular can their involvements with economic 
interests in an overall complex of domination and subjection. “But studies proceeding in that 
way”, he claims, “invariably discover a third mode, dimension or region of domination – the 
ideological” (ibid:75). For Abrams, the state emerges as ‘a third-order object’, ‘an ideological 
project’, ‘an exercise in legitimation’, and the particular function of the ideological is to “mis-
represent political and economic domination in ways that legitimate subjection” (ibid.).  
 
The assumption here is that there is no such thing as ‘a common cause’ or ‘disinterested 
domination’ because every institutional field has a history as a field of struggle. Historically, 
the outcome of political struggles has been institutionalised and causes of the struggles turned 
into the constitution of the state whereby partial interests are presented as common interests. 
As part of the process, formerly autonomous agencies, such as administrative, judicial, 
educational, and so forth, are turned into state agencies for the concentration of state power. 
And, as noted by Engels, once the state emerges an independent power vis-à-vis society, it 
produces an ideology – “an ideology in which the reality of the state is taken for granted” and 
the connection with, as in the Marxist thesis, economic facts “gets lost for fair” (ibid:76). 
According to Abrams, it is the production and reproduction of the idea of the state as an 
independent moral entity that needs to be dismantled and “attend to the senses in which the 
state does not exist rather than to those in which it does” (ibid:82, my italics). Doing this, he 
claims, will reveal the state as it really is: an assembly of uncoordinated practices and claims. 
Abrams thus shifts the focus away from the state as an object, to a far more diffuse field of 
power relations where the state becomes an ideological object that is used by the state-system 
to give it legitimacy (Krohn-Hansen & Nustad 2005). 
 
Chapter 3: Encountering the State 
 
 95 
Although inspired by Abrams, Timothy Mitchell argues for the non-separation of the material 
forms of the state from the ideological, or the real from the illusory: “The state-idea and the 
state-system are better seen as two aspects of the same process” (1999:77). The process in 
question is the creation of ‘the structural effect’, that is, the effect of practices that make state 
structures appear to exist. While for Abrams the state comes forth as a particularly powerful 
symbolic construction, internally linked to aspects of more complex power relations but with 
no reality beyond the ideological, Mitchell insists that “the idea of the state is itself a form of 
symbolic capital that enters into the material power of the state-system and is reciprocally 
upheld by it” (Fuller and Harriss 2001:5). According to Mitchell, it is not the ideological 
alone creating the idea of the state, but participation in the state-system; armies, schools, 
bureaucracies, and so forth creating the effect of a state structure external to processes 
producing them. What appears is a ‘machine’ greater than its individual parts (Krohn-Hansen 
& Nustad 2005:14). Abrams and Mitchell appear to be at variance in terms of how the idea of 
the state is produced, but in agreement on what it does: enforce social order. For Abrams, as 
noted, subjection is a question of historically constructed presentations of the state as a 
‘common interest’, while for Mitchell it is a matter of Foucauldian disciplining techniques. 
For both, however, the state is a matter of creating notions of a powerful system of control.  
 
In the much-celebrated article Blurred Boundaries: The Discourse of Corruption, the Culture 
of Politics, and the Imagined State (1995), Akhil Gupta reaches a similar conclusion about the 
ambiguous nature of the state, but from a different position. In his view, the state appears as 
little more than its everyday practices; the endless negotiations taking place between 
representatives of the state and the citizenry, in more or less familiar settings, making use of 
more or less familiar problem solving methods. Approaching such encounters as patterns of 
individual negotiations, the analysis shows how perceptions of the state are produced. What it 
does not do is explain the circumstances under which negotiations occurs in the first place. 
The problem of political sociology mentioned above also appears to apply here, namely that 
“although a sense of the state was there the state was not treated effectively as part of the 
problem to be investigated” (Abrams 1988:67). While Gupta deftly demonstrates the pertinent 
problem of drawing a fixed line between state and society in an Indian village, illuminating 
our understanding of what the state is not, he does not tell us much about the Indian state, 
except that it is a corrupted one. As important as his point about blurred boundaries may be, 
locating local village officials at roadside tea stalls and at home rather than in the office 
during working hours, government buildings and offices are a fact, and “nobody imagines that 
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the endless cups of tea and coffee drunk in India’s government buildings turn them into tea 
shops or homes” (Fuller and Harriss 2001:23). Except for images traced in news agencies, 
which mostly present the state as contested, Gupta has little to say about the ‘the imagined 
state’ that after all allows for an existence as something more than individual experiences over 
time.  
 
Gupta’s problem of conceptualising the state reflects perhaps the limitations of ethnographic 
methods favoured by anthropologists for the study of the state and for that reason “perhaps 
anthropologists have been well-advised in steering clear of it” (Fuller and Harriss 2001:1-2). 
Then again, having observed how the ‘The State’ creates some real effects by its very being, 
both as system and idea, the challenge remains to demonstrate and explain what it is. 
 
In making sense of the modern state in Bangladesh, it is vital to recognise that formally it is 
precisely that; modern and a state, possessing all the characteristic institutions of an army, a 
judiciary, a school system, and a bureaucracy. And, as noted by Fuller and Harriss in the case 
of the Indian state, through all these characteristics and in all these respects;  
 
the state can and often does appear to people… as a sovereign entity set apart from 
society by an internal boundary that seems to be as real as its external boundary. A 
local administrative office, a government school, a police station: to enter any of these 
is to cross the internal boundary into the domain of the state, whose conceptual 
separation from society is perhaps most ubiquitously symbolized by all its special-
purpose buildings with their painted notice-boards outside (2001:23).  
 
Although structurally established as modern and rational, power of the state cannot be taken 
for granted, as pointed out in the introduction of the thesis. In the previous chapter, the South 
Asian state was emerging as a site of sovereignty, a centre of political will, and as a power 
above partial interests. To communicate its position, and trying to follow an old tradition for 
establishing power relations, the British arranged grand public ceremonies aimed at ritually 
establishing the Crown as the single superior power supported by all (Cohn 1983). As 
Michael Walzer says, “The state is invisible; it must be personified before it can be seen, 
symbolized before it can be loved, imagined before it can be conceived” (1967:194). Public 
ceremonies are still used, I will argue, as a mean to establish the state not only as a power, but 
as a particular system of power relations. “Through rituals”, claims David Kertzer, “aspiring 
political leaders struggle to assert their right to rule, incumbent power holders seek to bolster 
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their authority, and revolutionaries try to carve out a new basis of political allegiance”.35 In 
what follows, it will become clear that rituals play an important role in realising state order.  
 
Rituals of the state 
 
For the analysis of the power of the state, I will present some cases of public ceremonies 
organised in the interest of the state, starting with the Prime Minister’s visit in Dinajpur. In 
this case the state emerges not only as powerful, but even sovereign. In addition, and as in the 
past, the state appears as a power hierarchically organised, but now in two distinct ways: one 
based on positions dividing between higher and lower; the other as separate powers dividing 
between the political and the bureaucratic. The selected cases enable the analysis of both. 
 
Inauguration ceremonies and a visiting Prime Minister 
 
I had been back in Dinajpur, my first fieldwork site, for a few days and was riding around on 
a rickshaw with Mr. V.36 Mr. V. is the male householder of where I stayed in 1996 (see 
introduction). Passing the state guesthouse, Circuit House, I noticed all the people busy with 
maintenance work of the buildings, attending the garden, and painting the walls surrounding 
the premises. This was not the only place getting a face-lift and tools and paint were put to 
good use on walls and buildings all along the main road. What was this sudden stir about? It 
was the obvious question since maintenance work is seldom prioritised in public places. The 
answer was even more obvious I was told. The Prime Minister (henceforth PM) was coming 
for a visit the day after and the so-called ‘beautification projects’ were part of paying her due 
respect. PM Begum Khaleda Zia was born and raised in Dinajpur and her mother, Mrs. 
Toiuba Majumdar, still lives there. Her sister, Khurshid Jahan Haque, Women and Children 
Affairs Minister, often travels to Dinajpur to attend political party meetings or smaller scale 
inaugurations, but this time the PM herself was coming.    
 
                                                
35 The term ‘rituals’ is used in a more general sense indicating “symbolic behaviour that is socially standardized 
and repetitive” (Kertzer 1988:9). 
36 Following anthropological convention, names of persons and more specific places throughout the thesis are 
pseudonyms.  
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Later in the afternoon government cars passed at high speed on the otherwise tranquil roads 
and Mr. V. said that all government officials from the Deputy Commissioner down to the last 
peon would be working frantically to get everything in order to receive the PM. According to 
his information, she would arrive by helicopter in the morning and travel by car to various 
destinations in the region. In Dinajpur, she had been asked to first inaugurate, “work on a 250-
megawatt coal-fired thermal electricity plant being set up at Barapukuria” and “commercial 
lifting of coal from the Barapukuria coal mine”,37 and second, Dinajpur Government 
Veterinary College. I decided this to be a good opportunity to observe the response such a 
visit created. After inquiring about the programme and getting different answers to where she 
would be when, it was difficult to decide which schedule to be the more reliable. Since the 
new college was closer to Mr. V’s house, timing for, and activities around this inauguration 
could be most easily observed.  
 
Rumours had it that the PM would arrive at the college around noon the following day and 
from early morning people started gathering along the main road. Local party members from 
the PM’s Bangladesh National Party (BNP) went door-to-door to farmers, fishermen, and 
other poor people of nearby villages distributing small paper flags printed for the occasion 
and partly requesting, partly demanding them to be present to greet the PM. On the occasion 
of a visiting leader, the local machinery usually works hard to gather as many people as 
possible to give the impression of popularity. “To show the general mass their artificial 
popularity”, Mr. V. humorously commented. A few taka38 and free snack for everyone 
attending is promised, but perhaps equally effective ensuring sufficient attendance is the use 
of threats. People in already deprived situations will usually not need much persuasion 
knowing their refusal to participate can have severe consequences, ranging from neglected 
public services such as water and power supplies, telephone connections, sewage and 
drainage systems, road constructions, and so forth; to court cases being filed with false 
accusations requiring resources beyond imagination to counteract. Besides, it was not 
everyday a PM was traversing this relatively remote part of the country and people are 
curious.   
 
                                                
37 Phrasings in quotes are taken from a local newspaper reporting on upcoming events 22 April 2003, and the 
inauguration was for the work of setting up, as production on the power plant was not expected before 2005.  
38 100 Bangladeshi taka equals about 8,99 Norwegian kroner (http://www.oanda.com/convert/classic, 12 June 
2007).  
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For hours and hours, and under the surveillance of a large number of police officers, people 
stood along the roadside under the glaring hot sun, with flags in hands, patiently waiting. 
Assuming the PM would have lunch at the Circuit House around one o’clock, Mr. V’s son 
(see key figures in the introduction) and I delayed our own departure for the college until the 
afternoon and set out by rickshaw around four. All along the road, people greeted us; waving 
their flags, smiling and shouting. The armed police officers kept everyone in place. 
Provisional gates with banners welcoming the PM to Dinajpur succeeded one another on the 
road and we passed about a dozen on our short rickshaw ride. A few minutes before reaching 
our destination, a police officer ordered the rickshaw to a halt; blowing his whistle and 
gesticulating, we were asked to step down. A motorcade was approaching. At high speed and 
under ear-splitting sirens, accompanied by the noise of violently blown horns, came first two 
police pickup trucks crowded with armed officers. About twenty vehicles – microbuses, jeeps, 
an ambulance, and trucks – packed with heavily armed service personnel followed. Among 
the jeeps there were four identical black ones with darkened windows so as not to disclose the 
one transporting the PM. Everyone cheered and waved their flags. After passing, our 
rickshaw, together with buses, motorcycles, and rickshaw-vans, were allowed to continue and 
we joked about how perfect our timing was as VIPs should always arrive last. However, only 
a few minutes later, a policeman’s whistle, accompanied by gestures, again signalled the 
traffic to clear the road as the motorcade was returning. The PM herself had taken an early 
departure, but I was assured that other VIPs would still be present. The problem was that we 
were not in possession of entry passes. Looking European, though, usually works as an entry 
pass and we proceeded, as the crowds along the road started to disperse. The PM had come 
and gone and normality could return.  
 
Reaching the college, we found ourselves again amidst a crowd waiting outside a closed gate, 
but not for long. Seeing the foreigner, an aide of the college guarding the gate took immediate 
action and invited us in. Inside we met a teacher who insisted on giving us a guided tour. 
While walking, she explained that when the PM came all she did was cut a red ribbon, shake a 
few hands, and smile to the cameras before hurrying back out to the waiting jeep; no speech 
or anything. An organising committee had worked for weeks to prepare the visit and to make 
sure all was in order at this very important event. Having been shown around the premises, we 
were asked to stay for tea. Refreshments were served outside the main building, but we were 
told to join the more important guests in the principal’s office. The seating arrangement in the 
office followed a familiar pattern: three rows of chairs in front of the desk, as well as one row 
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along each side. Behind a solid desk sat the principal together with the guest of honour, who 
for the occasion was a Joint Secretary. Teachers were seated to the left, a little removed from 
the desk, and the Director General of Department of Livestock Services in Dhaka and 
Assistant Director of Power Cell under the Ministry of Energy and Mineral Resources to the 
secretary’s close right. In front were other government officials and some businessmen. I was 
told to take a seat in front of the desk. Mr. Joint Secretary, Mr. Director General, and Mr. 
Assistant Director had all accompanied the PM first to the power plant and later to the 
college, but someone had to stay behind for tea on behalf of the PM. Mr. Joint Secretary 
talked energetically on the phone when we entered giving the impression of a busy man with 
many commitments. By the time tea was served the room was bustling with conversation – 
only interrupted by the principal constantly pressing the buzzer on his desk calling for the 
peon who was running back and forth making sure guests were properly taken care of.  
 
On returning to Chittagong and meeting up with a government official (GO), who I regularly 
interacted with, I decided to tell him about the event of the PM’s visit to Dinajpur. The 
conversation proceeded as follows:  
 
Anthropologist: We were coming down the street on a rickshaw and (he interrupts) 
GO: You will find colourful banners there.  
Anthropologist: Many. There were more than a dozen banners on the street and lots of people 
standing there with (interrupted again) 
GO: Placards.  
Anthropologist: Flags. 
GO: Flags and placards; like that.  
Anthropologist: Bangladeshi flags. BNP party members had been distributing flags. We were 
on a rickshaw when a policeman stopped us and told us to get off the rickshaw. Twenty cars 
were passing.  
GO: Yeah, ministers’ cars.  
Anthropologist: Prime Minister Khaleda Zia came, twenty cars passing, and all the people 
standing at the roadside waving their flags. She was opening the veterinarian college in 
Dinajpur and we were on our way down there to see. She passed us on the road and we had 
only a few minutes before reaching there… Few minutes later they all came back; she hurried 
inside, cut the ribbon, and hurried back out.  
GO: She has got cameraman with her.  
 
Mr. GO (see key figures in the introduction) needed no explanation of what had happened; he 
already knew the procedures. His many years in service had taught him and on several 
occasions he had been involved in similar events. What was his comprehension then?  
 
Anthropologist: I was thinking about what the people standing along the road could have been 
thinking; twenty cars coming like that and like you said [in a prior conversation] they are 
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hungry and their stomachs are empty. She is coming with twenty cars, police force and 
(interrupted again) 
GO: So many people. Just then you were seeing twenty cars and policemen, but before that, 
one week or two weeks before; NSI (National Security Intelligence), helicopters, air force 
people coming looking for places to land, and SSF (Special Security Force). If they give green 
signal, before riding helicopter also, then she moves. Other ways she never moves. If she likes 
to come to [Bagerpur39] you will be surprised, but if you don’t see it is not possible for me to 
make you understand. All of the officials of Chittagong Division and every district officer 
pending will all be planning where she should land; what will be the heliport; even toilets they 
make for one or two hours. This is a poor country and toilet is made in places were it cannot 
be used in the future. In that way toilet is made, heliport is made, and everybody working day 
and night for this – 24 hours working.  
Anthropologist: This is what I mean; when people standing at the roadside seeing all these 
things; what are they thinking? The money spent on (interrupted) 
GO: These poor people all are, sometimes I become excited and say that, all these fucking 
people they are all happy and they just wave their hands to the PM and they become happy. I 
use to say that waving your hand fulfils your stomach? Sometimes I say to the people that you 
are waving to the PM like this then stomach fulfilled? Then they just become surprised 
because people are actually not supposed to say like that – like me – but sometimes out of 
excitement, curiosity, and frustration I say such things. Why I should stop here? PM is also 
waving. She is staying in AC car, in a very cool car, with air freshener, and in a mosquito free 
zone and you are under the sun. Who told you to stand-by here? For the last two or three hours 
you are standing here. Who says? You go for your work and that will give you food in your 
stomach. Waving to the PM does not give you food in your stomach. People say, why you are 
saying like that, and I am saying that this is reality. Try to understand; go and think and then 
have some sound sleep at night. Think about me and what I said and later on you can 
understand. Tomorrow you will have to fight for your life. Tomorrow the PM will not come 
and you will not get the chance to wave your hand and your stomach will not fulfil. This is 
past and time is yours. Days already past, but tomorrows feeding you have to manage yourself. 
Nobody is coming then.  
 
From my position, the whole state spectacle appeared amusing and worth narrating, but to Mr. 
GO there was nothing amusing about it. He was annoyed about the extravaganza surrounding 
such events and criticised politicians for lack of responsibility allowing for what he saw as 
careless spending of limited government resources. In his bureaucratic way of thinking, a poor 
country could not afford such display of power and people would be better off caring for 
themselves than playing along with it.  
 
On more than one occasion, Mr. GO expressed contempt for politicians and their priorities. In 
his view, politicians and civil servants share a responsibility for the people and for their 
welfare. Spending vast resources improving the infrastructure only to accommodate a visiting 
PM he saw as contrary to such responsibilities. Mr. GO appeared to have not only accepted 
the whole colonial idea about serving the state discussed in the previous chapter, but even 
                                                
39 The name “Bagerpur” is a pseudonym for an upazila in Chittagong.  
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incorporated it, a claim that I will explain in a later chapter. For now I will concentrate on the 
power structures of the state as manifested in ceremonies.  
 
Whereas in British-colonial times bureaucracy in India was the state, the post-colonial 
situation brought about the separation of powers dividing the state into a political and a 
bureaucratic order (see chapter 2). In today’s Bangladesh, the chief political figure is the 
prime minister. The president is the head of state, but in a parliamentary system where the 
president is elected by the legislature this is a largely ceremonial post with limited powers. 
The prime minister as the head of government holds real power. This power structure, though, 
demands no reality in itself and its existence is in its enactment.  
 
As in the colonial days, ceremonies are important for the demonstration of state power, and as 
before, they are arenas for power struggles (see discussion of Cohn’s article Representing 
Authority in Victorian India in chapter 2). While in the past, these were struggles between 
foreign and native powers, the struggle is now between the political and bureaucratic. 
Whereas politicians are elected for limited periods, civil servants are civilian career public 
sector employees working for a government department or agency. To stay in office, 
politicians depend on being re-elected, while bureaucrats have life-long career patterns. 
Nevertheless, it is the political that sets the agenda and subordinates the bureaucratic, which 
is, as expressed by Mr. GO, not completely straightforward. I will return to this shortly.  
 
In the case described, the hectic activities around the PM’s visit functioned as a general 
notification of an important upcoming event; the topmost political leader of the country was 
coming. She was not, however, travelling alone. Along with her came senior civil servants 
representing the respective authorities of the places visited stressing the relationship between 
the political establishment and bureaucracy. Participation of the different levels of 
administration stressed its hierarchical structure. Mobilisation of different societal segments, 
from the farmers and fishermen waiting by the roadside to the VIPs having tea in the 
principal’s office, allowed for the spectacle to unfold and for the state to emerge. Parading the 
streets before the crowds completely hidden inside cars, cutting ribbons before invited guests 
behind closed gates, having tea in seclusion, and so on is a demonstration of state power in all 
its complexity, which is a theme also for the next case.  
 
Chapter 3: Encountering the State 
 
 103 
A book-release ceremony 
 
Functions are indeed many in Bangladesh and government officials are regularly called on to 
participate. Mr. GO expressed weariness about having to partake, but said he had no choice 
because it was part of the job. Once he tried to turn down an invitation to a publishing 
ceremony. The writer was releasing his latest book of poems and government officials had 
been invited to ‘grace the occasion’. Head of district administration, Union Nirbahir Officer 
(UNO), and the magistrate were both attending and requested Mr. GO to join them, but he 
wanted to be excused. He said: “I don’t like ceremonies very much and I don’t understand 
poems. I am very much realistic and my equation is straight cut: I’ll work hard and earn 
money. I’ll look after my family, sleep, and then I’ll work again. This is my equation. I don’t 
like to go through poems and other things for thinking”. They kept sending for him and he 
finally went. His presence was required in order to make the spectacle complete.   
 
Magistrate gave me the book and they brought me up on the stage, but I am not prepared for 
what is going on or what the poems are about. I don’t understand very much. This one poem I 
understood very easily where the subject is hand. I said “I understand only one poem and that 
is very easy. By hand we can do very good things and we can do bad things”. This one could 
be understood and I conveyed some of the message to the writer. This also came in the daily 
newspaper with my name. I said that I want the writer to write with his pen about our society, 
about our dishonest people, about those people who are suffering as they are honest. For their 
suffering his pen should move. His pen should not move to bring some moneymen here with 
their crowd to make it sell more. That should not be his motto or his objective. Then he also 
became surprised. I said that, “You just write so many poems there, certainly you called me, 
but I don’t understand all the poems. I don’t have much time to go through all the books so I 
just picked one poem that I understood, which is related with the hand. Those hands can do 
good things, but they can do bad things also”. With this poem about the hand I just started my 
speech. People were laughing. People were actually laughing at the time when I was 
delivering my speech. Usually they don’t hear this kind of speech from the official because the 
officials they never utter this kind of thing: malpractice, dishonesty, or bribery. They never 
utter this kind of words in that way. Look like they are all angels, but people are all bad. They 
all pretend to be angels; they are doing what they are doing and this is all correct. They act as 
if what they do is right and they see it as their job to give guidelines to the audience. I say that 
first give the dais people guidelines. The audience is ok and they are not making any harm to 
the other people … At the dais there maybe three to eight persons sitting down to deliver 
speeches before the audience. Audience is so many people and guest speakers are only a few. 
Looks like the situation is that only the speakers are the talented ones and they are the only 
persons that are very good; they are honest and they are intellectual. When I go to some 
meetings I find that people, especially our officers in bureaucracy, never talk about the real 
things. When they sit down their attitude is like that; that we are all angels seated here and all 
the devils and all the culprits are in the audience. So we have to say something good for them.  
 
Speaking on the occasion, Mr. GO knew what was expected of him but decided to address his 
audience differently. According to him, he took everyone by surprise talking about dishonesty 
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in the services with the result of people laughing. On the other hand, the way the story was 
narrated bears testimony to a felt responsibility to do exactly what he accused his colleagues 
of doing, that is, acting as an authority person telling others what to do. Being present as 
‘special guest’, taking his seat on the dais and, although hesitantly, delivering a moral speech, 
Mr. GO played his part in demonstrating power.  
 
On this occasion, and by virtue of his position as head of the district administration, Mr. UNO 
had been invited as the Chief Guest, but his superior position could only be realised through 
the attendance of subordinates. On arrival, Mr. GO was immediately placed on the dais next 
to Mr. UNO and Mr. Magistrate and entrusted to speak first, as the lowest ranking officer 
among the three. As a bureaucratic system, the state is a hierarchically ranked order ranging 
from a ministerial secretary in Dhaka to the last peon in the local administration. On its most 
local level, UNO is the highest-ranking officer and everyone else will be arranged according 
to his superior position. On occasions of secretaries or other senior civil servants visiting from 
Dhaka, UNO is no longer the central figure and will take the role of subordinate. In this way, 
the state is continuously (re)forming itself according to the position of the highest-ranking 
officer present, but the fundamental order remains the same, namely hierarchical. I will now 
go to the next case which is also, as mentioned above, about the question of hierarchy, only 
this time in relation to the state as separate powers: the bureaucratic and the political.  
 
Staging a ceremony 
 
In particular, politicians tend to arouse people’s curiosity and whenever a minister is present 
there will be large crowds gathered to see what is going on. To Mr. GO, representation meant 
more than cutting ribbons and shaking hands in front of cameras. The welfare of the people 
were at stake and the very thought of taking advantage of that he found appalling, which was 
why he resented politicians.  
 
Last time I was not with that programme, but I was in the audience. I saw somebody coming 
to dance at the stage, but there is no karen, no light, and flashlight is given by a cameraman. 
There is no sound either. People [on stage] are coming and going, coming and going, but no 
speeches are delivered. I’m asking some people [from the audience] what is happening and are 
told that the minister is there. Later on when the magistrate came down from the stage I asked 
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him “Mama40, what happened there? I saw you people just coming and going, coming and 
going, but no delivering of speeches”. He said, “You didn’t understand? This is just acting to 
show us on TV”. Without sound this was going on and I said that “We are foolish and the 
audience is here to see this kind of thing”. He was laughing and saying that “Mama, you have 
nothing to do. As the minister instructed me I did”. I said, “If the minister told you to go right 
to the toilet, and you don’t need to go to the toilet, you should go?” Again he is laughing and I 
said, “Mama, this should not be”. I felt deeply shocked on that day. I said that “We are all 
waiting to hear what speech our minister and our officers will deliver, and we are eagerly 
waiting, but you were just coming and going.” He said “We were just acting. The meeting had 
finished already”… This country is really an interesting country and I think in my old age, if I 
get time, maybe I will write a book [about it]… In the newspaper you can read about the 
minister distributing relief material to the poor... That is the same thing. Maybe four or five 
people are given. They just distribute and come back. They are directing the cameraman to get 
ready. The minister is saying “Are you taking my picture or not?” “Sir, I am getting ready.” 
“Oh, ok. May I start?” “Yes, Sir, you can start.” And he starts giving, saying that “Come on 
you are a good man, trying to work hard”. After two or three he says “Stop, stop. Go and give 
it to the TV. I am leaving”. What kind of country is this? This is not affection to the people 
and this is not his duty. This is… only for exposure… and people’s empty stomach is not 
important.   
 
Examples of a minister in search of media exposure might not strike one as remarkable, but 
rather quite mundane in the world of politics. Presidents and ministers from all over the world 
can regularly be seen inaugurating new projects such as industrial plants, schools, and 
hospitals; engaging in community work; or chairing meetings, in short, engaging in any event 
promising publicity. In Mr. GO’s clearly rationalistic way of thinking, the people elect 
politicians and their main responsibility should therefore be towards the electorate. Finding 
ministers more concerned about media exposure than their responsibilities as elected leaders 
angered him. Sitting with the audience he felt disillusioned to see how the programme went 
on without electricity and with no regard to the people who he believed had come to be 
addressed by the minister and other officials expressing some visions for the future. As soon 
as the television crew had finished recording, the minister left and the event was over. 
Although resentful towards a minister behaving in such a way, worse yet, in Mr. GO’s 
opinion, is how he and his colleagues were expected to take part.   
 
You know what our minister does? When some development work is going on [in his 
constituency] he wants to inaugurate the programme. When he sees that sunset is coming, its 
getting late, and it will not be possible to telecast this news to the TV then he just bring the 
people; UNO, Magistrate, and other officers. He calls all the officers to come. “Sir, what’s 
happening?” they ask. “You just go in front of the microphone and you just move your 
mouth.” “Why?” “It will be on TV.” Why should I act like this? I don’t understand and I feel 
shy. The cameraman will take the picture and he will spread this news. Why should I act like 
this? Peculiar, this country is peculiar.  
                                                
40 Mama is a familiarity term literally meaning mother’s brother (see also footnote nr. 56).  
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On the one hand there is bureaucracy, consisting of professionals employed according to 
proven skills and for an indefinite period of time to perform specific tasks. On the other is the 
political system, consisting of representatives of political parties elected for a limited period 
of time and espousing a certain policy direction. From a political point of view, the state is 
that pliable apparatus entrusted in the hands of political forces committing itself to the task-
of-the-day. At the same time, the state, going back to the times of the British, was instituted as 
something larger and more durable than the prevailing regime in power at any one time. To 
transcend its own temporality, political forces seek alignment with the more durable state 
system by subordinating bureaucratic order to political authority. Acting on its own, that is, 
ceremonies without the political presence, bureaucracy arrange itself according to its own 
principles. In the presence of the political, bureaucratic authority is made dependent on 
unpredictable political behaviour, an unpredictability that is in direct opposition to its very 
constitution.  
 
This temporal aspect of political interests, seen as both opposed to, and dependent on, the 
more permanent and enduring character of a state apparatus, is a potential source of tensions 
between bureaucracy and the political, as expressed by Mr. GO. As a bureaucrat, Mr. GO had 
to deal with people’s needs and demands, on a daily basis, but was acutely aware of the gap 
between political promises and the limited means available to fulfil them. The minister’s 
apparent lack of interest in the welfare of the people, using bureaucrats merely to support a 
political strategy showing a minister pretending to be interested in development work, 
angered Mr. GO. His resistance can be taken as an indication of change not only in relation to 
the function and idea of the state (question of interests to serve), but also in relation to the 
very order of the state.  
 
As a civil servant, Mr. GO has been trained by a system developed under different 
circumstances and serving different ends. As seen in the previous chapter, bureaucracy went 
through several stages as British interests in India kept changing, but maintained a certain 
degree of autonomy throughout the colonial period. After independence, first from the British 
and last from Pakistan, the political was becoming increasingly dominant, subordinating the 
bureaucratic to its interests, while the self-contained spirit of the services remained more or 
less the same (see chapter 2). The struggle between the political and the bureaucratic 
continues, as seen in the case of Mr. GO and his contempt for politicians, but during 
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ceremonies the political encompasses the bureaucratic. On the more daily bases though (and 
as in the colonial past, see chapter 2), bureaucrats represent the state and encounters with the 
state usually mean bureaucracy, as discussed below.  
 
Spatial arrangement of state power 
 
In the case of the PM’s visit to Dinajpur, having confirmed that she would come to inaugurate 
the two new projects, the whole local machinery was put to work. More specifically, the place 
had to look nice and considerable resources from an otherwise acutely strained local economy 
were spent on preparations. The bustling atmosphere informed of an important upcoming 
event. Everyone asked answered that it must be some important government official visiting 
and that it was probably the PM. The sudden need to improve the condition of the Circuit 
House and its surroundings was an indication of who was coming. Then there was the act of 
BNP party members’ making sure there were people at the roadside to observe the spectacle. 
People stood there for hours in the heat only to wave at the passing motorcade assuming the 
PM would be in one of the jeeps, but unable to see because of the darkened windows. At the 
destination, huge walls and the massive closed gate kept the uninvited out. For those standing 
outside, what they experienced was a brief glimpse of a PM confined between armed guards 
when entering and leaving. Inside, everyone invited could take part in the main ceremony, but 
only a few were invited to have tea in the principal’s office. The particular seating 
arrangement in the office with the guest of honour in the principal’s chair behind the desk 
played its part in evoking a sense of hierarchy. When entering the office with my assistant, a 
young student with an unimposing family background (son of Dinajpur family, see key figures 
in the introduction), we both waited for someone to let us know where to sit. Being told to sit 
in front of the desk visibly distressed my assistant who was, considering himself inferior to 
those present, ready to take a seat at the back. 
 
So far I have discussed ceremonies as the structure of state power and argued for a 
hierarchical order where type of office, bureaucratic or political, and position, higher or lower, 
decides authority. During ceremonies, people are categorised and ranked and through rituals 
made more or less powerful. As seen in the old durbar traditions discussed earlier, and in the 
cases discussed above, ceremonies are very much about making power visible and to this end 
spatial arrangements are important. From the above, changes in the order of the state came 
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into view (relationship between the political and the bureaucratic); the reminder of this 
chapter focuses on ceremonies as the reproduction of state order.  
 
Accommodating a Deputy Commissioner 
 
In a meeting with a Deputy Commissioner (DC) I was told about a letter he had received from 
the Ministry of Education containing new instructions regarding procedures for public 
examinations. “Irregularities and students adopting unfair means in the SSC (Secondary 
School Certificate) examination have been a problem for many years and there is now 
political will to take it seriously”, he explained. In the letter from the ministry, the local 
authorities were instructed to make sure the new procedures were implemented and the DC 
had called on all the Union Upazila Nirbahir officers of his district to arrange for meetings, 
inviting local political leaders, community leaders, school headmasters and teachers, social 
workers, and parents to participate. Over the next few days, the DC would attend the meetings 
together with the Additional Deputy Commissioner (ADC) for education and the 
Superintendent of Police (SP) to inform those present about the new procedures and reactions 
if not followed. The DC called them ‘motivational meetings’ and invited us to join the first to 
be held.41 
 
On returning to the DC’s office the next day, there were several official jeeps waiting outside, 
including a couple from the police. The DC travelled with the SP asking us to go with two of 
his office staff, as he could not be seen travelling in the same car as a female foreigner. The 
meeting was held in an open field next to UNO’s office under a large tent put up for the 
occasion and had already started by the time we arrived. Mr. Deputy Commissioner, Mr. 
Superintendent of Police and Mr. Additional Deputy Commissioner were shown to their 
chairs at the dais behind a large, flower-decorated table. A lot of people had turned up for the 
meeting and most seats on the floor were occupied. At the immediate front, which is where 
important guests are placed, all seats were taken. At a peon’s request, two seats were vacated 
and I was asked to sit. Seeing that my friend had not followed I turned to look for him and 
                                                
41 State schools in particular were infamous for mass cheating during exams. In 2002, the government decided to 
do something about it and ordered stern action against anyone responsible for what was termed as ‘indiscipline’ 
in the examination halls. Students caught in, or even only suspected of, cheating could be expelled and teachers 
“neglecting their duty in the examination hall”, i.e. failing to keep students from cheating, risked salary 
suspension or even indictment. 
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found him seated at the back. Shortly after, he was collected by the peon and placed next to 
me, but not without objections. His attempt to resist, claiming he would be fine at the back, 
was politely overruled by a gesticulation in my direction and an explanation that it would be 
better for the two of us to sit together. After the peon had gone, he said he did not expect to be 
seated in ‘the special chairs’, adding under his breath that someone else was even asked to 
give up these chairs for us. Practices of seating arrangements are common knowledge, but 
inexperienced in accompanying a DC to meetings, he did not anticipate the special treatment. 
Under normal circumstances he would have been just another ‘invisible’ spectator taking his 
seat in the back. The attention left him bewildered.42  
 
Invitation to lunch was not something he had anticipated either, but after the meeting we were 
asked to join the DC, the ADC, the SP, local political leaders from the two main political 
parties Awami League and Bangladesh National Party, and community leaders for lunch in 
UNO’s residence. Conversations taking place in UNO’s residence drew my attention to how 
the sequence of the speeches effectively discerns the hierarchy of authority. Everyone praised 
the DC for his initiative in arranging the meeting and for giving such an inspirational talk. The 
DC was the last to speak and he had questioned the argumentation of some educators 
speaking before him.  
 
These educators, working in semi-governmental schools, had raised the issue of unequal 
working conditions between government and semi-government teachers, implying the stakes 
to be higher for the latter group, which they claimed could explain teachers trying to help 
students through exams. If the government was serious about making improvements in the 
examination system, the same conditions should apply to all teachers, they said. In semi-
governmental schools, unless forty per cent of the students pass the SSC exams, teachers’ 
salaries are suspended. The government does not manage these schools, but having received 
recognition from the local board of education, salaries are paid by the government. The 
teachers said irregularities during exams in semi-governmental schools can be explained by 
the forty per cent rule and they questioned both its existence and the fact that it only applies to 
particular schools. The DC had answered that he did not see the relevance of comparing the 
conditions between the different kinds of schools because “there are many, many classes of 
people in the society”. Varying conditions would always persist, he claimed, as there has 
                                                
42 I will come back to practices of seating arrangements later.  
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always been and will always be differences between people. “Yes, I am the DC. I have one 
way of life and a salary that is not comparable to any of your salaries. So what are you trying 
to compare?” he had said frowning. His colleagues praised him for claiming his space of 
authority as the chief administrative officer of the district.  
 
Later, when discussing the meeting and the lunch conversations, my friend said he agreed 
with the teachers arguing for equal conditions, but that he was not surprised to hear the 
response. He said, “Government officials do not like to be challenged because they think of 
themselves as the ones to be giving directions and not the other way around”. In the meeting, 
teachers and headmasters had been given the opportunity to express their opinions, but 
speaking last, it was up to the DC to conclude the discussion however he saw fit. Although 
having found the DC’s behaviour in the meeting typical for government officials claiming the 
last word, my friend also found him unconventional in the way he had welcomed us in his 
office and included us in his programme. Besides talking to me with only the three of us 
present, the DC had also chatted with him without keeping the expected distance and instead 
treated him as a special guest. To be met with that kind of hospitality and friendliness was 
apparently not to be expected from someone of DC’s rank.   
 
A Deputy Commissioner out of office 
 
A similar observation was made on another occasion when meeting the same DC, but 
accompanied by someone else. This time I had been invited to learn about government 
projects initiated by the DC for a better environment. Travelling in separate cars was again 
required, but reaching the destination and walking together at the location, conversations were 
informal. On starting out on our trip my friend (a Chakma from the Hill Tracts, see key figures 
in the introduction) had already expressed concerns about spending much time with a high-
ranking government official and was anything but enthusiastic about staying the night at the 
state guesthouse. On returning to the Circuit House late afternoon, my friend said he had 
expected the DC to act formally, keeping a certain distance, but had on the contrary found his 
behaviour rather unpretentious and friendly. However, before going to dinner, the DC asked 
us to “please understand that it will be a formal dinner” and that we would be joined by 
colleagues from the city. Seeing my friend wearing shorts and t-shirt, the DC asked him to go 
back to his room and change into something more formal, as required when staying at the 
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state guesthouse. Looking stunned, but without a word, my friend did as he was told. Later, he 
expressed anger towards the DC for embarrassing him like that, giving him orders all of a 
sudden. While earlier that day the DC had conducted himself humorously sharing personal 
experiences, coming back to the guesthouse he immediately became serious. All through 
dinner he talked to his colleagues about government policies and official duties. As the 
highest-ranking officer, he was seated at the one end of the table with colleagues arranged 
next to him according to rank, and with the two of us (my non-government friend and myself) 
at the further end. Taking command of the conversations from the start, the DC stayed at the 
centre of attention the whole time, with his colleagues merely supporting his conclusions. 
 
In addition to such spatial arrangements for the visualisation of state power, government 
officials are granted certain privileges promoting their position. On the transfer system, civil 
servants in Bangladesh serve a maximum three years in each place, but usually less. The 
higher-ranking officials are offered accommodation, transportation, and a number of 
personnel at their service. The Superintendent of Police in Chittagong told me that there were 
nineteen people serving the government house where he was residing during his term there, 
including housekeepers, cooks, cleaners, gardeners, drivers, and guards. His wife and children 
stayed in Dhaka and he was living there alone. With the gates outside his house constantly 
guarded, uninvited visitors were kept at a secure distance. Whenever he left the house, it was 
in a jeep with darkened windows. He was also protected against unnecessary contact with the 
public at the police station. His office was at the end of the corridor and most of the time 
visitors were told to present their cases to his subordinates. If allowed to continue down the 
corridor and before entering the office, visitors had to first pass an anteroom where they were 
asked to submit name, position, and purpose of visit on a piece of paper which was taken to 
the SP for approval. Depending on circumstances, people could be kept waiting for hours only 
to be told at the end of the day to come back another day.  
 
The enclosed atmosphere created around government officers, the comprehensive procedures 
prior to any visits, and the exclusive treatment when figuring in public are all examples of 
state behaviour that are very much part of people’s everyday experiences. The procedures 
described are one way the state practices regulation and control by exposing itself as a higher 
authority with a capacity to create order and whose authenticity is confirmed through being 
enacted by those embodying and encountering the state. Even when private institutions 
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manage traditional functions of the state such as education, as will be seen in the next case, 
the state still plays a major role in how the event is organised and what it means.  
 
In the name of the state 
 
Education is commonly a state responsibility of wide public interest and a field where the 
state gets to practice its order. Education in Bangladesh is basically state financed. 
Government allocations to the education sector out of its revenue and development budgets 
primarily finance educational expenditures. Given the low revenue/GDP ratio, the 
government is however heavily dependent on external sources for financing its development 
budget. External aid finances more than 50 percent of government development expenditures 
on education.43 Despite vast spending, the government is far from reaching its goal of 
providing education for all (Compulsory Primary Education Act of 1990).  
 
By 2000, the number of NGOs involved in education programmes was more than 450 
facilitating around 2.5 million learners. Among the major NGOs offering non-formal 
education are BRAC (employing about a hundred thousand people!), PROSHIKA, Ahsania 
Mission, Friends in Village Development Bangladesh, Village Education Resource Center, 
CONCERN, Peoples Aid (GSS), and Rangpur Dinajpur Rural Service. BRAC alone, runs 
over 34,000 Non-formal Primary Schools and other providers take that figure up to well over 
50,000 schools.44 A study has shown that NGOs’ education programmes covered about eight 
percent of total enrolment in 1998, playing a complementary role alongside the main stream 
primary schools of the country, and that about eight percent of primary schools are run by 
NGOs (Education Watch Report, 1999).45 In addition, the number of international schools is 
rapidly increasing. Hence, the function of providing education in Bangladesh is, to an 
increasing extent, taken up by a number of non-governmental institutions, as well as private 
actors, subjected to varying degrees of state regulations depending on type of institution.  
 
                                                
43 Source: National Policy Review Forum 2003, United Nations Online Network in Public Administration and 
Finance, http://unpan1.un.org/intradoc/groups/public/documents/APCITY/UNPAN018224.pdf, June 2007.  
44 Information gathered from BRAC’s own home pages on the internet: http://www.brac.net/index2.htm, January 
2007.  
45 No recent figures available. 
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There are a growing number of private English medium schools in Chittagong and women of 
wealthy families manage many of them. Child Paradise School is an example of the wife of an 
influential businessman opening an English medium school. Starting with a kindergarten in 
1999, a year later Mrs. Murshid was running a school with forty-five students between class 
one and four. In 2005, the school expanded to a hundred students up to class seven, 
employing thirteen teachers and twelve support staff. The curriculum follows the national 
English medium standard and the school prides itself as a member of the British Council. Her 
husband helped finance the school, but Mrs. Murshid assumed the overall responsibility as the 
school’s founder and principal. Towards this type of school the government generally exerts 
minimum control practicing a rather liberal policy.   
 
In the tradition of state schools, Child Paradise School also has a yearly one-day function 
where the children compete for awards by participating in games, performing traditional 
songs and dances, reciting verses, solving jigsaw puzzles, memorising numbers and words, 
and so forth. The immediate families of the students attended the “Unique Day 2003” and, to 
grace the occasion, the Minister of Food was invited as ‘Chief Guest’. The ‘Special Guest’ 
was a professor from the University of Chittagong and member of the school’s advisory body. 
In their separate ways, both were esteemed members of society holding responsible positions 
and their attendance, especially that of the minister, had been widely announced in advance.  
 
The programme was supposed to start in the morning, but was rescheduled to the afternoon 
due to a busy minister and his many commitments. At three o’clock, preparations were still 
ongoing and Mrs. Principal was concerned about getting everything ready in time for Mr. 
Minister’s arrival. A government officer with years of civil service experience had arrived 
early to advise on protocol for official visits. His wife had requested him to assist the principal 
with formalities. Although this was to be a relatively small and private function, concerns 
were many because at stake was the position of Mrs. Principal and her school. 
 
At three forty, Master of Ceremony welcomed the guests, announced the occasion, and called 
on the Convenor of Sports to declare the games opened. Singing, dancing, and other activities 
followed rapidly to give the evaluation committee time to complete the final result sheets 
prior to the minister’s arrival. Shortly after six o’clock, Mrs. Master of Ceremony announced 
the arrival of the guest of honour who was asked to sit “in the special chair” close to the stage. 
Mrs. Principal was asked to accompany him. The ‘special chair’ referred to sofas up front, as 
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opposed to the plastic chairs arranged behind. Mr. Minister was accompanied by a number of 
assistants and security personnel – all dressed in white Islamic shirts and pants. Police officers 
assigned to escort the minister to his various functions guarded the building. 
 
A teacher presented the Chief Guest with a flower ribbon that was then pinned to his shirt and 
the VIPs received bouquets of flowers. A student recited a verse from the Koran to open the 
closing ceremony, which continued with the national anthem and children singing ‘patriotic 
songs’ commemorating the liberation of Bangladesh. The cultural show of more music and 
dance performances continued for about an hour, only interrupted by a ten-minute break to 
serve the minister, his companions, and other important guests refreshments in the school’s 
reception room while leaving the audience waiting in the venue. After the entertainment, 
speeches followed. The Chief Guest, the Special Guest, the principal, and the advisors were 
seated behind a grand, decorated table on stage with the minister in the middle sitting in much 
grander chair than the others. Speeches were addressed to “Honourable Chief Guest and 
Minister of the People’s Republic of Bangladesh, Special Guest, Principal, Advisors, 
respected parents, guests, journalists, students, and all others” in that order ranking everyone 
in accordance to the position of Mrs. Principal as friend of the minister. The message of the 
speeches, which for the occasion were performed in English, can be seen to have served the 
same purpose. 
 
Advisor 1: Values and other part of our life are associated with the school. Here a total 
education programme is given by the principal Mrs. Murshid and I congratulate her. I am very 
proud to read the motto written here that the children one day can be free from fear and have 
their own thoughts (gesturing at a banner behind him). I believe that the way this school is run, 
one day all the children, those who will be the future citizens of this country, can be able in the 
future to express their thoughts without any fear, which is required now in this country. Not 
only for Bangladesh, but for all over the world. We are passing through transition that requires 
good citizens. Last of all I want to say one thing that our minister he gave us such ample time. 
He has not only honoured us but inspired children not only in this school, but children all over 
Bangladesh. In these critical times he spends such a long time with the children and letting us 
enjoy. May Allah bless him and bless all the children and light our lives. Thank you.  
 
As hostess, and someone able to invite a minister to a school function, Mrs. Murshid had to be 
acknowledged. Her devotion to children and their education was mentioned, praising her for 
assuming a communal responsibility. In the presence of a minister, the adviser stressed the 
importance of a liberal education system for the production of ‘good citizens’. The statement 
is interesting as recognition of the state as an agent of equality and individual rights while 
taking part in a ceremony stressing inequalities and the power of the state. 
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Advisor 2: I am very much honoured to be here as a Special Guest and thankful to the 
principal of this school. Today is the “Unique Day” and the audience and I enjoyed very much 
so many events; annual sport, culture programme, and last very nice veritable dishes the 
school provided. I feel very homely and very friendly ... Ladies and gentlemen; a whole day 
programme like this must have exhausted the children. The teachers are very much spirited. 
Especially the most senior teacher, but also the other teachers, worked hard. I am also very 
much moved to see and observe the dynamic leadership of this school’s principal, Mrs. 
Murshid. She is very courageous, bold and innovative. God bless her and I wish for the school 
to prosper in a very short span of time. The inception of the school is not very long. I think 
from 2002 or 2001 (looks around for confirmation). It started in 2001 and I am very much 
lucky that they invited me as their Special Guest and I have been working as the advisory 
body. I wish good luck to the school and thank you very much for giving me this chance. 
Thank you.  
 
In addition to honouring the hostess, the second advisor took the opportunity to point out his 
own capacities for the day, not only as advisor, but also as ‘Special Guest’.  
 
Advisor 3: Thank you for this “Unique Day”. It is very nice for me to be here on this occasion. 
All have worked hard under the excellent leadership of Mrs. Murshid. She is very unique and 
proud to have this kind of school and I wish her good luck with this school. The children here 
are doing very nice considering this school is not very old. It started in 1999 I guess (receives 
recognising nods from the principal). I wish good luck I guess, as the advisor of this school. 
Thank you.  
 
The third advisor was briefer in his address, but also referred to his own position in regard to 
speaking on the occasion.  
 
Advisor 4: It is very good luck for me to say that I am in this dais in a school that is mainly 
created by my student. She is really a creative woman who has taken the light of giving 
education to young children. She has showed a commitment to the society. Actually she didn’t 
need to create a school to make a school, but she thought about the kids of our country who 
will be the future citizens of this country to give them proper education; proper training; 
proper cultural knowledge and everything. From three o’clock this afternoon I am sitting here 
observing her and observing her activities and the activities of her teachers. We know that a 
school is teamwork between the leader and the teachers. She has got a good team to run the 
school properly. Not only giving knowledge to the students, but she has got the ability to give 
every type of cultural training also to the students, that is Bangladeshi culture. Today’s 
function I have observed and it is all Bangladeshi culture. There is no foreign culture and I am 
very happy to see all these things because now-a-days most of us are very interested in foreign 
culture. In this school, although it is English medium school, foreign culture is not injected 
among the students, which is very nice. We hope that this school will flourish – although it is 
very young – but that it will flourish under the able leadership of Mrs. Murshid and also from 
the eagerness of the teachers. I bless you all. I think that after a period of time this school will 
be the best school in Chittagong. I hope so. Thank you.  
 
As Mrs. Murshid’s former teacher, in addition to the function as advisor, the last speaker also 
claimed her space. Generally, all guest speakers placed themselves in relation to the principal 
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whose position was important enough to invite a minister as chief guest to a small school 
function. As the organising principle of the ceremony and the authority of the event, Mr. 
Minister was the last of the guests to speak. The minister started to get up, but had to wait to 
be properly introduced by Mrs. Master of Ceremonies.  
 
On this delighted day the honourable minister has come to share our feelings and to 
understand the interaction between the students and teachers and to realise the relation 
between the teachers and guardians. We are really fortunate that the honourable minister has 
given his kind consent to be our Chief Guest. We express our deepest gratitude to the 
honourable minister. We expect that our honourable guest will give us a new direction; which 
way should we sprint. Being a politician he understands the sufferings of most people and as a 
food minister his prime responsibility is to maintain a good food nutrition system countrywide. 
The minister and Child Paradise School have the same visions, but work in different 
directions. Being a teacher we try to understand the students suffering of gaining knowledge 
and we try to enrich the values of the students. Now I would like to request our honourable 
Chief Guest, honourable [Mr. Minister], to focus his valuable views to the audience. Dear 
audience get your hands together please (round of applause). 
 
Just as Mr. Minister took the stand, a nearby mosque called for namaz (prayer). Anticipating 
for a few seconds with a look of uneasiness, indecisive as to how to proceed; the minister 
started his speech despite the adhan (call to prayer).    
 
Bismillah hirRahman nirRahim (in the name of Allah; most gracious, most merciful). This is a 
unique day and not only for this Child Paradise School, but this is a unique day for me also 
(applause). Mrs. Murshid she is my relative; my close relative. 
 
The minister switched to Bengali and spoke for about fifteen minutes, mostly delivering a 
political speech focusing on the importance of education, as well as government policies, but 
he also praised ‘Mrs. Murshid bhabi’46 on her dedication and efforts. Educational advice for 
the parents was naturally offered and the minister stressed their responsibility as parents of 
ensuring ‘fair and proper education for the children’.47 The tone was as soft and authoritative 
as expected from someone in his position, granting him admiration and respect. Mrs. Murshid 
was visibly pleased with his performance. Finally Mrs. Principal took the stand, greeted the 
guests in the proper order starting with Mr. Chief Guest, and said:  
 
                                                
46 Bhabi translates to brother’s wife, but is commonly used as a familiarity term indicating the closeness of the 
relationship.  
47 Once cheating was officially on the agenda, the importance of a fair examination system was a popular topic. 
That the school in question was not part of the public examination system did not seem to concern the minister.  
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Child Paradise School strives on its mission to achieve a few things. It strives for the highest 
level of academic achievement to develop skills necessary to become a contributing member 
of our democratic society; to instil a respect for the right of other people and their culture; and 
to promote the importance of learning as a life long need. In the effort to achieve our mission 
we monitor and evaluate the continual process of being an effective school. Today, the 
“Unique Day”, is a combination of a lot of activities, which you have enjoyed. They will 
receive the awards and we will have a magic show.  
 
The speech was cut short by a power cut, which is not unusual, and after a few minutes it was 
decided to go ahead with the prize giving ceremony. The first, second, and third student from 
the various events were announced and Mr. Chief Guest, assisted by the Special Guest, 
advisors, principal and teachers, awarded the prizes. After about thirty minutes, electricity 
returned and students’ handshaking with Mr. Minister upon receiving their prizes could 
finally be photographed. ‘Student of the Year’, ‘Best Student’, ‘Disabled Student of the Year’ 
(for loss of spirit!), ‘Best Teacher’, ‘Best Student Attendance’, ‘Perfect Student Attendance of 
the Year’, and many more awards were distributed offering most students a chance to shake 
hands with the Chief Guest while smiling to the cameras. A raffle draw closed the ceremony 
and the evening came to an end. Mrs. Principal thanked Mr. Minister for coming to grace the 
occasion. She said: “I think this has been an opportunity for us to show to the government 
people how deeply we are engaged with the social consent; how deeply we are dealing with 
the people; and how deeply we are concerned with the children, their education, and their 
upbringing”. Lastly she thanked the honourable guest, special guest, advisors, parents, 
journalists, students, and teachers for their attendance. The ceremony was over and ‘the state’ 
took its leave first, allowing no one to move before minister, assistances, security personnel, 
and lastly police officers guarding the building were out of sight.     
 
Reality of the state 
 
According Abrams, the only reality the state can claim is as a ‘false consciousness’, the denial 
of the fragmented reality behind relations of power, and as such, ‘the state’ should be treated 
as nothing more than an ideological construct waiting to be dismantled. Mitchell proceeds 
along similar lines, but inspired by Foucault approaches the state as the effect of 
modernisation and the production of new techniques for domination. The perspective offers a 
way of connecting micro- to macro-level, appearance of structures as the result of modern 
technologies of power, but fails to take fully account of the reproduction of “objectified 
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structures” (the taken-for-granted, Bourdieu 1977). This is what I argue ceremonies do, as a 
kind of the habitus of the state going back to at least British colonial times, lending 
significance to state power through ritualisation. According to Bourdieu et al., it is “in the 
realm of symbolic production that the grip of the state is felt most powerfully” (1994:2). 
 
In the case of the PM’s visit, the effect of the event depended on the contribution of many: a 
large number of people standing at the roadside waving; masses waiting outside the closed 
gate; people inside finding their places close to or far from the dais; majority of invited guests 
taking tea outside while allowing for the few to meet in the principal’s office, and so on. All 
along people are categorised and ranked; creating distance and separation between state and 
society, as well as between state branches (political and bureaucratic) and agencies (within 
bureaucracy), and segments of society. Being the object of special attention, the state comes 
forth as the apex of authority subsuming all others within its hierarchical order, which is 
realised through various techniques involving invitations, seating arrangements, order of 
speeches, and so on. Although people may have objections, no one openly protests. On the 
contrary, during ceremonies, people submit to state authority and find their places according 
to formal positions. Even in situations where the state is not present, as the case of the private 
school function discussed above, the state materialises in the organisation of the event. Thus, 
the rites of ceremonies can be seen as instrumental for the (re)production of the reality of a 
powerful state, structured as a hierarchical order, but constantly rearranging itself according to 
situation (office and rank of officials present). The state makes its appearance and is met with 
submissive behaviour.  
 
To overcome the problematic distinction between state powers as material order, on the one 
hand, and a separate sphere of meaning, on the other, Bourdieu says the following:  
 
In order truly to understand the power of the state in its full specificity, i.e., the 
particular symbolic efficacy it wields, one must, as I suggested long ago in another 
article, integrate into one and the same explanatory model intellectual traditions 
customary perceived as incompatible. It is necessary, first, to overcome the opposition 
between a physicalist vision of the social world that conceives of social relations as 
relations of physical force and a “cybernetic” or semiological vision which portrays 
them as relations of symbolic force, as relations of meaning or relations of 
communication (Bourdieu, Wacquant, Farage 1994:12).  
 
Seeing acts of submission and obedience as cognitive acts involving cognitive structures (how 
perception is structured, and principles of vision and division), Bourdieu argues for the 
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deconstruction of such cognitive structures (how knowledge, practical and tacit, of the 
familiar world is obtained). In this perspective, the state is the producer of “a shared principle 
of vision and division, identical or similar cognitive and evaluative structures… a tacit, pre-
reflexive agreement over the meaning of the world which itself lies at the basis of the 
experience the world as ‘commonsense world’” (ibid:13). To account for this experience, 
Bourdieu suggests that we critically explore not only the mere existence of “common forms 
and categories of perception and appreciation”, but also the ongoing production of “social 
frameworks of perceptions” and “the contribution of the state to the constitution of the 
principles of constitution that agents apply to the social order” (ibid.). To fully understand the 
immediate submission that the state order elicits, Bourdieu argues for a break with the 
intellectualism of “the neo-Kantian tradition to acknowledge that cognitive structures are not 
forms of consciousness but dispositions of the body”.  
 
That the obedience we grant to the injunctions of the state cannot be understood either 
as mechanical submission to an external force or as conscious consent to an order (in 
the double sense of the term). The social world is riddled with calls to order that 
function as such only for those who are predisposed to heeding them as they awaken 
deeply buried corporeal dispositions, outside the channels of consciousness and 
calculation (ibid:14).  
 
The suggestion of keeping dispositions of the body separate from forms of consciousness is 
perhaps questionable, but the point is that according to Bourdieu, individuals are disposed for 
collective action through socialisation. These corporal dispositions Bourdieu terms doxic. 
“Submission to the established order”, he argues, “is the product of the agreement between, 
on the one hand, the cognitive structures inscribed in bodies by both collective history 
(phylogenesis) and individual history (ontogenesis) and, on the other the objective structures 
of the world to which these cognitive structures are applied” (ibid.). This idea of a doxic 
submission, attaching individuals to the established order as an immediate and tacit 
agreement, together with the notion of habitus (Bourdieu 1977), processes of internalisation 
and objectification of structures, can explain the ease with which domination can be practiced 
both materially and ideologically, i.e. state power as taken-for-granted, although more useful 
for explaining reproduction than for explaining production.  
 
We may thus talk about a ceremonial habitus causing a doxic submission, a habitual 
agreement or adjustment to the order of the state manifested in ceremonies, but without 
presuming total submission to state order as such because these are only selected cases of 
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state domination; situations in which the state assume complete control and appear as a 
dominant social force. In situations such as seen in this chapter, state power is taken for 
granted and its order immediately and completely enacted, but this does not mean that its 
reach is complete or power is total, which is evident in chapter 5. That the state is also a place 
where people seek assistance, go to work, are evaluated, draw their salaries, get promoted, 
and so on is the focus of the next chapter arguing for the state as more than ceremonial 
reproduction or situational power.  
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4 
Realising the State: the relationship between state power 
and powerful state agents 
 
In Economy and Society (1978:53), Max Weber made the following distinctions: “‘power’ 
(Macht) is the probability that one actor within a social relationship will be in a position to 
carry out his own will despite resistance, regardless of the basis on which his probability rests. 
‘Domination’ (Herrschaft) is the probability that a command with a given specific content 
will be obeyed by a given group of persons. ‘Discipline’ is the probability that by virtue of 
habituation a command will receive prompt and automatic obedience in stereotyped forms, on 
the part of a given group of persons”. He exemplified the difference of domination by mere 
power with the case of monopolistic control in the market where the dictate of a market is 
complied with by virtue of interest constellation. “Through many gradual transitions, this 
relationship [between customers and a monopolistic enterprise] may be transformed into 
domination proper, that means, by virtue of the authoritarian power of command… 
Domination exists insofar as there is obedience to a command; in general, obedience is due to 
a mixture of habit, expediency and belief in legitimacy” (ibid:XC). For Weber, “Herrschaft is 
a structure of superordination and subordination sustained by a variety of motives and means 
of enforcement” (ibid.), and he is interested in the historical persistence of structures of 
domination; their forms, enforcement, and legitimacy. Although motives for obeying are often 
complex and varying, the most stabile structures of domination he finds when accompanied 
by a general belief in legitimacy; belief in a ruler’s right to command and subjects’ obligation 
to obey.  
 
For comparative reasons, three pure types of legitimate domination or authority (as a special 
case of domination) were identified: rational-legal, traditional, and charismatic. Rational-legal 
authority is based on a system of rational rules and founded on a belief that the leader, chosen 
through legally correct and accepted procedures, can rightfully issue commands to be obeyed; 
obedience to norms rather than persons. Traditional authority rests on appeals to the sanctity 
of immemorial traditions that persist as long as commands are seen to be in the interest of 
maintaining tradition; obedience to some particular person who enjoys personal authority by 
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virtue of inherited status. In the case of charismatic authority, it is the charismatically 
qualified leader as such who is obeyed by virtue of personal trust in his revelation and his 
heroism or exemplary qualities as long as they fall within the scope of the individual’s belief 
in his charisma. “[T]he continued exercise of every domination”, claimed Weber, “always has 
the strongest need of self-justification through appealing to the principles of legitimation. Of 
such ultimate principles, there are only three” (ibid:954). Thus, domination is made dependent 
on justification of authority.   
 
Power, therefore, works through individuals’ motivation in following orders and authority is 
institutionalised power hierarchically structured in a chain of command, i.e. power as 
obedience or disobedience. Whether domination by virtue of interest constellation, as in a 
monopolistic market situation, or by virtue of authority, as in patriarchal, magisterial, or 
princely power, power is seen as a result of an interest situation where one enters into power 
relations ‘willingly’ agreeing to follow the will of others. “The difference between the two”, 
writes Warren, “turns on the extent to which an individual’s subjectivity is defined by the 
relationship” (1992:29). It is when “interests are defined through the relationship itself, and 
individuals lose, as it were, the cognitive competence to identify their distinctive interests”, 
and “[t]heir subjectivity is molded in the image of the power relation” (ibid.), that the relation 
of domination is no longer based solely on material interests but on authority.  
 
It is not always clear what Weber means by ‘interests’. In terms of ascribing meaning, 
interests are never just ‘material’ but also affective, ideal, rational, and so on (ibid:30). Even 
though Weber appears to spend much time on material interests, he argues that relations of 
domination founded on ‘constellations of [material] interests’ alone are unstable bases of 
organisation as material interests are never enough to constitute ‘meaning’, that is, to orient or 
constitute the self in such a way that institutional practices can and do continue. “Subordinate 
parties obey”, recapitulates Warren, “because their ‘ideal interests’ are engaged and defined 
through the system of attributes that legitimizes the power relation… Insofar as subordinate 
parties orient their activities and explain their lives through these identities [as a member of a 
family or a tribe; as an instrument of god, the nation, or a leader; as an official, a legal-
juridical person with rights], the power relation is legitimate and justified” (ibid:31). In other 
words, structures of domination are most effective and stable when the command is accepted 
as a ‘valid’ norm, i.e. meaningfully combining a consistent system of values with actual 
behaviour (Weber 1978:946). For Weber, man is the ultimate creature of structures through 
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meaningful behaviour and power is the means to realise values. It is the recognition of 
common (although not necessarily same) values that produce subordination, materialised 
either in norms or persons, or both, and manifested in institutions. One obeys because doing 
so provides meaning, an identity, a place, and a purpose. Interests, then, have more to do with 
meaningfulness in a wider sense than merely material rewards, requiring a rather high level of 
consciousness to be involved.  
 
In contrast, domination within bureaucratic hierarchies violates an interest in, and potential 
for, rational agency. Bureaucracies provide identities for their members through status, 
offices, rational codes of conduct and the like; identities that are not integrated into the 
content and goals of their own actions since their actions serve the ends of the organisation, 
dictated by processes over which the bureaucrat has little control. The rhythm of bureaucracy 
is thus likened to that of a machine where wheels keep turning and the whole is moving in one 
or another direction without any of the involved necessarily knowing, or even bothering to 
know, how or why. There are individual functions, but each functionary is “shorn of his 
natural rhythm as determined by the structure of his organism; his psycho-physical apparatus 
is attuned to a new rhythm through a methodical specialization of separately functioning 
muscles, and an optimal economy of forces is established corresponding to the conditions of 
work” (Weber [1948] 1997:261-62). Each engages in specialised functions according to 
education and training and, as stated by Brubaker, “the more closely a bureaucratic 
organisation approximates a technically efficient machine, the greater the danger to individual 
freedom and dignity: the individual official is reduced to a ‘small cog in a ceaselessly moving 
mechanism which prescribes to him an essentially fixed route of march’” (Brubaker 1984:22). 
Individuals marching in step with objectified, supra-individual forms of rationality embodied 
in the social structure have no will of their own and relationships, including those of power 
and authority, and activities are marked by impersonality and objectivity. Without this 
‘discipline’ and ‘self-denial’ the whole apparatus would fall apart. Hence, each and everyone 
have a place in a predefined hierarchy of positions where others, such as political leaders, 
decide aim and purpose. “Bureaucracy”, says Brubaker, “induces an ethic of adjustment 
(Anpassung), of ‘adaptation to the possible’, an ethic that discourages the value-oriented 
striving that Weber sees as central to the development of autonomous moral personality” 
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(ibid.).48 Bureaucracy is the ‘iron cage’ of modern societies; founded on a formalism that 
constrains individuals from without, determining existence with irresistible force (Weber 
1978).  
 
The notion of ‘an ethic of adjustment’ also appears in Michel Foucault’s analytic of power, 
which he first started to address explicitly in Discipline and Punish first published in 1975. 
For Weber, the calculable, disciplined control over men exercised by modern bureaucracy 
was established with the help of an ethos of rigorous self-control derived from Puritanism (a 
particular configuration of religious doctrines of salvation, of institutional practices of 
salvation, and of the religious interests of the faithful that resulted from them, Schluchter 
1989).49 In an effort to clarify the relation between social structure and personality, Weber 
supplements institutional with social psychological analyses by emphasising the historical 
connection between new forms of institutionalised discipline and self-discipline. Foucault’s 
studies of the hospital, prison, and school can be seen to ground Weberian formal analysis in 
the history of various social techniques for the administration of corporeal, attitudinal and 
behavioural discipline. According to Foucault, discipline is “the generalisation and 
interconnection of different techniques themselves designed in response to localized 
requirements” (1991:80). While Weber is concerned about the conscious cognitive processes 
and individual interests involved in discipline and self-discipline, Foucault goes beyond 
individual reasoning in explaining dominance and exercise of power.  
 
To understand how power works in Foucault, there are two main sources – The History of 
Sexuality and Discipline and Punish – exploring two different, but simultaneous forms of 
power, namely pastoral power and disciplinary power respectively. While Discipline and 
Punish ([1975] 1977) can be seen as an attempt to analyse the way power works on the body 
through external controls, The History of Sexuality ([1976] 1978) analyses the way it does so 
through internal controls. The former work looks at the rise of the modern system of 
surveillance in prisons, schools, factories, hospitals, and so on. Modern power relying on 
constant supervision and control of individuals in accord with a certain concept of normality 
                                                
48 According to Brubaker (1984:62-63), “Personality, for Weber, is constituted by that which every prophecy 
demands: ‘a constant and intrinsic relation to certain ultimate “values” and “meanings” of life, “values” and 
“meanings” which are forged into purposes and thereby translated into rational-teleological action’. Without a 
value-orientation, it is impossible to have a genuine personality”. Only those whose actions are guided by norms 
of own convictions are seen to have personality.  
49 See also chapter five. 
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Foucault calls disciplinary power. The latter work looks at the extension of a confessional 
technology of the self from a religious domain to social life as a whole. Individuals policing 
themselves by examining, confessing, and regulating their own thoughts and behaviour in 
accord with a certain concept of normality is seen as pastoral power. According to Mark 
Bevir, the crux of Foucault’s position is clear: 
 
[S]ociety, conceived as a specific regime of power/knowledge, defines the subject, 
conceived in terms of both the norms by which we try to live and the techniques by 
which we try to ensure we do so. The individual is the arbitrary construct of a social 
formation. Society gives us the values and practices by which we live… Even when 
individuals appear to live in accord with commitments they have accepted for 
themselves, they really are only examining and regulating their lives in accord with a 
regime of power (Bevir 1999:66).  
 
Most of Foucault’s writings have concerned the kind of power that subjects (agonistic force 
relations) at the expense of the idea of the self-constituting subject. For instance, his historical 
studies of biopower, of how modern power controls our bodies, tell a story of the ceaseless 
and unlimited domination of social power over individuals. “In his early work,” Bevir 
observes, “Foucault portrayed the subject as a construct of social languages or epistemes. 
Later, however, and especially following his research for Discipline and Punish, he portrayed 
the subject as a product of regimes of power/knowledge, the will to power, and other such 
things” (ibid:65). Declaring that, “it is not power, but the subject, which is the general theme 
of my research”, and saying that his objective was “to create a history of the different modes 
by which, in our culture, human beings are made subjects” (2002:326), Foucault appears to 
efface the possibility of self-constituting subjects altogether. Following Bevir and his reading 
of Foucault, however, this need not be the case.50  
 
Distinguishing between violence and power, Foucault admits some space to individual choice 
by defining the former not as a relationship of power, but as that which forces, bends, 
destroys, or “closes off all possibilities” and thereby denying the other the ability to act. A 
                                                
50 Besides, in one of his lectures Foucault made the following modification: “Of course, if one wants to study the 
history of natural sciences, it is useful if not necessary to take into account techniques of production and semiotic 
techniques. But since my project was concerned with the knowledge of the subject, I thought that the techniques 
of domination were the most important, without any exclusion of the rest. But, analyzing the experience of 
sexuality, I became more and more aware that there is in all societies, I think, in all societies whatever they are, 
another type of technique: techniques which permit individuals to effect, by their own means, a certain number 
of operations on their own bodies, on their own souls, on their own thoughts, on their own conduct, and this in a 
manner so as to transform themselves, modify themselves, and to attain a certain state of perfection, of 
happiness, of purity, of supernatural power, and so on” (Foucault 1993:203).  
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power relationship, on the other hand, “can only be articulated on the basis of two elements 
that are indispensable if it is really to be a power relationship: that “the other” (the one over 
whom power is exercised) is recognised and maintained to the very end as a subject who acts; 
and that, faced with a relationship of power, a whole field of responses, reactions, results, and 
possible inventions may open up”. Foucault does not exclude use of violence or, for that 
matter, the obtainment of consent for the establishment of power relations; “no doubt, the 
exercise of power can never do without one or the other, often both at the same time”, but he 
sees neither as the constituting principle or basic nature of power (ibid:340-41). While 
violence controls people by acting directly and immediately upon their bodies, forcing them 
to conform, power is “exercised only over free subjects, and only insofar as they are free” by 
which he means “individual or collective subjects who are faced with a field of possibilities in 
which several ways of behaving, several reactions and diverse comportments may be realised” 
(ibid:342). According to Bevir, discipline can loosely be identified with violence and pastoral 
power with power as influence.  
 
Whereas biopower, the discipline of the body, can control the subject without his 
collusion, pastoral power has to pass through the consciousness of the subject, and, in 
doing so, it necessarily creates a basis for resistance (Bevir 1999:72).  
 
Operating not as a direct, immediate form of domination, but rather as a type of influence, it 
works by ‘convincing’ the other of the rightness of certain acts. Following Bevir, power or 
pastoral power recognises the value of the subject as an agent, whereas violence or discipline 
attempts to extinguish the capacity of the subject for agency, which is why power, unlike 
violence, also entails a capacity for resistance. “To treat someone as an agent, one has to 
recognise that they can do other than one wishes – they can resist”, which is why they have to 
be convinced (ibid:73). In modern society, however, individuals typically use their agency 
only to regulate themselves in accord with social norms. “Far from resisting the normalising 
effects of power, they act so as to promote them” (ibid:75). Foucault’s view on modernity can 
thus be compared to that of Weber’s. Where Weber talks about ‘iron cage’, constraining 
individuals from without and determining existence with irresistible force, Foucault talks 
about ‘biopower’ as that force which both constrains and promotes certain behaviour 
(productive power). I will come back to this later in this chapter.  
 
According to Foucault, then, relationships of power can, on the one hand, only exist where 
individuals are able to act and react to action, action upon action, which also opens up 
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possibilities for resistance: “There is no power without potential refusal or revolt” (Foucault 
2002:324). On the other, seeing the exercise of power as a “conduct of conducts” and “a 
management of possibilities” (ibid:341), seriously limits the field of possible action in which 
a subject must act. Rejecting the idea of a “sovereign, founding subject” (Bevir 1999:67), 
Foucault similarly rejects the idea of autonomous subjects with the capacity of founding and 
ruling themselves uninfluenced by others, but without ruling out possibility of agency.  
 
Although agents necessarily exist within regimes of power/knowledge, these regimes do not 
determine the experiences they can have, the ways they can exercise their reason, the beliefs 
they can adopt, or the actions they can attempt to perform. Agents are creative beings; it is just 
that their creativity occurs in a given social context that influences it (ibid.).  
 
If we understand power as ways of influencing behaviour according to certain norms, and 
power relations as the way some act on others, disciplinary techniques taking the form of 
surveillance in schools, factories, hospitals, and the like can be seen as means to ‘convince’ 
individual bodies to behave in accord with those very norms. This way we may be able to 
overcome what, by some, is seen as a problem of incompatibility between techniques of 
discipline and technologies of the self, as suggested by Giorgio Agamben: 
 
In one of his last writings, Foucault argues that the modern Western state has integrated 
techniques of subjective individualization with procedures of objective totalization to 
an unprecedented degree, and he speaks of a real “political ‘double bind,’ constituted 
by individualisation and the simultaneous totalization of structures of modern power”. 
Yet the point at which these two faces of power converge remains strangely unclear in 
Foucault’s work… where, in the body of power, is the zone of indistinction (or, at least, 
the point of intersection) at which techniques of individualization and totalizing 
procedures converge?... Confronted with phenomena such as the power of the society 
of the spectacle that is everywhere transforming the political realm today, is it 
legitimate or even possible to hold subjective technologies and political techniques 
apart? (Agamben 1998:5-6) 
 
It is enough to read The Subject and Power (2002) to understand that Foucault did not 
necessarily see them as separate. On the contrary, by defining strategies of power as what 
agencies do in practice in exercising power, operationalising programmes and technologies, 
both subjective technologies and political techniques are treated as “mechanisms one can 
direct, in a fairly constant manner and with reasonable certainty, the conduct of others” 
(Foucault 2002:347). In closing, Foucault says that, “what makes the domination of a group, a 
caste, or a class, together with the resistance and revolts that domination comes up against, a 
central phenomenon in the history of societies is that they manifest in a massive and global 
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form, at the level of the whole social body, the locking-together of power relations with 
relations of strategy and the results proceeding from their interaction” (ibid:348). In other 
words, Foucault does not locate transformations, but treats them as the result of processes of 
interaction. Government is that ‘zone of indistinction’ or ‘point of intersection’ constituting 
that space in which “the negative and positive dimensions of power come together: it is a 
space in which technologies of domination work through the individual acting on himself, and 
in which the technologies by which individuals act on themselves coalesce to form structures 
of coercion” (Bevir 1999:350). “Governing people”, Foucault says, “is not a way to force 
people to do what the governor wants; it is always a versatile equilibrium, with 
complementarity and conflicts between techniques which assure coercion and processes 
through which the self is constructed or modified by himself” (Foucault 1993:204).  
 
For as much as Weber and Foucault can be seen to share a view on power as the ability to 
assign identities and exercise discipline, for the latter this is just a point of departure. While 
for Weber, bureaucratic rationality represents an end in itself structuring relationships and 
directing behaviour for common causes, for Foucault it is merely a tool for the more subtle 
formation of structures of coercion. “Power”, he says, “consists in complex relations: these 
relations involve a set of rational techniques, and the efficiency of those techniques is due to a 
subtle integration of coercion-technologies and self-technologies” (ibid.).  
 
To explain the complex nature of power relationships and how power works, we need more 
than a definition describing power as individual commitments (Weber [1948] 1997) or as 
agonistic force relations (Foucault [1976] 1978). In fact, the aim here is not to arrive at any 
neat and clear-cut definition of power as such, but rather to show the dynamic relationship 
between, on the one hand, power of the state and, on the other, powerful state agents. For this 
purpose, I will draw on the insights of Weber and Foucault, as well as making use of 
Bourdieu as discussed in previous chapter, and suggest ways of modifying and expand these 
perspectives.  
 
Continuing from previous chapter, spatial techniques are useful for visualising power and in 
this chapter I will show how buildings and offices are used to promote certain behaviour, i.e. 
the habitus (Bourdieu 1977) or disciplinary techniques (Foucault [1975] 1977) of the state. 
Starting with a description of the bureaucratic system, a structure dating back to British 
colonial times as the ideal type of rational organisation and hardly altered since (see chapter 
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2), the purpose is to show the principle behind habitus of the state primarily concerned with 
hierarchy and positions (Weberian institutional power). Furthermore, the descriptions of 
procedures behind recruitments, promotions, postings, transfers, training, and so on that state 
officials are through as part of service preparations relates to a later discussion arguing for the 
incorporation of the state in the subject (Foucauldian biopower). However, as different people 
can be seen to adopt different strategies against the background of the same structures (as seen 
in this chapter), buildings and authority structures alone cannot explain the complex meaning 
of power and its production. Rather, what this chapter shows is a dynamic relationship 
between power of the state and powerful state agents.  
 
Bangladesh Civil Service51 
 
In 2005, the public sector in Bangladesh numbered around one million people, with around 
seven hundred thousand employed in various ministries/divisions, departments/directorates, 
and other government offices comprising the Bangladesh Civil Service (BCS). The rest are 
employed in various public enterprises. Presently, BCS officers staff forty-one ministries and 
fifteen administrative divisions, in addition to the offices of the president and prime minister.  
 
One of the major characteristics of the administrative system of Bangladesh is a rigid pattern 
of rank corresponding to a specific occupational type. In the early days of British rule in 
India, there were two major types of civil servants, covenanted and uncovenanted. The former 
filled the superior positions. The members of the covenanted service entered into a covenant 
with the East India Company to serve the latter with ‘loyalty and honesty’, which is why they 
came to be known as members of the covenanted civil service. The other category of civil 
servants in subordinate positions did not enter into any covenant. Hence they belonged to the 
uncovenanted civil service consisting of both Europeans and Indians. The uncovenanted civil 
servants were posted mainly to junior positions in the revenue and judicial establishments.  
 
In the formative phase of the civil service, appointment, posting and transfer of covenanted 
civil servants was notified in the official gazette series, printed and published by the 
government. One of the earliest references to the gazette traces back to the late eighteenth 
                                                
51 Sources: Ali (1982, 1993, 2004), Banglapedia (2006), DFID (2005), Zafarullah et al (1997), Zaman (1980). 
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century. With the growth of bureaucracy, and consequent upon the Indianisation of the 
services, the distinction between covenanted and uncovenanted services disappeared. A new 
distinction was introduced wherein members of the civil service came to be known as 
gazetted and non-gazetted. Appointment, posting, transfer and other career incidents of the 
gazetted officers were required by law to be published in the official gazette series, indicating 
their superior rank and status in the service in relation to the non-gazetted government 
servants. 
 
BCS has several features in its organisation, composition, and divisions. The service is 
divided into two broad categories, cadre and non-cadre services.52 Cadre Service basically 
refers to the organization of civil servants into well-defined groups, services or cadres and 
with recruitment and promotion rules. Recruitment to cadre services is made through the 
Public Service Commission (PSC), a constitutional body established primarily to recruit 
persons for various services and posts in the government, based on open competitive 
examination. Non-cadre services, on the other hand, are mostly based on position, with no 
definite structure of mobility either horizontally or vertically. Those belonging to cadre 
services can move from one department to another as against non-cadre people who stay 
within the department of recruitment. All positions in the BCS are horizontally divided into 
four classes: Class I, II, III, and IV. These divisions are made on the basis of levels of 
responsibility, nature of work (administrative and executive), method of recruitment, and so 
on. All Class I, and most Class II, government servants are gazetted officers.  
 
Recruitment, promotion, posting and transfer 
 
In addition to recruiting government personnel, the Public Service Commission is also 
involved in decision processes relating to other service matters such as promotion, posting, 
transfer, discipline, and appeal of government servants. The main purpose of constituting such 
a body, designated in most countries of British heritage as ‘civil’ or ‘public’ service 
commission, is to ensure that all decisions relating to recruitment and other service matters are 
made consistent with principles of merit and equity. It is supposed to be a body independent 
                                                
52 A cadre simply specifies the posts reserved for the members of the service concerned. 
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of the executive branch of the government. In practice, it has remained as an advisory body, 
its executive function being limited to holding of tests and examinations.  
 
Composition and functions of the Commission are defined in the constitution mandating the 
president (in practice on the advice of the prime minister) to appoint the chairman and 
members for five-year terms, or for periods not exceeding the appointees’ age of sixty-two. 
The number of members to be appointed is not constitutionally specified, but should, 
according to a presidential decree (1977), be between six and fifteen, including the chairman. 
There are no special qualifications for appointment except the requirement that at least one-
half of the members must have held offices in the government service for at least twenty 
years. Normally, the chairman and members who come from government service are senior 
officers and those from outside are mostly senior academicians. A member from the 
government service is not eligible for further government service employment, including in 
the PSC, after retirement, except the chairman who is eligible for re-employment for one 
additional term as chairman, and a member who may be re-employed in the PSC either as a 
member or as chairman. According to the Warrant of Precedence, the chairman of PSC ranks 
as a full secretary to the government while members rank as additional secretaries.  
 
The Constitution specifies that PSC shall conduct tests and examinations for selection for 
government service appointments, advise the president (government) on certain matters on 
which the commission is consulted, and perform such other functions as prescribed by statues. 
Matters on which the president is obligated constitutionally to consult the Commission 
include methods of recruitment, principles of appointment and promotion, principles of 
transfer, terms and conditions of service, and discipline. In practice, however, the 
responsibility of PSC is not as extensive as it may appear, for the president may, by order 
made after consulting the Commission, exclude any of the constitutionally specified matters 
from the Commission jurisdiction. Moreover, while the president is otherwise obligated to 
consult the Commission, there is no obligation to accept its advice in all cases. In fact, a 
number of presidential orders issued so far have progressively excluded important categories 
of employment from PSC jurisdiction. 
 
In summary, the PSC usually performs the following functions: (i) conducts competitive 
examinations and/or interviews for direct recruitment of persons in government service, (ii) 
conducts psychological and intelligence tests for candidates who qualify in the competitive 
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examinations seeking selection to various civil service cadres, (iii) conducts tests and/or 
interviews for promotion of government servants from one service to another, for instance, 
from class II to class I, (iv) selects candidates from among temporary government servants for 
appointment to permanent posts, (v) endorses ad hoc appointments made under various 
ministries/divisions, (vi) advises on matters in respect of framing necessary recruitment rules, 
as well as principles to be followed in making recruitment, promotions and transfers in 
government service, including determination of inter se seniority position of government 
officers, (vii) examines and approves rules and syllabi of various departmental and 
professional examinations, as well as conducts such examinations for government servants, 
(viii) advises on matters affecting the terms and conditions of service of government servants; 
and (ix) advises on disciplinary and appeal matters affecting government servants. In addition, 
PSC also performs functions in the field of personnel research, such as compiling data and 
statistically analysing aptitudes, including academic, socio-economic, regional, and 
institutional backgrounds, of persons seeking government employment.  
 
All vacancies in the civil service are not filled on the basis of overall performance in the 
several components of BCS examination. Forty-five percent of positions are reserved for top-
performing candidates while the remainder is distributed among the sixty-four districts on the 
basis of population. Further, the allocated number of each district is again distributed among 
freedom fighters (30%), women (15%), and tribal population (5%). The district quota was 
introduced to remove disparity in civil service representation among different regions of the 
country.  
 
To assist PSC in discharging its functions, there is an establishment called the Public Service 
Commission Secretariat. Structurally, it is part of the ministry of establishment, a ministerial 
portfolio of the prime minister, and is accorded status of a ministerial division. Business in the 
headquarters of PSC, located in the capital city, is conducted in ten functional sections, 
including establishment section; accounts section; examination section; recruitment section; 
psychology section; research section; and library section. In addition, there are six zonal 
offices of which five are located in the outlying five divisional headquarters, while Dhaka 
division is accommodated within the headquarters of the PSC Secretariat. These zonal offices 
act in effect as liaison offices. The secretariat has an officer designated as secretary who acts 
as its chief executive officer. The officer is an additional secretary to the government placed 
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in PSC on deputation. The secretary’s senior aides include a joint secretary, controller of 
examinations, chief psychologist, two deputy secretaries, and seven directors. 
 
Training 
 
There are about 150 training institutes in the country belonging to different ministries, 
divisions, and public statutory bodies. The Public Administration Training Centre (PATC), 
the apex-training institute in the public sector, emerged as an autonomous organisation in 
1984 by amalgamating existing institutions (Bangladesh Administrative Staff College, 
National Institute of Public Administration, Civil Officers Training Academy, and Staff 
Training Institute).  
 
Since inception, PATC has trained government officers and officers of autonomous and non-
government organisations. Among courses conducted by the Centre are: the foundation 
training course for new entrants to BCS, the advanced course on administration and 
development for deputy secretaries and equivalents, and a senior staff course for 
joint secretaries and equivalents. In addition, the Centre conducts a number of short courses. 
Objectives of these courses are to make officers aware of government policies, rules and 
regulations, and to inform them about recent changes in the field of public administration. A 
senior secretary installed as rector heads PATC. Below him are five member-directing staff of 
the rank of joint secretary, who are responsible for supervising the following five divisions: 
management and public administration, programme and studies, and regional centres, 
development economics, research and consultancy, and development projects. Each division 
consists of a number of departments headed by a director of the rank of deputy secretary. 
Below them are deputy directors, assistant directors, evaluation officers and research officers. 
The Centre also has four regional centres called Regional Public Administration Training 
Centre (RPATC) at four divisional headquarters. Regional centres are mainly for staff training 
and a deputy director heads each. The twelve-member Board of Governors chaired by a 
minister provides general policy directions as and when required. The Board is composed of 
the following members: Cabinet Minister nominated by the government to act as the 
chairperson of the Board, Cabinet Secretary, Rector, Ministry of Establishment Secretary, 
Finance Division Secretary, Education Division Secretary, Vice-Chancellor of a university 
nominated by the government, Defence Services Command and Staff College Commandant, 
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Bangladesh Federations of Commerce and Industry Chairman, Chairman of Department of 
Public Administration from either University of Dhaka, Chittagong, Rajshahi or 
Jahangirnagar by rotation in that order, and two persons nominated by the government, 
including one woman.  
 
After the establishment of PATC, the need for a separate academy for the administration 
cadre was keenly felt. Established in 1987, the Civil Service Administration Academy is 
responsible for imparting training to young and mid-level officers belonging to the BCS 
administration cadre. A senior member of the administrative cadre designated as the director 
general and holding the rank and status of an additional secretary to the government head the 
Academy. Under the director general, there are three directors of the rank of deputy secretary. 
Faculty members act as directors, co-ordinators and assistant co-ordinators of courses run by 
the academy. Generally, trainees of the administrative cadre attend the Academy’s prescribed 
professional training course on completion of the compulsory foundation training-course with 
new recruits of all other cadres from PATC. The Academy conducts various courses for 
training, covering subjects such as law, administration, office management, and land 
management. Participating in the training are assistant commissioners/assistant secretaries; 
magistrates; district magistrates; additional deputy commissioners; upazila nirbahi officers; 
revenue deputy collectors; land acquisition officers; and general certificate officers.  
 
Central administration 
 
The ministry/division is the national level units of administration organised as parts of 
Bangladesh Secretariat for the conduct of business of the secretariat. In the Rules of Business 
of 1996, division is defined as a self-contained administrative unit responsible for the conduct 
of business of the government in a distinct and specified sphere and declared as such by the 
government. Ministry is defined as the division or a group of divisions constituted as a 
ministry. Generally, larger ministries have more than one division, such as ministries of 
finance and planning consisting of three divisions each. Secretaries work under ministers or, 
as in some cases, state or deputy ministers’ and head the divisions. Business of the 
government is allocated among the different ministries and divisions. The responsibility for 
allocation of business rests with the cabinet division. Under each ministry/division are the 
departments headed by director generals, subordinate offices (territorial unit of a department 
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acting as its field establishment), and parastatal bodies set up to perform specialised public 
functions or implement specific tasks.   
 
There are no fixed rules about who will head a ministry. This is left to the discretion of the 
prime minister who alone is responsible for deciding about appointments of ministers, state 
ministers and deputy ministers. He or she is also the final authority for allocating minister 
portfolios. Allocation is also subject to change at the discretion of the prime minister. Again, 
it is left to the discretion of the prime minister to reorganise ministries by merger or 
separation. 
 
The secretariat is the nerve-centre of the administrative machinery and all government 
activities. Functions of the secretariat include policy formulation, planning, evaluation of plan 
under execution, legislative measures, assisting ministers in the discharge of their 
responsibilities to the parliament, top level personnel management, and such other matters as 
may be determined by the prime minister from time to time. For efficient disposal of business 
allocated to a ministry/division, it is divided into ‘wings’, ‘branches’ and ‘sections’.  
 
A wing is a major self-contained sub-division of a ministry/division for conducting specified 
duties of a distinct nature and headed by a joint or additional secretary. A branch means 
several sections grouped together and headed by a deputy secretary or an officer of equivalent 
rank, whereas a section is the basic working unit headed by an assistant secretary or senior 
assistant secretary. The secretary is the administrative head of a ministry/division responsible 
for its administration and discipline, and for proper conduct of business assigned to it. A 
secretary is also responsible for careful observance of the Rules of Business in the ministry/ 
division and attached departments and subordinate offices, and for keeping the minister-in-
charge informed of working of the ministry/division.  
 
Members of various cadre services hold posts of secretary, additional secretary, joint 
secretary, and deputy secretary. In 1980, the government introduced a unified career service 
with 28 cadres and sub-cadres. Subsequently, BCS was reorganised and the number of service 
cadres increased to 29. Before creation of BCS, an apex service cadre called the ‘Senior 
Services Pool’ (SSP) consisting of members of the former Civil Service of Pakistan, East 
Pakistan Civil Service and East Pakistan Secretariat Service staffed all top administrative 
posts in the secretariat, as well as a certain percentage of administrative posts in different 
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executive departments, and district and divisional offices. To accommodate officers of other 
service cadres to top administrative posts of the secretariat, the government abolished the SSP 
in 1989 and introduced reservation of quota for the posts of deputy secretary and joint 
secretary for all cadre services.  
 
The posts of secretary and additional secretary remained open for officers of all service 
cadres. Initially, sixty and sixty-five percent of the posts of joint secretary and deputy 
secretary respectively were reserved for the BCS administration cadre. In 1998, the 
government decided to keep seventy and seventy-five percent of the same positions for the 
BCS administration and the rest for officers of other cadres. Junior posts below deputy 
secretary, such as assistant secretary/senior assistant secretary, are filled mainly by officers of 
BCS administration cadre, but also by officers drawn from the non-cadre secretariat service. 
The posts of deputy chief, senior assistant chief/assistant chief and research officer are 
reserved for officers of BCS economic cadre. Officers of BCS information cadre are also 
posted to every ministry as information officers. Apart from officers mentioned above, the 
different classes of employees are also recruited to every ministry/division for the posts of 
administrative officer, personal officer, steno-typist and messenger.  
 
Field administration 
 
Below the central secretariat, divisional commissioner ranks highest among all the field level 
officers in the administrative structure. In fact, a division is the apex field level administrative 
unit. Its creation dates back to 1829. 
 
In 1828, it was felt that there was no effective control over the district revenue administration 
and no coordinating authority to supervise operation of the judicial and revenue system as a 
whole. It was thought expedient to abolish the Board of Revenue and to create the post of 
commissioners, each in charge of a division comprising a number of districts. Bengal was 
divided into twenty divisions, each under a commissioner. Each division again consisted of 
three or four districts. At the time of partition in 1947, the area constituting what was then 
known as East Bengal had three divisions, namely Dhaka, Chittagong, and Rajshahi. Later, 
Khulna division was created out of Rajshahi division. During the 1990s, two more divisions, 
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Barisal and Sylhet, were created, increasing the total number to six. In terms of districts the 
country now has sixty-four, each headed by a deputy commissioner.  
 
The divisional commissioner’s primary role is to act as the supervising authority over deputy 
commissioners in respect of revenue and judicial work carried out in the districts, but is also 
associated with development work. Usually, a divisional commissioner is appointed from 
amongst the senior joint or additional secretaries who have previous experience in district 
administration. 
 
Ranked as deputy secretary, the deputy commissioner is the chief administrative and revenue 
officer of a district. The office of deputy commissioner traces its origin to the district collector 
system of the early phase of British rule. A district supervisor was appointed with limited 
functions in 1769 and Warren Hastings introduced the district collector system in 1772. The 
system was repealed the following year, but restored again in 1787 vesting the collector with 
the powers of a judge and magistrate, in addition to some authority over the police. With 
introduction of the permanent settlement in Bengal of 1793, the collector was stripped of all 
judicial and police powers, but by 1831 he was reinvested with judicial powers. Since then, 
the collector was known as district magistrate and collector, or just district magistrate.  
 
The term deputy commissioner was used during British colonial days in a different context to 
describe the chief revenue and executive officer of districts in what was known as non-
regulation provinces. Regulation provinces signified the settled areas of Bengal where a 
legalistic system based on comprehensive acts or regulations governed the working of the 
district administration. Non-regulation provinces meant newly acquired territories that 
because of unstable conditions demanded a more authoritarian pattern of administration. In 
East Bengal districts, appellation district magistrate and collector was uniformly used. 
 
The designation district magistrate is used in the criminal procedure code to denote the 
principal magistrate of the district. The term ‘collector’ is derived from land revenue laws. 
The designation district magistrate- and collector was used during the British colonial days for 
districts except in the Chittagong Hill Tracts, as a non-regulation district, where the term 
deputy commissioner was used. After 1960, the district magistrate and collector came to be 
known throughout the country as deputy commissioner. During the early years, the deputy 
commissioner’s office was concerned with internal security and revenue administration. Over 
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time, the office became increasingly occupied with the general welfare of the people in the 
district. To that end, the deputy commissioner’s role was conceived of as the general 
controlling authority for all other activities in the district. The universality of the deputy 
commissioner’s role since the early 20th century was affected by the introduction of elected 
legislatures and creation of specialised departments having their own officers in the districts. 
Deputy commissioners are still looked upon as the eyes and ears of the government in such 
areas as development, law and order, land administration, disaster management and elections.  
 
The deputy commissioner works under the general guidance and supervision of the divisional 
commissioner. Both are under the administrative control of the cabinet division, although the 
ministry of establishment makes postings and transfers. Deputy commissioners are drawn 
from the members of the BCS administration and selection is made through a committee 
consisting of the cabinet secretary as chairman, and secretaries to the ministries of 
establishment; home; and land as members.  
 
A deputy commissioner has five additional deputy commissioners (ADC) to assist him as 
coordinator between local and central government: ADC Literacy and Development; ADC 
General; ADC Revenue; ADC Land; and ADC Magistrate. 
 
The Upazila Nirbahi Officer (UNO) is the chief executive of an upazila (sub-district), a newly 
created post in accordance with a decision made by the military regime of General Ershad. 
Under pressure from the donor community, who felt that under Ershad’s ‘autocratic and 
corrupt regime’, a decentralisation effort was the only way to reach out to the vast majority of 
people living in the rural areas (Siddiqui 2000), the Ershad government in 1982 constituted a 
committee for administrative reorganisation and reform. A major recommendation of the 
committee was to have a representative body called upazila parishad (council) under a directly 
elected chairman. The government accepted the recommendation and accordingly a post, 
designated first as thana nirbahi officer (thana executive officer) but later renamed as upazila 
nirbahi officer, was created in each of the existing thanas (later upgraded and renamed as 
upazila) outside the metropolitan areas. About the same time, all existing subdivisions were 
converted into districts. Responsibilities for all development activities at local level were 
transferred to the upazila parishad. It was also decided that the UNO should continue to act as 
chairman of upazila parishad until such time an elected chairman takes office.  
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UNOs are normally posted from among the senior scale officers of the administration cadre of 
BCS. The charter of duties of UNO stipulates that he performs such functions as to: (i) act as 
staff officer to the elected chairman of upazila parishad and thus in that capacity assist the 
chairman in implementing all policies and decisions of the parishad, (ii) assist the parishad/ 
chairman in supervising all upazila level administrative/development work and in preparing a 
coordinated upazila development plan, (iii) exercise powers under section 144 of criminal 
procedure code and sit in court to perform functions such as taking cognisance of cases, 
hearing bail matters, granting adjournment etc. when the upazila magistrate is unable to attend 
the court, (iv) initiate annual confidential reports of all upazila level officers except the 
munsiff-magistrate (assistant judge), (v) attend emergency duties such as relief work 
following natural calamities and receive food and other materials for distribution under the 
direction of upazila parishad/chairman, (vi) supervise and control revenue and budget 
administration, (vii) ensure observance of all government directives on upazila administration, 
(viii) co-ordinate all upazila level training activities, (ix) grant casual leave and countersign 
travelling allowance bills of heads of all functional departments, except that of the munsiff, 
(x) act as drawing and disbursing officer vis-à-vis officers and staff working directly under 
him, (xi) supervise activities of the officers and staff working under him, (xii) protocol duties, 
and finally, (xiii) perform such other functions as entrusted to him by the government or the 
upazila parishad/chairman. Appointed functionaries of different departments (health and 
family planning, education, agriculture, fisheries, social welfare, engineering, rural 
development, etc.) assist UNOs.  
 
It should be noted that the designation ‘upazila nirbahi officer’ changed to ‘thana nirbahi 
officer’ consequent upon the abolition of the upazila system by the BNP government in the 
early 1990s, but was changed back to ‘upazila nirbahi officer’ after the AL takeover in the late 
nineties. The Local Government Commission formed by the AL government recommended a 
four tier local government: Gram Parishad (village council), Union Parishad, Upazila Parishad 
(sub-district council) and Zila Parishad (district council), but it was never fully implemented. 
At present, the only level of local government with elected members in the districts is that of 
Union Parishad. In the municipalities, the mayor and commissioners are directly elected to a 
city corporation and wards, but the City Corporation has a rather limited mandate and budget. 
Administrative functions are carried out by a melange of agencies with no de jure focal point 
of control and coordination at the city level. The various agencies have respective lines of 
control, coordination, policy determination and finance terminating in various ministries in 
A State of Corruption? 
 140 
Dhaka. While the system continues to be highly centralised in terms of policymaking, its 
everyday manifestations still depends on local offices, which I will discuss next.  
 
The architecture of power 
 
Anyone who has entered a government building in Bangladesh and spent some time there 
observing the activities cannot help but notice what I will call the disciplinary power of 
architectural techniques structuring the behaviour of anyone entering. Walking into a public 
building, one immediately senses the reality of strictly maintained hierarchical authority. The 
first indication of rank is found in the physical location of offices. The support staff occupies 
the most accessible office space and offices of high-ranking officers are usually the most 
secluded ones located on the upper floors of the building. Clerks and peons are usually placed 
in an open-space office structure in the central area and a desk designates each employee to 
his or her workstation. The highest ranked officer is usually to be found at the far end of the 
last corridor and the office next door will belong to the immediate subordinate. To enter the 
office of first in command, visitors first have to pass an anteroom where they are asked to 
submit name, position, and purpose of visit on a piece of paper to be taken to the officer for 
approval. Doors will be closed and no one will be allowed to enter without permission. 
Clients are asked to take a seat in the waiting room where they can spend a whole day waiting 
to be called, but at the end of the working day most of them are told to come back another day 
(see also chapter 3).  
 
Most often, on entering an office, the room is already crowded with other visitors, clients, 
clerks and assistants either competing for the office-holder’s attention or patiently waiting to 
be heard. In the case of commissioners, for instance, work schedules are busy and 
appointments hard to come by. Situated behind a large desk fronting the door ensures control 
with the room and everyone in it. Friends and well-wishers are immediately invited to sit 
nearest ‘The Boss’ allowing for private consultations to take place during conversations with 
clients. Important clients can approach directly once in the room and take a seat at the 
immediate front. Less important clients are expected to stay in the back and sit quietly until 
called. Attention is not easily attained and clients commonly bring along all the support they 
can gather, preferably someone connected with the commissioner. The mode of address – 
‘Sir, Sir’ – leaves no doubt about the superior position of the person in the chair.   
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Following up on an invitation to visit a deputy commissioner (DC) I knew from before when 
he was working in another district and who on earlier occasions had helped me understand the 
intricacies of bureaucracy, the first challenge was to locate his office in a multi-storey 
building and with corridors in all directions. There were office clerks taking files from one 
office to the next, men in suits carrying briefcases, women accompanied by male relatives, 
and labourers in their work outfits – lungis – passing in all directions. Eventually my 
companion (Chakma friend mentioned in key figures in the introduction) and I found his 
office at the end of the busiest corridor. Since the commissioner was expecting us, we entered 
directly after a light knock on the door and found him seated behind a solid desk in a spacious 
office; extravagantly furnished with an air conditioner, solid wood furniture, wall-to-wall 
carpet, private bathroom, and so on. Barely seated, the DC rang the buzzer and a peon 
immediately appeared from behind the curtain behind his desk, humbly approaching the boss 
asking, ‘Sir?’ The DC requested tea for his ‘special guests’ and the peon came back serving 
fruit, samosas, biscuits, soft drinks and tea. The DC particularly wanted us to try the samosas, 
a local speciality, repeatedly insisting we eat more. Usually, visitors are offered tea and 
biscuits, but on special occasions other food items are offered in honour of special guests. By 
the mentioning of ‘special guests’ the peon knew what to serve. In between talking to us, the 
DC signed papers, answered phone calls, buzzed for the assistant and passed instructions, and 
so on, generally looking busy and important. Colleagues from another district arrived and my 
companion and I were asked to go with Assistant Commissioner Ahmed to the Circuit House 
(state guesthouse) where the DC would join us after meeting with his colleagues. 
 
The guesthouse was located on a hill in a peaceful, lush green natural environment shielded 
from the usual hustle and bustle. The only road leading to the guesthouse was closely guarded 
and it would be difficult to enter the premises unnoticed. Buildings and gardens being in 
remarkable good condition reinforced an impression of overall orderliness. Ahmed said the 
DC had arranged for me to be in the VIP room, which is where the prime minister stays 
during visits. It was the only room with air conditioning, a hot shower, and a separate seating 
area. Ahmed was eager to practice his English and appeared rather outspoken without his boss 
present. When the DC’s car arrived, Ahmed excused himself and went to meet him. After the 
DC joined the conversation, Ahmed either kept quiet or commented in support of his boss. 
For instance, when discussing development work and I voiced my disagreement with the 
DC’s views, Ahmed interrupted on behalf of his boss to stress his authority, both in terms of 
intellectual capacity and personal dedication. Not only had he written two or three books on 
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the issue, but he had also, on limited resources, initiated a number of “successful development 
projects for the benefit of the people”, he said. In fact, whenever challenged on his views, 
Ahmed intervened to praise his boss and explain on his behalf. During lunch, Ahmed faced 
competition from the magistrate with both of them trying to finish the DC’s sentences. Now 
and again they interrupted with misinterpretations, but the DC did not seem to mind and 
continued talking unaffected. Later Ahmed explained that it is all part of bossing. This was of 
course not a first time experience of this kind of submissive behaviour, but it was the first 
time I was offered an explanation. 
 
Throughout the stay Ahmed ran back and forth looking after things. Waiting for lunch, 
Ahmed disappeared every ten minutes or so to confirm its progress. Arriving at the lake to see 
some of the DC’s development projects, Ahmed went on in front to arrange for a boat. 
Stepping ashore again on the other side of the lake, Ahmed had arranged for refreshments at 
the local café and made sure the cars where waiting outside ready for departure by the time 
we finished tea. Back at the guesthouse the DC instructed Ahmed to “take care of things” 
while he made a brief stop back at the office. Ahmed saw him off and walking back he 
mentioned the importance of bossing, a concept he expected me to be familiar with “having 
spent all that time doing research on bureaucracy in Bangladesh”. He said he would explain 
after seeing about dinner for the evening, which he continued to do throughout our 
conversation.   
 
I will explain to you what it means to be a good government official. The single most 
important quality is the ability to please the boss and find out what he wants without him 
saying anything. This is the custom. It is very different from student life and requires different 
skills than we learn in university. You can be a top student, standing first, but unless you are 
good at bossing your future as a government official is bleak. You must know what the boss 
thinks and wants, and do it without him telling. Bosses have a big ego, but this is the custom.  
 
Ahmed said his primary goal was to work for the people, but that he was willing to sacrifice 
ideals for ambitions. He said he sometimes faces dilemmas between what the boss demands 
and what he believed to be in the interest of the people, which to him meant compromising. 
“You have to consider the total situation”, he said. Bosses are to be obeyed and respected. 
Besides, refusing to do so could cause the boss to write an unfavourable Annual Confidential 
Report (ACR).  
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This is important because if it [ACR] goes to the ministry I will be finished. What would you 
think if you got a report about an uncooperative officer? Actually it does not matter what you 
think because everyone else would think of me as incompetent. All the other officers are able 
to work with their bosses, they would think, why not this one? Must be something wrong with 
him they would think and send me for a lifelong service in Banderban or any other punishment 
post. It matters what the boss thinks and the only way is to please him if I want to make a 
career as government officer.  
 
Ahmed wanted to climb to the top to hopefully one day become a minister secretary. I asked 
him about his career choice and he said he actually wanted to become a politician, but 
changed his mind considering ‘anyone’ could become a politician. To become a service 
holder, on the other hand, candidates face many tests and tough competition. Politicians may 
hold the power to make the decisions, but depend on service holders for guidance and 
implementation. For this reason, he reckoned, “service holders can be even more powerful 
than politicians”. Ahmed said that, even if he does not necessarily agree with the concept of 
bossing, he believed that by the time he gets the chair, he will expect the same because he will 
be accustomed to it.   
 
Whoever sits in the chair is the boss. Right or wrong, he is the boss and must be pleased. 
Sacrifices are made and orders executed even if you know that what the boss is demanding is 
not for the betterment of the people. If you have strong objections to how the boss is running 
his office you may approach the higher authority, but you will have to convince them first. I 
believe that the man, who sits in a higher chair, his eyes are more open. He can see even 
against the wall… He can understand all those untold things… I don’t think you ought to be 
diplomatic to do the job in your country. I don’t think you need to be diplomatic like us in our 
country. You see, you must know how to work in this country. That is very important and 
because of this type of culture that we face every day, it was unnecessary for me to study 
psychology because ultimately the situation taught me.  
 
After dinner, the DC told us to get rest and be ready to leave early next morning. He was 
taking the day off to take us sightseeing, but we had to leave early because the place he 
wanted to show us would take some time to reach. Coming out after breakfast there were 
several jeeps waiting to take us to the interior. Refreshments and lunch had been arranged for 
and we were told to just sit back and enjoy the trip. Back at the Circuit House at the end of the 
day I asked Ahmed when the DC was not there, worried about offending his hospitability by 
offering payments, how to convey my appreciation. Ahmed said that, “You see, he is very 
positive to you I observed because he spent a day for you and I did never see this before. So 
you are lucky enough that you are getting my DC”. When I agreed he answered, “Thank you. 
Perhaps you have that much eyes like the boss of whom I was telling – higher chair have 
more eyes. You are keeping more eyes because you understand those untold things. He spent 
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a lot of time for you”, he said. As head of the district administration, the DC remained 
inaccessible to most, but for me, the foreign guest, he had spent time and resources showing 
me around. Apparently, expressing my gratitude towards the DC, sincerely thanking him for 
spending his valuable time like that, I had acknowledged his position as an important man.  
 
From the architecture of government buildings and offices to superiors commanding 
behaviour and the submissive behaviour of subordinates, the impression is the same, namely 
that of a structured system of authority founded on formal positions, just as Weber described 
it. Ahmed’s statements and behaviour clearly indicates the habitus of the state and can only be 
understood in the context of the formal order of the state, i.e. bureaucratic order. Running 
back and forth looking after the needs of the DC, Ahmed recognises his own position vis-à-
vis the DC’s in a hierarchically ordered system. Always trying to be ahead with his services, 
he recognises that there are certain skills necessary to do the job properly. Setting aside his 
own opinions on behalf of those of his superior, he recognises the importance of order of 
command for the system to work, and worrying about his ACR, Ahmed recognises the 
requirement for making a civil service career. If subordinates such as Ahmed can be said to do 
more than just recognising the system and how it works, i.e. subjecting to the power of the 
state by reproducing it, I will come back to shortly.  
 
Similarly, immediately upon entering a government building, clients and visitors looking for 
government officials are made subject to this system of rank. Obstacles are many in the 
corridors of power and high-ranking officers are commonly inaccessible. Waiting rooms 
outside closed doors and seating arrangements inside offices are used to distinguish important 
clients and visitors from the less important ones indicating that there is no such thing as 
universal service. Either you are in a position to directly approach the person in charge, or you 
are left negotiating with his subordinates about rules and regulations. Inexperienced clients 
will usually do the latter, but most of the time people try to find ways of overcoming formal 
procedures, as seen in the next chapter.  
 
At the same time as there are some ‘blocks’, in Foucault’s phrase (Foucault 2002), demanding 
particular behaviour in certain situations, there must also be an ‘undecided space’ (Bevir 
1999) where individual subjects decide what beliefs to hold and what actions to perform for 
reasons of their own because different people can be seen to adopt different strategies against 
the background of the same structures, as this chapter demonstrates. That buildings and 
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formal authority alone cannot explain the complex meaning of power is evident from the 
following cases showing the dynamic relationship between state power and powerful state 
agents.  
 
The complexity of state power 
 
The Annual Confidential Report referred to earlier, is a performance evaluation report of a 
public servant written by his immediate superior. In addition to performance, it contains 
specific observations on the character, conduct and integrity of the officer reported upon. As 
of 1990, the following grading system has been in use: outstanding 95-100; very good 85-94; 
good 61-84; average 41-60; and below average 40 and below. The report is to be 
countersigned by an officer immediately superior to the reporting officer. 
 
This system of evaluating the performance, conduct and character of public servants goes 
back far. Until 1834, promotion was wholly based on seniority, determined by the date of 
entry in the service. An order of the governor general in council passed in 1834 laid down that 
appointment to a vacant post would no longer be on the basis of seniority alone, but also in 
consideration of competence and qualifications. This order laid the foundation for annual 
confidential reports previously known as character rolls. In the beginning it was an open 
official record, later made secret, and finally confidential. Except for a few modifications, 
such as choice of language (English or Bangla); provision for annual medical examination; 
and introduction of a new grading system, the system of ACR has remained the same. The 
system is also applicable for non-gazetted officers and employees, excluding the lower 
subordinate service, but the form is different from that of gazetted officers (Ali 2004). 
 
Agents of the state 
 
As prospects of promotion, training, salary increase, and so forth, depend on officers 
performance, a favourable ACR is of outmost importance. During my fieldwork, Alam’s (see 
key figures in the introduction) immediate superior, Madam, was transferred to another 
district. The transfer was described as normal and expected after four years in the same chair. 
She received the transfer order with mixed emotions; unhappy about leaving people she had 
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worked with for the last four years, but pleased about having been granted her request for the 
next station. Alam was anything but pleased about the transfer. He was concerned about 
getting a new boss.  
 
A few days before departing, Madam, Alam and I, as on many previous occasions, were 
chatting in her office. The door was open allowing anyone to enter without asking permission 
or first being announced. Students would come to talk about problems at school, parents to 
discuss enrolment, and teachers to complain about trouble at work. Madam would listen and 
consider solutions. The atmosphere and mode of address was generally relaxed and informal. 
When only the three of us were present, even support staff would join the conversations 
jokingly telling stories about different types of bosses causing loud outburst of laughter when 
imitating gestures. Madam behaved with Alam and the others more as a colleague than 
superior causing no one to engage much in bossing. Alam said that although she is the boss, 
she had never behaved like one. Her office door was always open and her attitude sincere. If 
she needed something she would ask for it. She refused to be the centre of attention and 
instead of taking praise she gave it. Talking about her departure, the support staff expressed 
concern about the new boss and his character (charitra). Madam said they asked about how 
they would manage to work for him because they had already heard that he was ‘hard’. “He 
says one thing and does another. He talks all the time and yells”, one of them said.  
 
Intermission 
 
The obvious question is perhaps if women in general are different from men when it comes to 
leadership. A woman principal I knew, for instance, conducted her office very different from 
male principals I met. The first time I visited the college I walked into a spacious and 
attractive room furnished with the usual executive office furniture, i.e. solid desk and tall 
chair facing the room. Seeing this tiny woman sitting beside the desk on an ordinary chair like 
a visitor, I asked for Mrs. Principal. Being told she was the principal I asked about her seating 
arrangement. Evidently she was not comfortable behind that large desk and preferred not to sit 
there. In fact, never even once coming to her office did I find her behind the desk or seated in 
the tall chair. She kept phone and office supplies within reach and used only the right side 
drawers. Instead of pressing the buzzer, she softly called the peon by his name asking him to 
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“please bring some tea and biscuits”. If she wanted a file from another office she would not 
hesitate to go and get it herself instead of shouting for others to fetch it for her.  
 
After class, all the teachers would gather in her office to chat and to read newspapers. She 
paid close attention to the teachers’ work, which she enthusiastically praised. People would 
casually come and go without being asked the purpose of their visit and Mrs. Principal 
engaged with all excluding no one. Anyone was welcome to sit in the tall chair and use her 
phone, causing confusion to visitors about whom to address first. Admittedly, high-ranking 
female officers are not all that common, but during fieldwork I met more than enough to make 
a comparison and few complied with the above description. For instance, Madam’s immediate 
superior was a woman, but the atmosphere surrounding her was as formal as that of any male 
colleague (see below). Rather, what it does show is the reciprocal relationship between the 
power of the state and powerful state agents. Refusing to sit in the chair and behave 
authoritatively, Mrs. Principal not only undermined her own powerful position, but also that 
of the state. No one in her office engaged much in ‘bossing’ and she and her college was 
never prioritised to represent the state either publicly or privately.  
 
In the case of Madam and Mrs. Principal, both are in superior positions, but with none of 
them involving in the rituals of the state neither were considered particularly powerful and 
neither were engaged much for ceremonial purposes or seen as representatives of state power. 
As pointed out by Ahmed earlier, though, most officers not only accepts the special treatment, 
but expects it when in superior position, as seen in the previous chapter and as can be seen 
from the following case, which by the way involves a woman. The example is from the time 
when I accompanied an officer on one of her many commitments as deputy director of 
secondary schools (Madam DD).  
 
On our way back to her office, having been present at a school function, I made a comment 
about how organised it all appeared. The occasion was the annual sports day at a government 
high school and Madam DD, in her function as controller of the school, had been invited as 
chief guest. Arriving by car in the afternoon, four boys from the Bangladesh National Cadet 
Corps, dressed in light kaki-brown uniforms and military boots and berets, took their position 
and marched Madam DD from the parking lot and into the school building. In the 
headmaster’s office, she was seated in the tall chair behind the desk surrounded by the 
headmaster, an ex-headmaster present for the occasion, schoolteachers and inspectors. Lunch 
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was served followed by tea and mishti (sweets). After a brief update on the school situation in 
general, the Cadet Corps marched Madam DD out onto the arena and over to the dais where 
she climbed the stairs to be seated behind a large table decorated with fresh flowers. All 
guests received bouquets, pictures were taken, the national flag was hoisted while the national 
anthem was played and a seventh grade student performed prayers. After the inspector and 
headmaster had said a few words, Madam DD declared the games open and four teams named 
after the four main rivers – Padma, Meghna, Karnaphuli, Jamuna – were ready to compete as 
soon as the ‘Olympic Flame’ had been lit. Competitions had been going on since morning and 
only the finals were left. After less than an hour the games finished and the prize-giving 
ceremony could start. Winners were announced and Madam DD handed over the prizes. The 
headmaster thanked the honourable Madam DD and her foreign companion for coming and 
the Cadets marched us back out to a waiting car. Madam DD responded to my comment about 
how organised it all appeared by saying that it is important to teach the students to “respect 
the national anthem, observe and comply with formalities, and respect honourable guests”. In 
virtue of her position, Madam DD was honoured and could appear as the authority of school 
activities. Following formal procedures, Madam DD re-created both state power and her own 
powerful position as an agent of the state.  
 
Agents of the state continued 
 
Returning to Alam and his new boss, he started researching his boss-to-be weeks before he 
actually arrived by calling colleagues asking for information. According to Alam, there were 
four types of officers: honest and efficient (HE), dishonest and efficient (DE), honest and 
inefficient (HI), and dishonest and inefficient (DI). His new boss, even before arrival, was 
categorised as DE, which was the most challenging. Alam said nobody cares about honesty as 
long as you are efficient at pleasing the boss and his career depended on his ability to satisfy 
his boss.  
 
I need it because he will write my ACR. I have to be much closer to him. As I am closest to 
him, he will not be able to write a bad ACR. Maybe out of a hundred he may give me forty or 
fifty, but I will not give him the chance to write on my ACR such poor marks. Since I joined 
this job I have got no less than ninety-four. So I have to remain this and keep it up and not 
give him any chance to write against me or do anything against me. This is very important. If 
he gives me poor marks it will be harmful for me and for my career in the future. [Superiors] 
will always take into consideration my ACR. My future depends on my ACR. Suppose they 
will send some officials abroad for training, foreign training, at that time they will go through 
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my ACR first. They will not go through other people although other people know that I’m a 
good and honest man, but they will have nothing to do as he has got the power. This way I 
have to carry on and I have to tactfully tackle the situation.  
 
Alam’s workstation was in the sub-district several kilometres out of town and travelling back 
and forth in one day was inconvenient, which is why he usually stayed in the sub-district for 
days at a time. After his boss arrived, Alam travelled back to the city more regularly trying to 
spend as much time with him as possible doing all sorts of odd jobs after regular office hours. 
Hearing about a shop owned by his boss, Alam decided to offer his assistance in an effort to 
gain some goodwill. None of his colleagues knew about the shop and Alam said it was 
important that it remained a secret. For one, government officers are not allowed to be 
involved in private business and running a shop is against service rules. By getting involved, 
Alam was hoping to be seen as his trusted accomplice. Also, by keeping it a secret he was 
hoping to keep colleagues equally concerned about their relationships with the new boss, from 
showing up. Alam’s strategy was clear; involve with the boss beyond official matters for the 
purpose of establishing a more personal relationship with him than otherwise possible.  
 
As mentioned, Alam categorised the boss as efficient and dishonest. By this he meant that the 
boss was on good terms with superiors and that he allowed monetary transactions to decide 
relations with subordinates. According to him, dishonest colleagues do not work extra 
because with a boss that accepts cash all they do is pay the right amount. He, on the other 
hand, had “no other way to make him satisfied. To maintain my career good I have to go on 
like this way – on this track”, he said. Besides helping out with the shop, Alam made hospital 
arrangements when the boss’ wife was giving birth, he arranged for doctors appointments 
when his child was sick, picked up train tickets and took the boss’ family to the station when 
travelling, buying them sweets and drinks for the journey, among other things. Talking to him 
months later, when he was his way to submit the two months delayed ACR, he said he had 
made little progress in swaying the boss.  
 
Actually this is the first time I’m giving him my ACR because he has joined just […] last year. 
Previously Madam gave my ACR, but she has given me 99, 96, 95, extraordinary. This time I 
don’t know what he will give me. He might make a delay or he might put it off in the table and 
take time. But I’m thinking that I must say that if you don’t take it and send it off to Dhaka 
office then it will be harmful for me. There is an efficiency bar and I have crossed my 
efficiency bar. So in that case, if you don’t sign this and send it in proper time, already two 
months passed as I’m supposed to submit it on January 1st and it is little bit late as today is 
March 3rd, I will not get the increment. I have to send it as early as possible.  
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Looking over the report with Alam he explained that it covers both professional and personal 
skills and that each of the twenty-five questions is marked between one and four. The first 
part asks about professional knowledge: quality and quantity of work, quality of supervision 
and guidelines, relationship with colleagues, efficiency in taking and executing decisions, 
interest and efficiency in supervising subordinates, communication skills, interest shown in 
submitting ACR in time and having it signed by the higher officer, and sense of 
responsibility. In the second part of the form, the reporting officer is asked about the 
subordinate’s personal qualities, such as behaviour with the public, ability to cope with 
demanding situations, ability to take action and carry out orders, interest in the work, sense of 
responsibility, dependability, punctuality, co-operation, personality, intelligence and 
judgement, and grade of discipline. Separate space is provided for mentioning of training, 
promotion and any other career relevant comments. “It’s like a character description”, said 
Alam, “reporting on my ideology, morals, and to what extent I am good and intelligent”. He 
wanted his boss to appreciate his extra-official efforts and consider him as more than just 
another subordinate. 
 
With his previous boss, Alam always knew how he had been evaluated. After completing the 
form, Madam used to ask for his approval, but that was because of the kind of relationship 
they had, interacting on a more personal level. He did not know what to think about this new 
boss or how he would be evaluated. Although concerned about marks, Alam appeared just as 
concerned about the evaluation report being further delayed. Depending on the marks, to pass 
the efficiency bar and receive his due increment the report had to be sent and countersigned 
by the project director in Dhaka.  
 
In November, the report was finally sent to Dhaka, but Alam seemed dismayed. By giving 
him ninety marks he did not get ‘outstanding’ as expected. For months Alam had tried to get 
him to complete it explaining about his much overdue increment. He had worked hard to 
please his boss, but without achieving what he was hoping for. After all else failed Alam 
became angry and threatened to write to the department with a complaint, but instead he 
waited. Shortly after, his boss called him to his office to see the completed report. 
 
Previously, out of a hundred Madam gave me ninety-nine, but this time I have done a lot for 
him. But he just gave ninety saying that “I have given you much more marks”. I said that I 
don’t care whatever it is because again it will be evaluated in Dhaka – my Dhaka office. They 
know me very well. I said that my [previous boss] has given me 99, but you should make it 98 
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or 99, like that – extraordinary. My lowest marks previously were 94 and highest marks were 
99. This time this [boss] is corrupted and all the people know. I cannot make him satisfied 
even if I did lots for him because it is quite impossible to match with this kind of dishonest 
bloody people.  
 
In this context, ‘corrupted’ was used to condemn action believed to have been decided by 
money. Alam thought his career could be decided by his efforts to please the boss, but was 
disappointed. He did not receive top scores and blamed his failure on a corrupted boss more 
concerned about making money than recognising his efforts. His boss, on the other hand, 
behaved as if informing Alam that his efforts had indeed been recognised by letting him see 
the report and pointing out the generous marks. Although obviously disagreeing on the value 
of Alam’s efforts, neither questioned the definition of a superior-subordinate relationship and 
the fact that superiors evaluate their subordinates according to some given criteria. Trying to 
please his boss for the purpose of scoring high on his ACR, Alam also recognised the system 
of performance evaluation report as criteria for his future career. The same can be said about 
his colleagues, but by different methods, which in this case proved more effective. Although 
to Alam there was a right and a wrong way to go about pleasing bosses, no doubt the boss had 
to be pleased. His efforts not only benefit him personally when successful, but also constitute 
the very power of the state. Alam’s efforts in pleasing bosses did not stop with immediate 
superiors and he spent much time entertaining important visitors.  
 
When superiors call from Dhaka informing about planned visits, Alam take it that what they 
actually want is to bring their families and spend the time either sightseeing in the hills or 
relaxing at the beach. Alam arranges for transportation, feeding and lodging making sure they 
are properly looked after. Back in Dhaka superiors claim travel allowances, while 
subordinates are the ones actually paying for everything. To compensate, government officials 
have invented a fund popularly known as the ‘LR fund’. Alam said jokingly that LR is short 
for “light refreshment” or “light requirement” and claimed its existence to be an open service 
secret known all the way to the top, even at the secretariat. Apparently the money is collected 
from the public in exchange for signatures on official documents and used for entertaining 
visitors. Alam said that some of his colleagues maintained LR funds, but not him. He saw it as 
corruption because money is unofficially collected from the public and secretly maintained. 
At the same time, such extra-official expenses were too frequent for him to manage privately 
and had to be retrieved somehow.  
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Ministers and parliament members visiting their constituencies to maintain popularity also 
expect to be entertained properly and expenses for arranging security, dinner parties, public 
meetings, leisure trips, and so on are covered by the hosting party. UNO is mainly responsible 
for receiving visitors at this level, but draws on the support of subordinates. The many visits 
mean that Alam spends a lot of time and money entertaining. “In that case officially I am not 
honest”, Alam admitted. “Then I say to my accountant that the boss came and I had to spend 
two or three thousand taka so you have to manage this. I don’t know from where you will 
manage. I have nothing more than that to do with it. No source is there.” Later he explained 
about this monthly budget allowance of 1000 taka to spend on office supplies, which he 
regularly supplemented. If he wants to spend more than the one thousand a month, a 
committee of three should approve it. Instead of going through a committee, he gets UNO to 
approve supplementary funds. On paper three names will appear, he explained, but in practice 
the money is disbursed without going through a committee. He suspected the office staff of 
using this fund to also cover entertainment expenses. 
 
Yeah, in government job, especially in our country, it is too tough to keep the job properly. Its 
requirement is actually too tough to keep your chair unaffected. If you fail then you will be 
affected. I am honest, but this not acceptable to my bosses and I have to tackle them. I have to 
tackle them tactfully. I shouldn’t say to them time and again that, “Oh Sir I am honest so I 
cannot bring this suit for you or arrange for you good accommodation”. I cannot say a lot of 
bloody things. This will not make sense. At that time even if he doesn’t say anything, which 
he will not, when he go back to head office in Dhaka he will not on behalf of me submit any 
report. He will just submit that this officer is ok or he is not up to the mark, he is not efficient, 
like that he will write. But if I entertain them properly and give them good respect, if I 
entertain them perfectly and spend much money for them they will be happy. When they want 
to go to Rangamati I have arranged a car and I say that don’t worry about money; money does 
not matter. In that case they are happy. If I fail they don’t like to understand. They know that I 
am just honest. They know very well which officer is honest and which officer is dishonest. 
They know and they have the information because from the upazila so many people they write 
against them – against dishonest officers. When they get two or three letters, or four or five, 
they get in their mind that this officer is not good. Sometimes when they go to the office they 
see the papers and going through the papers they can understand that this officer is not honest. 
In my case they know that I am honest, but when they come they say that I want to go to your 
upazila and I want to visit your upazila. I say that you are most welcome Sir. When would you 
like to come? Then they say that your bhabi, that means his wife, she also likes to go there. 
When does she like to go? She likes to visit Chittagong. Then I say ok, let bhabi also come to 
Chittagong. Then he is asking me what you can do. It is a terrible question. What I can do; I 
will say no, what do you need? Then he is just delivering that your bhabi she wants to visit 
Rangamati and Cox’s Bazar, and she wants to go to Kaptai and Bandarban. Then I just say 
that ok Sir, you just come. And my wife she becomes crazy; you are just entertaining your 
boss, but you never even took us to Rangamati, your kids and me, you never took us. But you 
are taking rental car for them and you are paying money for them – from your own pocket. 
From your salary you will carry on your job. I am saying that I have nothing to do. In that case 
I have to do something wrong and officially I am not honest. Government rules and 
regulations actually is like that I cannot remain myself honest.  
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What Alam says here is that it is practically impossible to remain ‘honest’ in the service 
because of all the unofficial expenses. Hospitality is important in Bangladesh and visitors are 
commonly treated with generosity. Anyone visiting will experience this, but in this context 
there is more to it than just hospitality. Subordinates acting upon bosses presumed needs, 
presumed because most of the time nothing in particular is actually asked for, are seen as 
efficient and loyal. Failing to do so is easily seen as inefficient and disrespectful and nobody 
cares for whatever reason.  
 
By doing whatever he can to please superiors, such as helping out with the shop, taking care 
of family needs, spending vast amounts of time and money entertaining (which his wife 
accuses him of not even doing for his family), Alam can be seen as a case of how power 
works on the subject. Looking to please superiors, he recognises the order of the state and the 
structure of the system as described earlier. In this system subordinates carry out orders from 
superiors, but the system may at any time reconstitute its order depending on positions of 
those involved, as seen in the previous chapter (chief guest today, but only special guest 
tomorrow). Besides, the concept of a superior-subordinate relationship is constantly 
reinvented through various ways of interpreting (what a boss is), absorbing (what it will take 
to please the boss) and rearticulating (what is actually done to please the boss). This means 
that it is not only power working on the subject, but even the subject working on power, 
which can be more or less successful. In Alam’s case, the struggle concerned morally 
acceptable or unacceptable methods (cf. Alam’s description of different types of officers in 
terms of honest/dishonest and efficient/inefficient) for accomplishing the same. Before 
discussing type of power at work with reference to Weber, Foucault and Bourdieu (see 
earlier), let me continue some more with Alam and the way power works.  
 
Powerful through the state 
 
Reporting directly to district education officer, Alam said that his office worked independent 
of that of the upazila nirbahi officer (UNO).  Nevertheless, meeting for lunch one day, he said 
he had been engaged with UNO until almost nine the night before. Not feeling well in the 
office, UNO had called on him to arrange a doctor’s appointment.    
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He is a very big doctor and appointments must be made six or seven days ahead, but it is 
impossible for us to stand on a line and take a ticket. Instead I made contact with the doctor 
personally and said that “we are government officials and you should excuse me and take this 
into consideration”. Then he said ok and to bring the UNO. I had to bring my UNO there and 
after seeing the doctor he went back to the upazila. But this is not my job – official job – but I 
have to keep him also satisfied because my seal is also on him. 
 
Alam explained that he depend on UNO for getting a casual leave granted or travel 
allowances reimbursed, but for that he did not need to spend an evening taking him to the 
doctor, or attending to any other business of his. He wanted UNO to see him as a friend and as 
such support him vis-à-vis higher authorities if needed. “Admin people” (from administration 
cadre), he argued, “rule BCS because they are in leading positions in all departments”.53 
UNOs, being posted from among the senior scale officers of the administration cadre, have 
contact with other admin people. UNOs become DCs, who eventually move on to secretariats 
and work with ministers. Alam reasoned that with UNOs having access to people in high 
places, friendly relations with a UNO could be useful.  
 
In principle, employment in the service automatically offers security in terms of tenure, 
definite structure of mobility and fixed salaries, but in practice this may not be so simple. 
Considering lower-ranked officers only earn around nine thousand taka a month, and without 
benefits such as free housing and transportation, few can afford delayed wages. In Alam’s 
case, family expenses are manageable because his father owns the building he resides in and 
he does not have to pay rent, which otherwise would amount to four or five thousand a month. 
His father had retired from his job, but renting out part of the building for government 
purposes adds to the family income. Additional sources come from his father’s business 
involvement and the family does not depend on Alam’s income alone to manage living 
expenses. In contrast, some of his colleagues have to pay house rent, tuition for children or 
siblings, and other household expenses from their salaries as sole provider of the family. 
Waiting for overdue pay checks is not an option for most officials. Alam, on the other hand, 
allowed twenty months to pass without getting paid before deciding to do something about it. 
Apparently, the government was discussing continuation of donor support and until funds had 
been released he was not receiving his salary. As it turned out, his problem not only relied on 
the outcome of government discussions with donors because after donors had disbursed the 
funds, he was still not getting his wages.  
                                                
53 BCS consists of 29 cadres, each undertaking a specialised function (administrative, auditing and accounting, 
agricultural, foreign affairs, health, education, engineering, etc.). 
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Salary I will manage. Salary I will have to go to Dhaka and I think I will have to give bribery 
to somebody. I already contacted somebody. No other way.  
That is the only option? 
Yeah, there is no other way. Otherwise to suffer because other people they are doing it and no 
other alternative. This time I am thinking that I can become a hundred per cent efficient in all 
works of life – I must be. So I already contacted them and they said that ok, Sir you come and 
we will make everything ok for you. So I have to spend maybe a little bit for them.  
So you have to spend money to get your salary? 
Yeah, to bring fund from them. Nothing else to do because now [my wife] is not also doing 
anything and this is very important. I am not taking any money from the people in dishonest 
way. Except from my salary there is no other source of income.  
You are not getting your salary automatically?  
No. I was supposed to get everything earlier, but last time my amount was very poor. They 
have given me 35,000, which is the lowest, because another upazila they gave 166,000. I went 
to the project director’s room and asked “what happened? They are working, but I am also 
working. So why did one get 166,000 and I only 35,000? Make it clear.” Then he asked how it 
happened. Have you sent your requisition properly? I said that everything was in order. 
 
The project director promised to look into it, but nothing happened. It is the same when he 
goes to Dhaka for official meetings and is entitled to travel allowances. First, the claim goes 
to central office for approval. If approved, it is passed on to the sub-district accountant who is 
supposed to pay him the money. When Alam sent his claim to Dhaka after completing a three 
weeks training course, the file remained on the accountant’s desk for weeks. Next time he 
went to Dhaka he made some inquiries and ended up paying five percent of his claim for 
having it signed and passed on to the sub-district. After the passing of more weeks waiting for 
his money in the sub-district, Alam decided he wanted his money and he went to the UNO 
with his problem. “I was so angry”, he explained, “I said I would beat up the accountant for 
not giving me my money”. UNO told him to sit down and have a cup of tea while he rang the 
buzzer to tell the peon to get the accountant. When the accountant came, UNO asked why he 
had not paid Alam his money, instructing him to do so immediately. Alam said the accountant 
was probably waiting for him to offer the usual ten percent for his service. Alam was not 
ready to pay money for the accountant’s service and trusted instead the UNO, as friend and 
colleague, to use his authority vis-à-vis the accountant. Having the accountant unconditionally 
provide the service and pay Alam the full amount on the spot, UNO helped him out by 
exercising his superior position. This system of files being moved from desk to desk for 
countersignatures is to ensure correct procedures, but is in practice an opportunity for civil 
servants to exercise power. Keeping cases pending for weeks and months can be an effective 
mean for making some extra money or gaining/repaying a favour (see also chapter 5).  
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Alam often claimed to have friends in high places, but he did not seem to benefit much from 
whatever connections he may have had. After finishing his master in accounting, he started 
out working for an international company, but resigned after a few months during a quarrel 
with the boss. In his own account, he was a clever student and several companies were 
interested in hiring him after graduation, but his family urged him to find a government job.  
 
He applied for a job with the ministry of education and was employed directly but, without 
going through PSC, he was not ‘encadred’. He was promised encadred service later, but after 
ten years in service that had still not happened. In 2003, he had held the same position for the 
last seven years and often complained about the inconveniences of commuting between 
workstation and home (see earlier account). If he had friends in high places, why was he still 
in the same position? He turned the question around saying that on several occasions the 
department had tried to have him transferred, but he had managed to avoid it. Positions 
available to him would be even more inconvenient than the one he was holding. Either the 
position would be less important, with reduced number of support staff, or even more 
remotely located. If he wanted to remain within the same line of work there were not that 
many options in terms of workstations and he did not want to give up any authority.  
 
On a district level, Alam was the lower-level officer ranked after deputy director and district 
education officer, but in the sub-district he was the head of office, instructing the work of six 
office staff, accountant, typist, sweeper, watchman, caretaker, and peon, all addressing him as 
‘Sir’. In his main function, Alam was responsible for distributing student stipends, but he also 
had a number of other functions of public interest. During exams he worked as sub-district 
invigilator with the authority to interfere with irregularities in examination halls. In cases of 
cheating, he could expel students and have teachers indicted for neglect of duty. He was also 
regularly nominated for committees representing the government during appointments of 
teachers to non-government schools. His signature of approval could qualify schools hiring 
new teachers for additional subsidies. As the executive officer he was recognised as a man of 
certain influence and people would approach him on all sorts of issues besides official ones. 
Although subservient in most situations, in his office Alam was the boss. Believing in the 
system as a system of authority based on formal positions, Alam insisted on a strict order of 
command in his own office and not like Madam neglecting procedures and refusing to be an 
agent of the state.  
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Dimensions of power 
 
According to Weber, bureaucracy in its most developed form is the ‘iron cage’ of modern 
societies because of a formalism constraining individuals from without and determining their 
existence with irresistible force. Bureaucracy, defined as a system of control based on 
technical knowledge, and its rationality consisting of officials engaging in routine work 
emerges as an end in itself. Bureaucracies providing identities for their members through 
status, offices, rational codes of conduct, and the like thus violate an interest in, and potential 
for, rational agency because these identities have limited relevance. Merely serving the ends 
of the organisation, actions are dictated by processes over which each bureaucrat has little or 
no control or interest. Hence, the iron cage; a field of possible action defined by bureaucratic 
rationality and limited to organisational activities. 
 
For Foucault, it is society, conceived as a specific regime of power and knowledge, defining 
the subject in providing both norms to live by and means to do so. While Weber worried 
about individual freedom being lost in the advent of bureaucratisation, Foucault saw no 
autonomous subjects to begin with as in his view, all human action occurs in already defined 
contexts influencing and directing its subjects in distinct ways. Power to influence behaviour 
through assigning identities not being limited to organisational activities, but something 
occurring anywhere at all times, Foucault is arguing for a far more diffuse field of power 
relations. While earlier forms of power were public and intermittent, he says, modern power is 
local and continuous taking the form of the gaze (normalisation through surveillance in 
schools, factories, hospitals, and the like). In fact, modern beings regulate and normalise 
themselves in accord with the modern regime of power. “The only effect of all our 
liberationist discourses, with their impossible, liberal view of freedom”, Bevir recounts, “is to 
mask the way in which modern power thus dominates us” (Bevir 1999:70). In other words, 
people merely take part in already defined social realities providing them with directions and 
the means to follow. At the same time as power is ineliminable in a way that undermines the 
very idea of the autonomous subject, power can only be exercised over ‘free subjects’, by 
which he means situations where “several ways of behaving, several reactions and diverse 
comportments may be realised” (Foucault 2002:342). Although individuals in modern 
societies typically use their agency only to regulate themselves in accord with social norms, 
he says, power is productive as there are several possible ways of relating to the same norms. 
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Far from resisting the normalising effects of power, however, people act to promote them. 
Thus, it is not the organisation and its rational enforcement – as for Weber – defining 
modernity. Rather, it is social norms, accepted at any given moment in time and seen as 
altogether natural, self-evident, and indispensable part of the social order. This modern type 
of power Foucault calls biopower, by which he means the field of possible action defined by 
the contemporary regime of knowledge and reproduced by individuals.  
 
As in British colonial times discussed earlier, order is hierarchically organised and depends on 
respect for bureaucratic authority to function properly. Indians taken into the Indian Civil 
Service were screened and separated from their origins, and their admission into a new culture 
was effected through the educational system and service training. These Indians were 
subjected to rule-based, rational control and expected to be one hundred percent loyal to the 
system. Employment was stable, but career opportunities were limited to positions belonging 
to the lower-levels of the services. ‘Iron cage’ thus seems the appropriate term to describe the 
relationship between Indians and their British masters, leaving little room for self-creation in 
the colonial machinery. Although maintaining the formal structure of this colonial system (cf. 
description of the BCS), the post-colonial situation indicates a much more diffuse field of 
power relations with the enmeshment of the political and the bureaucratic, and of the public 
and the private (involvement of interests beyond those of the organisation). In other words, 
the rigorous structure is maintained, but its operation appears less rigid than before. Not only 
is the system reproduced, power working on the subject; it is simultaneously constantly 
recreated by individual inventiveness, subject working on power.  
 
We may talk about a dynamism, then, between power of the state and powerful state agents, 
materialised in the use of buildings and offices, yet depending on internalisation of state 
order. Alam and his colleagues different ways of satisfying the boss for achieving the same, 
that is, high marks on the ACR as criteria for future career opportunities, suggests 
inventiveness beyond iron cage and closer to Foucault’s notion of biopower. I say ‘closer to’ 
because arguing for career opportunities and prospects of becoming boss as reasons for 
reproducing the system I have also explained “the real dynamics of production” (who or what 
drives the system), which Foucault has been criticized for having neglected (Hardt and Negri 
2001:28). On the one hand, a distinction can be made between formal and practical order. On 
the other, the practical order seen in this chapter makes sense because of the existence of the 
formal order.  
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In this chapter I have engaged concepts such as iron cage, habitus and biopower to discuss 
power and power relations within a state system, but little has been said about what this 
means for various forms of sociality. Bureaucratic organisation Weber saw in relation to 
increasing rationalisation of human life, which traps individuals in an “iron cage” of rule-
based, rational control (legal principles). Bourdieu argued for a differentiated society using 
habitus to explain the reproduction of social diversities (bodily dispositions). For Foucault, 
society of control is the result of life itself being administered by biopower (morality of the 
body). Crux of the matter is social order and dynamics of human behaviour, which is explored 
further in the next chapter.  
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5 
Challenging the State: social order beyond rationality of 
the modern state 
 
According to Weber, religion in the West played a part in moulding human conduct in a 
particular way. In The Protestant Ethic and the Sprit of Capitalism from 1930, Weber traces 
the connection between religious ideals and practical life arguing that changes in how people 
viewed and enacted religion through Lutheran and Calvinistic Protestantism was essential for 
a transformation of attitudes towards life in general to take place. First, the doctrine of 
demonstrating one’s faith through worldly activities represented a shift towards religious 
determination of life-conduct. Second, the concept of deity was de-mystified and practical life 
came to be seen as expressions of divine will. Third, self-discipline became central to 
everyday behaviour and the concept of good and evil took a practical meaning in terms of 
one’s deeds. Finally, salvation became attainable and not something to be left to destiny. In 
Weber’s account, practical solutions to spiritual challenges opened up for a whole new way of 
thinking and acting on the world that, albeit unintentionally, effected a rationalisation of 
practical conduct. Economic success became interpreted as a sign of grace and thereby 
channelling worldly activities and spiritual concerns in the same direction. It was this 
rationalisation of religious beliefs that facilitated the development of modern capitalism. Only 
later, and after a process of secularisation, did devotion to the accumulation of wealth on its 
own terms come to be justifiable (Brubaker 1984).  
 
The argument is that religion functioned as a facilitator towards a development of thinking in 
terms of means and ends. Individuals had a religious interest in ascertaining their state of 
grace and with the help of religious prophecies came to believe this could be achieved through 
conscientious planning and righteous behaviour. The end was salvation and the means hard 
work and modest living. It was this rational and practical attitude towards the world that 
formed the basis for the modern institutional practices within the state, the bureaucracy and 
the enterprise.  
 
To Weber, bureaucracy, defined as a system of control based on technical knowledge, 
emerges as a peculiarly ‘modern’ form of organising the state, economic corporations, and 
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voluntary organisations, which he sought to understand through ideal-types. Ideal-types are 
conceptual or analytical models constructed for comparative purposes by selecting a series of 
culturally significant facets of a complex socio-historical formation, relating them to each 
other and contrasting them with a different, and often opposed, type of formation. For 
instance, certain aspects of world religions can, according to Weber, be grasped in terms of 
two analytical dimensions: other-worldliness vs. this-worldliness, mysticism vs. asceticism. 
Protestantism, he argued, must be understood as a form of this-worldly asceticism 
emphasising one’s unique ‘vocation’ in life, as well as the values of discipline, obedience, 
regularity, efficiency, and methodical rigor in one’s work habits, the suppression of one’s 
passions and desires by a kind of self-rationalisation, i.e. the subordination of feelings and 
emotions to cognitive control and, ultimately, the devotion of one’s whole life to God’s plan. 
It was this attitude that was seen as fostering attitudes favourable to the rise of Western 
entrepreneurial capitalism and its increasingly bureaucratic institutional forms, which in its 
ideal-typical form is, as seen before, a system of: 1) division of labour and specialisation, 2) 
hierarchy of authority, 3) formal, written rules, 4) impersonality and detachment, and 5) a life-
long career pattern.  
 
The way rationalisation is portrayed in The Protestant Ethic and the Sprit of Capitalism 
illustrates but one incident of how this process came about and represents only the “the 
specific and peculiar rationalism of Western culture” (Weber [1930] 1976:26). One of 
Weber’s great discoveries was that other religious civilisations have gone through similar 
processes of rationalising religious belief systems in terms of consistency, coherence and 
greater applicability, but with different effects (cf. his studies of The Religion of India (1958) 
and The Religion of China (1951)). 
 
In the Weberian thesis, then, the concept of rationality is central and important. Although 
Weber never really defined rationality, he himself repeatedly calling attention to its 
multiplicity of meanings (Brubaker 1984), two elements are conspicuously present in his 
notion of modern rationality.  
 
One is coherence or consistency, like the treatment of like cases, regularity, what might 
be called the very soul or honour of a good bureaucrat. The other is efficiency, the cool 
rational selection of the best available means to given, clearly formulated and isolated 
ends… Orderliness and efficiency may indeed be seen as the bureaucratic and the 
entrepreneurial elements in an overall spirit of rationality (Gellner 1993:20). 
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In modern society, Weber would claim, social order and state order is one and the same (state 
order as institutionalised social order) and legal rationality an end in itself, thereof ‘iron cage’. 
Foucault, on the other hand, argues that, “the social body is the effect not of a consensus but 
of the materiality of power operating on the very bodies of individuals” (Foucault 1980:55), 
which he calls biopower. To him, the state is interesting as a social orientation and ‘will’ of 
the state relevant as embedded in and reproduced by subjects. A problem in Foucault, as 
observed earlier (previous chapter), is how this ‘will’ has come about, but that does not have 
to concern us here. The point here is the notion of the state as a moral authority, reproduced in 
social relations. This is achieved, he claims, not merely by force, but through “the activity that 
consists in governing human behaviour in the framework of, and by means of, state 
institutions” (Foucault 2003:203). In other words, the state is realised in disciplinary 
institutions such as schools, universities, barracks, hospitals, prisons, and so on, established to 
regulate human behaviour. Methodologically Foucault is calling attention to the more “minute 
and everyday level” (Foucault 1980:60), but his main concern is with practices of the state as 
a moral order regulating human behaviour.  
 
According to Weber, rationalisation of society in terms of a means-to-an-end logic explains 
the legitimacy of rational-legal organisations such as the state, economic corporations, and 
voluntary organisations. Similarly, Foucault is interested in historically situated systems of 
institutions, but his emphasis on practices of the state as a moral power takes the analysis 
beyond the question of legality. While Weber used ideal types to organise historical material, 
Foucault differentiated himself from Weber methodically. “His contribution”, says Dreyfus 
and Rabinow, comparing Foucault with Nietzsche, Weber, Heidegger, and Adorno, “is a 
heightened methodological sophistication and an a unique emphasis on the body as the place 
in which the most minute and local social practices are linked up with the large scale 
organization of power” (Dreyfus and Rabinow 1983:xxvi). 
 
Foucault’s effort to “stay as much as possible on the surface of things, to avoid recourse to 
ideal significations, general types, or essences” (ibid:132), does indeed methodologically 
differentiate him from Weber. What they have in common, though, is the use of history for 
explaining the “problem of reason” or “how forms of rationalisation become embedded in 
practices, or systems of practices” (ibid:133). And according to Dreyfus and Rabinow, 
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Foucault’s advance over Nietzsche, Weber, and Adorno is to have taken this 
prescription to heart and to have produced concrete analyses of specific historical 
practices in which truth and power are the issue. He has isolated and identified the 
mechanisms of the power of rationalisation with a finer grained analysis than Weber. 
But this should be seen as an advance, not a refutation of the Weberian project” 
(ibid.).54 
 
The Foucauldian analysis, however, appears to assume “explicit programs” like Panopticon, 
functioning as actual programs of action and reform, and he has been criticised for failing to 
link modern power to colonialism and for drawing a opposition between pre-modern, 
sovereign power and modern, disciplinary power (Krohn-Hansen and Nustad 2005).55 In a 
sense, Foucault’s analysis of modern power can be seen to depend on disciplinary institutions 
and the individual’s attachment to them, much like Weber’s. On the other hand, how 
institutions are constituted or who or what makes up the institutions is not defined. For 
Foucault, it is the ability to engage individuals in particular behaviour that matters (see 
chapter 4). What he does, then, is to disconnect power from a particular institutional form, 
allowing for more dynamic conceptions of both power and state.  
 
Considering the colonial past of South Asia as discussed before, and following the Weberian 
thesis, one could expect a society dominated by a bureaucratic rationality that perpetuate itself 
according to an inexorable logic of purely formal rationality, a logic that excludes all 
considerations of substantive rationality, all questions of ultimate value. The rational-legal 
way of organising the state from the past continues, as seen in this thesis, to the present, but 
the practical meaning of such structures is another issue. During colonial times, Indians 
sought employment in the British administration as a way of exercising power (cf. chapter 2). 
Consequently, they became agents of Western modernisation promoting Western education 
and way of life. Formal positions are still, as we have seen, an opportunity to exercise power, 
but perhaps the rational logic supporting the bureaucratic system never really became a total 
way of life after all and that the social is about much more than rational-legal state processes, 
as suggested by Foucault.  
 
                                                
54 See also the discussion of Weber and Foucault in previous chapter where a similar comment is made: 
“Foucault’s studies of the hospital, prison, and school can be seen to ground Weberian formal analysis in the 
history of various social techniques for the administration of corporeal, attitudinal and behavioural discipline”. 
55 For criticism see Agamben (1998), and Hansen and Stepputat (2005). Also, see discussion in previous chapter. 
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The object of this chapter is to approach the question of state power through an analysis of 
everyday practices asking how the state is part of the social order. Looking at both familial 
and official routine practices, such as raising children and arranging marriages in the first 
instance, and dealing with requests for public services in the second, the aim is to discover 
forms of rationalities at work as “embedded in practices, or systems of practices” (cf. above).  
 
Living with neighbours 
 
Dangerous liaisons and futures at risk 
 
Talking to Vincent one late afternoon on work related issues, our conversation was cut short 
by his wife interrupting us to inform him about this neighbouring woman coming by again 
with an update on their eldest son’s recent movements. Once again, said Mary with an 
expression of anger and weariness, I was obliged to listen to this woman’s account of my 
son’s whereabouts. In a calm voice Vincent asked about the son and was told that he had not 
been in since lunchtime. Seeing his wife’s state of mind, he asked her not to jump to any 
conclusions before confronting Paul on the matter. Mary left the room and Vincent let me in 
on what was going on.    
 
On a number of occasions over the past few weeks Paul had been observed in the company of 
a girl from the neighbourhood. Vincent said they had been aware of him meeting this girl for 
some time, but saw no reason to interfere at first thinking it was not very serious. More 
disturbing was his choice of friends and how he spent his time hanging out with boys who had 
dropped out of school and showed no interest in the future. Vincent worried about his son 
spending more time drifting around doing nothing with these boys when he should be 
studying. Belonging to a Christian minority group, Paul was among few to attend university 
and seeing him through was important, as this was his only chance of a career in government 
service. Paul’s first-term exam results had been poorer than expected and Vincent wanted him 
to take his studies more seriously. Getting involved with a girl at this time would only further 
disturb his studies and jeopardise his future career opportunities.  
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From the times of the British, government service has been a popular career choice and is still 
highly valued. The British offered jobs in the civil service for those who fulfilled educational 
requirements and attracted children of middle class families to western education institutions. 
Jobs were secure, income was steady, career opportunities were there, and, in time, authority 
and respect followed. For similar reasons, children nowadays are encouraged to try for 
government jobs. Graduating from a government school increases the chances of a career in 
government service. A career with the government thus starts in secondary school and the first 
obstacle is getting children admitted to the local government school. Competition is tough 
because schools are few and applicants are many. Next is to see them through board exams, 
and then college and university, until final examination, preferably for a master’s degree 
qualifying them to apply for cadre service in public administration.  
 
Vincent believed his son saw the family’s reservations about him seeing the girl as an 
expression of disapproval of her and her family, which only seemed to encourage him. The 
girl is Christian, but her mother is Bengali and her father was Pahari (tribal origin). The boy 
is fantasising a Hindi movie story, his father claimed, where boy and girl cannot have each 
other because of mismatching family situations, but where the hero is willing to forsake 
everything to be with the girl. All the time spent watching these movies is convincing him that 
love does not come easy and that the only way is to pursue it, his father explained. It’s a kind 
of madness, he concluded.  
 
Paul’s way of denying having any relationship with the girl was taken as confirmation of the 
opposite. When for instance Mama56 came by asking Paul about girlfriends he laughingly 
brushed him off saying there was no one. Encouraged by Paul’s evasive reaction, Mama 
wanted to know how a young man like himself could claim not to be pursued by young ladies 
when even an old man like himself was having trouble keeping female admirers away. 
Everyone laughed, and especially Paul whose appearance seemed to confirm the insinuation. 
His father said that he can understand the excitement, but worried about his son’s education. 
He had only just started his university studies and to finish the degree he would need to stay 
focused. Marriage was out of the question. Vincent said he had asked the boy’s elder sister to 
talk to her brother and tell him that when the time is right he may marry whoever he wants. 
                                                
56 Mama is the term used for mother’s brother indicating an open and relaxed relationship. It is often used about 
someone elder regarded as particularly close to the family and whom one wants to express closeness and 
familiarity with. Apon mama indicates mother’s actual brother.  
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The family did not intend to interfere in his choice, but for the time being his studies were 
more important. Paul, on the other hand, seemed to think that the girl was not good enough 
for his family.  
 
Vincent admitted that he was not thrilled about her family situation and the fact that her 
mother was alone with only daughters gave him reason to believe they were looking for 
suitable marriage partners. Their method was known, he claimed, from the way an elder sister 
had managed to get married to a local boy from a respectable family. Having been observed 
together on a number of occasions, and as a result of becoming the object of village talk, they 
finally married. Vincent did not want Paul having to marry because of people gossiping.  
 
After leaving us, Mary went to her daughter’s husband and asked him to locate her son, but he 
returned alone. He had gone to the field where the two had last been seen, but found no one 
there. Vincent suspected the sight of the women who had informed on them before could have 
caused them to flee. Since it was already late afternoon and would soon be dark; every decent 
girl is home by sunset, Mary waited by the gate watching the girl’s house to see if she was 
returning, but she was not to be seen. Vincent said he would talk to Paul, but when Paul 
finally returned late in the evening, only brief nods were exchanged. Noticing the tense 
atmosphere and sensing what was going on, Paul went straight for the TV room joining his 
younger brother watching a Hindi sitcom. When his father received a telephone call, I joined 
the boys letting Paul know what trouble he was in. He said he could not be bothered trying to 
explain because they refused to believe anything he said anyway. I told him that I had already 
heard his father’s version of what was going on and that I was interested in his side of the 
story. He agreed to talk about it after class on the following day and I promised to convince 
his father to leave him alone for the time being.  
 
Returning to our conversation, Vincent said he was considering letting Paul stay at the 
university hostel. The reason he had kept him at home in the first place was that the university 
was close by and the hostel was costly. Seeing how Paul spent his time doing nothing with 
these ‘useless’ friends and chasing girls made him reconsider thinking he would be better off 
staying full time with other students. Besides, with him at the hostel there would be nothing 
for the villagers to talk about. This was the second time within a few days they had been 
notified about Paul’s secret meetings.  
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The other time was on Good Friday after Mass. Vincent had stopped at the teahouse across 
from the mission for a cup of tea before returning home. While talking to his friends, he had 
seen Paul passing, and then the girl going in the same direction shortly afterwards. He 
remembered wondering where she was off to as to his knowledge she did not have any friends 
or relatives in that direction. He finished his tea and went home to find his wife waiting by the 
gate. His son was not back and Mary said the pair of them had been seen sitting together alone 
talking by the paddy fields. It was the neighbour residing next to the fields that had reported 
it. Shortly after the girl appeared from one side and Paul from the other, insisting he had not 
been with her. His mother accused him of lying, but Paul, grumbling under his breath that 
there was no point in arguing since she was not listening anyway, ignored her.  
 
The place Paul and the girl apparently used for their secret meetings was only a few minutes 
walk from the house. Why choose a place that close to home for dating when the risk of being 
seen by someone familiar with the family seemed so obvious? I asked Vincent. 
 
This is nearby and everybody knows, but this is a kind of immaturity that they did not think 
about it. Just they are thinking that their parents are not seeing them and not thinking about the 
others. Even they are not thinking that these people that are seeing them will inform the 
parents. They did not think about it. This is kind of immaturity.  
 
As it turned out, though, meeting elsewhere was no solution. They had already tried.  
 
The girl, Paul, and his friend Ben went to this other side where the people do not know them, 
or whose son he is. They do not know, but only they found them sitting – Paul sitting with the 
girl talking. They came and told “what are you doing here?” seeing these two sitting and 
discussing alone. They said that “this is not acceptable; she is a young girl and you are a 
young boy sitting under a tree talking about what? Give us money otherwise we will take you 
to the police station”.  
 
In all my ignorance I asked why not just tell them they were married, but married couples do 
not go elsewhere to sit and talk. They stay at home. 
 
Everybody can understand here and they become sure that this boy and girl are having an 
affair. That’s why they are charging them. As they are immature they don’t know how to 
reply. They are just standing and when these people ask for money they give money.  
 
Paul paid them some money and left with the girl, but his friend stayed back arguing with the 
two guys who demanded money from him too for conspiring with ‘unacceptable behaviour’. 
When they started pushing him around, Ben pushed them back and a fight broke out. Hearing 
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about the fight, Ben’s mother and sister came running, but received knife cuts on their hands 
and arms when they tried to interfere. The police showed up and were informed about what 
had started the fighting, that is, Paul and the girl meeting and with Ben watching out for them. 
Later the police came to the house asking for Paul. Vincent was not home at the time and his 
wife told them that their son was out too, even though he was not. The police told her to tell 
her husband to bring their son to the police station at the earliest. Vincent saw no reason to 
take Paul down to the station unless the police came back, which they did not. Vincent said it 
would not have been a problem had the two met somewhere else; either at the university 
campus with other students or at the mela (fair). Meeting alone like that is not accepted and 
the boys saw a chance to earn some money. Threatening to involve the police is sometimes 
enough to settle differences, as people have little faith in the integrity of the police, but not so 
in this case. Fighting broke out; the police came, registered course of events, and sided with 
the boys claiming Paul and the girl had committed an offence with Ben as accessory.   
 
Waiting for Paul to come back from the university on the following day, I decided to go for a 
walk around the village. A few houses down the street I found a young woman breast-feeding 
her baby on the patio of her house and stopped for a chat. Seeing some young boys running in 
the direction of the paddy field I decided to follow. By the banyan tree in the middle of the 
field, a small crowd had gathered. On one side were Ben and other of Paul’s friends. On the 
other, some young guys from another village claiming they had come to compromise on 
behalf of their friends that had insulted Ben and his family earlier. Ben was angry, showing 
little interest in compromising. As the atmosphere grew tenser, an elderly man from the crowd 
came forth as intermediary. Ben said that no matter what differences there may have been 
between them; insulting his mother and sister was unacceptable and he wanted names and 
addresses of the perpetrators. The intermediary called for pen and paper and wrote down 
names of families involved. After discussing for about half an hour, they all went their several 
ways with an understanding of not bothering each other again, while keeping the police out of 
it. Families involved were similarly positioned (none particularly influential) and the only 
reasonable resolution had been to compromise.  
 
On the way back to the house, Paul and his younger brother Sean, having heard about the 
meeting, turned up on a bicycle heading towards the field. Paul was curious and I told him 
that he might be able to hear some of the conversations from my recording. Some children 
who had tagged along to the field, thrilled to discover my video camera, had tried their best to 
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monopolize the recording without totally succeeding and we went home to watch it. Shortly 
after, his friends came to discuss what had happened. Hearing them talking, Paul’s mother 
appeared wanting to know what was going on. Paul insisted nothing was going on, but she 
said his father would deal with him later; indicating she did not believe him. Paul and I went 
for a walk around the village.  
 
Paul was upset with his mother for accusing him of lying all the time instead of listening to 
what he had to say. He did not like the prospect of ‘being dealt with by his father’ either. He 
was aware that the whole affair had caused his father tensions and Paul wanted to spare him 
further details. On the other hand, Paul could not understand what the fuss was about when all 
they had done was to sit and talk together. “I am not going to do anything unexpected”, he 
said, “I just want to see her and talk to her. I respect her and would not do anything to her”. 
He admitted to a fascination since secondary school and told about letters they had exchanged 
when he was away studying in Dhaka. He loved her, he said, and imagined he would 
eventually want to marry her, but for the time being he just wanted to get to know her better. I 
told him about his father’s concern regarding his education and he said he had no intentions of 
marrying her before finishing his education. As long as they were just sitting and talking 
together, it should be of no concern to anyone. His parents in particular should understand, 
always encouraging him to make his own decisions, but in this case his mother decided to 
listen to the village gossip demanding that he stay away from the girl instead of hearing the 
truth.  
 
Back at the house, Mary was waiting for me to have lunch. Paul had already eaten and left to 
attend to his studies. During lunch I told Mary that Paul was upset and disappointed with 
them for not listening, taking the neighbour’s word over his, and she responded that he could 
not be trusted because he had already been telling lies (mita kotha). Suggesting that he may 
not have been with the girl the evening before, she replied that it did not matter much what he 
said when the neighbours were saying something else.  
 
At least two, yet interrelated, concerns are made evident: education and marriage. Education 
is the main gate to government service and a career potentially going all the way to the 
ministry. Marriage is seen as an obstruction to a career. Due to circumstances, Vincent had 
married before completing a master’s degree, which compelled him to discontinue his studies 
and get a job to support the family. As the oldest son of a low-income family (both parents 
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were teachers), the whole family had pooled together for his education. Once he got a job he 
was expected to support parents and siblings in addition to wife and children. Having worked 
for non-government organisations (NGO’s) all of his professional life he knew how 
unpredictable work was, being mostly dependent on foreign funding, in addition to challenges 
of being tribal in a small private organisation (cf. Sissener 1999). He wanted his son to 
achieve more and the best chance of succeeding professionally would be working for the 
government. In this case, the argument of education is used for the benefit of regulating the 
future family situation, which has several implications as discussed below.  
 
As Vincent tried to insist on his main concern being the son’s education and not village 
gossip, concerns about the family’s reputation in the village finally caught up with him. 
Village talk was making it difficult to maintain a relationship with the girl without marrying 
her and marriage was out of the question. His education being of course the most important, 
but also her family situation spoke against it; a widowed mother without male relations in the 
village.  
 
Paul may or may not have been seeing the girl on the reported occasions, but neighbours were 
gossiping about them. To Vincent, his son’s behaviour only proved his immaturity and that he 
was too young to understand what he was getting into.  
 
You know, in our country these young boys and girls they are watching the Indian films where 
they see what the hero, the actor, is doing to get the actress. He is doing lots of things – 
fighting and everything. They think that this is maybe the way to get her and they try to follow 
in that way… These films are made in such a way that these young chaps will be encouraged 
to do this – they are being encouraged. Their only thinking is that I want her. I don’t want the 
world, but only her… If you ask them to put the world in one side and the girl in the other – 
measuring the world against the girl – they will say they want the girl because of emotions and 
all these things. We can also imagine because we were also at that age and many things 
happened… When we became matured then we realised that we were wrong at that time.  
 
What Vincent was saying is that it takes experience to understand that the ‘world’ matters and 
that to think anything else is the illusion of young people. To exemplify, he told a story about 
this boy he knew who learned the lesson the hard way. After completing a master’s degree in 
accounting, he started working for the same organisation Vincent was working for at the time 
and eventually put in charge of a sub-office where several girls worked. Soon the whole 
department talked about an affair between this Christian boy and a Muslim girl. His father 
was informed and, angered by the news, he asked Vincent to do something. From the boy’s 
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friends, Vincent found out that, if necessary, he was ready to leave his job and family to be 
with the girl. The affair continued and when the manager heard about it the boy was asked to 
either drop the girl or resign from his job, of which he did the latter. The organisation worried 
about its own reputation and did not want to be seen as a place where love affairs were 
accepted, or worse, encouraged. Knowing neither of the families would support marriage, the 
couple eloped and married in court, after which his father renounced him as his son. Having 
been evicted from his father’s house, they rented a place in the city. Without jobs or income, 
life became hard. “At least he finished his education”, Vincent dryly commented, but without 
support from family or friends he could not find a job, and without a job he could not support 
his family. In this case, laws of the state and village practices conflicted, as the couple was 
able to confirm the relation in court when the environment went against it, but without work 
or income chances of making it on their own were few.   
 
Seeing that the son’s marriage caused no greater social unrest in the village, and that even the 
girl’s family had accepted it, his father was persuaded to resume contact with his only son. 
Mixed marriages are commonly not accepted and elopements can cause antagonism between 
whole communities. Initially, the girl’s family protested the daughter’s relationship to this 
non-Muslim boy, but realising their daughter was marrying into an educated and wealthier 
family no action was taken. That the boy’s sister was working in the United States also spoke 
in favour of accepting the family as in-laws.57 Husband and wife finally settled with his 
parents, and his father, who was well connected, managed him a job with another 
organisation. Vincent reasoned that had the situation not been resolved, it would not have 
been long before the marriage would suffer. “Obhab jokhon dorja eshe dalai; bhalo basha 
tokon janala die bhalai”, he reckoned, which translates to when poverty knocks on the door; 
love disappears through the window. The ‘world’ decided not to bother in this case, but the 
father’s reaction of renouncing his only son is an indication of what was at stake, viz. the 
villagers opinion of who can and cannot marry regardless of what is possible under the state.58 
 
Marriage is for the most part a family matter and to be arranged at an appropriate time to a 
suitable partner. Until such time, boys and girls unrelated to each other by kinship are 
                                                
57 See Kathy Gardener (1995) and Santi Rosario (1992) for discussions of both dowry practices and effects of 
oversee employment. See Tone Bleie (1995) for a more comprehensive discussion of dowry practices.  
58 In some cases whole families have fled to escape revengeful guardians holding the other family responsible 
for eloped children. Most of the time, eloped couples can never return (Sissener 1999).  
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expected to avoid unnecessary contact. Being seen alone together easily starts rumours of a 
love affair, which is generally condemned as improper behaviour. Vincent was initially not 
concerned about his son occasionally talking to a girl, but felt compelled to take action when 
it was becoming the topic of village talk. Rumours can be difficult to contradict and Vincent 
did not want to see his son marrying before completing his education and jeopardise his 
future. Besides, a child’s marriage, and especially that of a son, is an opportunity to connect 
with another family for mutual support. On suspicion of a possible love affair, such 
opportunities may be lost along with any favourable position the family may have enjoyed. 
The importance of marriage arrangements can be seen from the case of Vincent’s daughter 
Paula’s marriage to Dan.  
 
Confirming relations and securing a future 
 
Dan and Paula lived in the same village, but had little to do with one another while growing 
up. Dan is Bengali and Paula tribal, but both are Christians. Being of different origin and 
belonging to different churches implied no regular contact between the two families who 
knew each other from before only as neighbours. Vincent said Dan actually proposed to Paula 
informally years before the actual proposal came, but at the time he had not completed his 
education, nor did he have a job. Neither had she. Besides, Vincent wanted something else for 
his daughter, preferably someone with a respectable career like a doctor or an engineer. 
 
Like her brother, Paula had also studied in Dhaka, during which time she wrote to her parents 
telling them about this boy, but her father wanted her to complete a master’s degree before 
thinking of marriage. Besides, there was also this medical student showing interest in her and 
Vincent liked the prospect of a doctor for a son-in-law more. Having confirmed that Paula 
was into the idea of the medical student, contact was established between the two families. At 
a later point, and without prior notice, they came to know that the boy had already married. 
Vincent was disappointed and angry for not having been informed. Fortunately, few knew 
about this marriage plan for Paula and nobody, at least not openly, discussed it.  
 
Paula completed a bachelor and moved to a neighbouring district to take up a job with a local 
NGO. Her father wanted her to go straight for a master’s degree, but she was more interested 
in working for this organisation that some of her friends from school had also joined. She 
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resumed contact with Dan who by then had completed a bachelor and was working for a NGO 
in Dhaka. He was still interested in marrying her, but her father hesitated due to his career 
choice. Paula made her own position clear, that she wanted to marry Dan, but that it was up to 
her father to decide. “She was showing me this politeness and I became soft then”, Vincent 
admitted, but there was much to consider. He still wanted her to complete the degree before 
marrying. She enrolled for an introductory course, but withdrew when she got a position with 
another NGO and was told to attend a training programme during the same period. Paula 
showed little interest in completing a master’s degree. She convinced her father to leave the 
issue and instead consider her marriage to a suitable man.   
 
Dan’s mother was a widower, but the family was well regarded in the village. When her 
husband died, their children were almost grown-up. The oldest daughter married a boy from a 
nearby family of some influence who agreed to let their son and daughter-in-law stay with her 
mother. After Dan finished his education and started working, he too was supporting the 
family. Dan belonging to a different church was questioned, but after discussing it with the 
parish priest, Vincent was told that this was not a problem since both were Christian. Another 
and perhaps more pertinent issue was the boy’s Bengali origin.  
 
It was not decided then whether I shall agree with their proposal or not because previously I 
was looking for a boy that is from my own tribe. But some way I came to know that this 
proposal was proposed earlier and then once again. And my daughter she agreed with this 
proposal. I came to know this and I was thinking that she is agreeing with this proposal so that 
maybe she has chosen him. Just I am passing time to decide. At the time my elder sister came 
and asked me “what are you thinking about [your daughter’s] wedding?” She also came to 
know that somebody from here, this village, has proposed to marry her. At that moment I had 
not decided about this boy. She told me, because she is my elder sister, she told me “why you 
are not agreeing with this?” And I talked with her a little bit more about in what way I am 
thinking about Paula’s wedding. Finally she advised me that this is the time for Paula’s 
wedding. This is the best time in terms of her age and she is doing her job and the proposal 
came from the same village. She will stay here and you’ll have the opportunity to see her all 
the time and all these things. All these are considerable things. So finally I decided to agree 
with their proposal.  
 
That the proposal came from the village was important not only because of the opportunity to 
see the daughter more often, but also in terms of support. Originating from another district, 
the family had no other family members living in the vicinity and the connection was 
welcome.  
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That the daughter was ready to accept whatever her father decided Vincent saw as a token of 
respect and understanding of family matters. Having expressed her own wishes she left it to 
her father to decide, entrusting him to know what was best for the family. In Bangladesh, the 
father is the formal head of the family, usually referred to as the guardian, and relations 
between older and younger family members, and often also between male and female 
members, can be rather authoritarian. Teenage years are seen as a period of madness because 
of the unpredictability of teenage emotions, but proper guardians control their children. A 
favourable reputation means better selection of marriageable partners, which again can mean 
a strengthening of family position in the village.  
 
From the experience with the medical student, Vincent wanted to take his time and make sure 
everything was in order before announcing the relation, which meant the two should not be 
seen alone together either. Wedding preparations would take at least a year to complete and 
the couple in question knew they were not supposed to meet during this period. A mutual 
friend came to their rescue and offered the perfect opportunity to meet without people talking. 
As it happened, on a number of occasions they were both invited to this friend’s house at the 
same time and with the whole family present no one would think twice about it. Should 
something go wrong during wedding negotiations, the family’s reputation would not have 
suffered, meaning they could still find Paula a suitable husband.  
 
The other family’s intentions proved sincere and wedding preparations continued as planned 
with Dan’s elder sister’s husband as ghortok, which is a kind of a middleman communicating 
with both sides to reach agreements on what arrangements to be made and by whom.   
 
When Vincent started thinking about Paula’s marriage he realised that he had some relations 
to mend. Over the years, contact with other tribal families in the village had become irregular 
and Vincent suspected they were consciously avoiding him. For instance, when a tribal family 
makes the special tea they usually call tribal families of the neighbourhood to come and share 
it. They meet, drink tea and share latest news, but for the last few years Vincent’s family had 
not been called to these meetings, which he blamed on hingsha (jealousy).  
 
Usually we found that the [tribal] people don’t actually want to see the other [tribals] in a 
better position. Those who are living around my house they were trying to avoid me because 
I’m just doing a job in a better position than them. They were thinking that “yeah, he is in a 
better position and he is developing his family in many ways. He is educating his children in 
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nice schools and better colleges, and he is earning more than us”… As I am in a better position 
than any of them and our life is better than theirs, they are taking in negative ways.  
  
He thought nothing of it at the time, but his daughter’s upcoming wedding changed his mind. 
When somebody is planning a wedding it is customary to call on a large number of people, 
usually from the same community, which in this case meant other tribals, and bring them for 
the first meeting with the other family. This is to show that you are widely supported. With 
this in mind, Vincent realised he had to improve relations with people of the community for 
the management his daughter’s wedding. One year ahead of the wedding, he resumed contact 
with the neighbours.  
 
What happened was that the relationship became good again as they were seeing that I several 
times came to their houses – even though they had not called me – and talked to them asking 
how they were and asking their children about school. Instead of continuing thinking bad I 
think they realised that maybe they were mistaken about me. When the time came to pay a 
visit to Paula’s in-laws house they went with me and became very helpful preparing for the 
whole wedding. When I later called a representative from each and every community – 
Christian, [Tribal], Hindu, and Muslim – they all came and we discussed how to manage the 
wedding. They said they would take responsibility for everything and I could just give them 
the money. A budget was made and I just gave the money. For the wedding, the cooking and 
everything were prepared in a very nice way and I did not have to do anything with that. It is 
our custom to take care of these things ourselves, as we cannot afford hiring people to cook, 
and for that we rely on each other for help.  
 
Reflecting on his relationship with his neighbours, Vincent admitted he was not happy with 
things, as they had been prior to the wedding. Not taking part in the special tea parties, or any 
other gatherings, he had become socially marginalised. Over the years, he said, he had tried to 
do his best helping out with jobs, providing loans, mediating village conflicts played out both 
inside and outside court rooms, and so on, but it was never enough.   
 
I was involved with some of these things, but I was thinking about the neighbours or the 
people in the way that I always think about others. I was expecting them to think of me as I 
think of them. But I found the opposite. Then there was some learning from all these incidents 
and once, seven or eight years back, I decided that I’ll stop doing like this – thinking for others 
and going for solving the conflicts and all this. I will stop this because the result is the 
opposite. Even though I am doing lots of things for the others, they are thinking about me like 
this – to do something harmful for me. So that I don’t need because I will not go for any 
elections that I must have a group of people that will support me always. I thought that yeah, I 
don’t need this. I have been spending the time for the others, but it is better to spend the time 
for my children and my family. Due to the learning of my previous things I decided that I will 
not involve with any others. I started doing my job in my office, coming back to my home, 
and just watching TV and discussing with my family members. I just changed my life in this 
way not to be involved with the things – whatever is going on. 
 
Chapter 5: Challenging the State 
 
 177 
Details about the nature of his disappointments are described elsewhere (Sissener 1999), but 
concerned in essence occasions in which he had been taken advantage of and even cheated 
when trying to help others. Besides, experiencing how people were only expecting more 
whatever his contribution Vincent decided to withdraw his support. He was not running for 
any elections and he was not looking to be considered leader of any kind, he explained. When 
there was a church election for the parish council, for instance, and his name was not on the 
list of candidates, people questioned why he was not competing. He answered that, “shamne 
gele dhisay, picchone thakle lathi mare”, which translates to something like standing in front 
of the cow and it rubs its head against you; standing behind it and it kicks you. Vincent did 
not want to be either kicked or rubbed; he wanted to stand on the side just minding his own 
business. His resources were limited and, no matter how much he tried, it never seemed to be 
enough anyway. However, the decision to regardless mind his own business got him into 
trouble with the neighbours.  
 
In one case, there was this bamboo tree belonging to Vincent, but with leaves constantly 
falling on the neighbour’s side of the fence. One day the neighbour started cutting down the 
tree without his permission. Finding them ‘mutilating’ his tree, and even earning money on it 
by selling its cane at the market, Vincent accused them of causing damage to his property. 
Accusing Vincent in return, of not doing enough to maintain the tree, annoyed him even more 
and they started arguing. Finally Vincent warned that unless they stayed away from his tree, 
he would take necessary action, implying he would go to the police and file a complaint. 
“This talking made them very angry”, he said, “and they kept this decision in their mind. They 
became non-cooperative and stopped talking”. Vincent decided it did not matter and stopped 
talking to them too. Threatening to go to the police for having the problem solved, Vincent 
had introduced distance and remoteness and thereby offended the nature of the relationship. 
Soon he was not on talking terms with several families of the neighbourhood due to similar 
issues (Vincent refusing to show particular consideration), which he was content to continue 
until there was a wedding to plan.  
 
Not only did he start talking to them again; he engaged in providing jobs for their sons and 
daughters; he started planning for a separate Christian-Tribal Housing Society; he engaged in 
peoples financial situations; offered advice on their children’s education and so forth. He still 
stayed out of competitions for positions in the church council and other committees, but 
realised it was not enough to mind his own business.  
A State of Corruption? 
 178 
 
To my knowledge, I never did any harm to anyone, but this was not enough… If I only think 
for myself that I want to live in peace and I don’t care about others then it is not possible and it 
cannot happen… The people who came to me asking for help I have done for them as much as 
I can. When I started doing this I got less trouble from neighbours… I did what I was able to 
do for them. Afterwards the things became easier and relations were rebuilt again – relations 
became better. Now it is ok. 
 
Previously, Vincent believed he could do without the support of neighbours, but his 
daughter’s marriage arrangement made him realise his dependencies. Finding her a suitable 
husband from the right family was one thing, being able to make the proper arrangements 
another. Having neglected taking part in tea parties, and refusing to involve socially and 
economically with the neighbours for years, he could no longer rely on them for support and 
help with his daughter’s wedding. Ending the ‘solitude’ meant actively taking part in their 
daily concerns. While Vincent had wanted to concentrate his resources on his immediate 
family, other concerns imposed themselves on him and he appeared caught up in the village 
rationality (making his son stop seeing the girl, taking part in communal gatherings, engaging 
in neighbours social and economic problems, and so on). Thus, what the cases discussed 
above shows is how life in the village requires much more than what is legally permissible or 
needed in the eyes of the state, which in particular the case of the elopement clearly states.  
 
At the time of my first fieldwork in 1996, Vincent was working for an NGO that he had been 
with for almost twenty years. He had started as a fieldworker (supervising projects in the 
field) and worked his way up the hierarchy until he was ‘second in command’. His boss, a 
Bengali Christian, was nearing retirement and Vincent was waiting to replace him as director 
of the organisation. Instead of promotion, however, he was transferred to a less important 
position in Dhaka. Vincent was convinced it was because of his tribal origin and his boss 
looking for someone from his own community to replace him. He refused to go to Dhaka and 
ended up leaving the organisation. Unemployed, resources were much constrained and 
Vincent could not afford to support all those he had supported in the past. Realising his 
situation, people stopped involving him economically and otherwise, and he became socially 
marginalised. After a few months he managed a poorly paid and, compared to his previous 
job, minor position for another NGO. Seeing that the organisation offered no advancement 
any time soon, he started looking for work again. On one of my return visits to the village, he 
had received an offer from a Christian international organisation as a director of development 
projects. The organisation had maintained minimum activities in the area for some years, but 
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was ready to revitalise the station. As director, Vincent was promised a decent salary and 
generous perquisites, such as a large and well-equipped office, several office staff, a car, 
international experience (travels abroad to attend meetings), and so on. The only drawback, 
according to him, was the funding situation and uncertainties related to how long the 
organisation would continue supporting development work in the area. Having consulted 
family and friends on the matter, he finally accepted the offer, which changed the way he was 
regarded. By virtue of his position, Mr. Director was greeted with renewed respect, but also 
anticipation, as his new situation meant more resources and ability to do more for others. This 
latter point may also explain why government jobs are so popular, namely that important jobs 
generally means access to more resources, meaning ability to support more people, which 
again is a source of honour and respect. What this means in practice can be seen from the 
following cases.  
 
Conflicting rationalities 
 
In government service 
 
Bangladesh has an institutionalised mechanism for community participation in secondary 
education. School management committees (SMCs) are required for all recognised non-
government secondary schools, as are governing bodies for all intermediate colleges. These 
bodies are responsible for mobilising resources, approving budgets, controlling expenditures, 
and appointing and disciplining staff. While government schoolteachers are employed 
centrally, managing committees employ teachers for non-government schools. To obtain 
accreditation for conducting Secondary School Certificate (SSC) and Higher Secondary 
Certificate (HSC) examinations from the Board of Intermediate and Secondary Education 
(BISE), there are certain criteria to be fulfilled.  
 
The BISE of Chittagong is responsible for educational institutions in the three hill districts of 
Rangamati, Bandarban, and Khagrachari; Chittagong; and Cox’s Bazar. At the time of my 
fieldwork, a chairman and four inspectors, in addition to permanent office clerks, managed 
daily operations of the board. The chairman and inspectors are recruited from the education 
cadre and appointed by the Ministry of Education for a period of maximum three years. 
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Besides managing the yearly exams, which is quite a task considering that for instance in 
2001 sixty-five thousand students sat for SSC examination, the four inspectors are charged 
with the duty of yearly inspections of more than eight hundred schools located within its 
jurisdiction. 
 
During a conversation, the chairman of BISE admitted that with the few inspectors he had it 
was impossible to inspect all the schools and colleges under the board’s jurisdiction. This was 
confirmed to me by one of the inspectors during a visit to a high school for girls that had 
applied for renewed accreditation.  He said he usually had no time to actually visit schools, 
but that the chairman had requested him to do so on that particular day in order to accompany 
me and explain the procedures. District officers sometimes inspect schools and report back to 
BISE, but generally accreditations do not depend on inspections.  
 
Arriving at the school, the headmaster was waiting outside together with a teacher of a nearby 
college. A relative of the college teacher, a wealthy local businessman, had founded both 
institutions. The inspector and teacher had been in school together and embraced each other as 
old friends. As usual, first on the agenda was tea in the headmaster’s office where Mr. 
Inspector was shown proper respect as representing higher authority by being accommodated 
in the headmaster’s chair behind the desk. After a briefing by the college teacher on the 
history of the school, which had offered education to local children since 1981, and its 
importance as the only local school, the headmaster explained that the school was having 
financial problems. Adding another floor would allow them to admit twice as many fee-
paying students. There were already five hundred girls attending sixth to tenth grade and the 
SMC had decided to also enrol five hundred boys. The expansion would imply hiring more 
teachers, but with government approval subsidies would cover salaries.  
 
As per government rule, inspectors are to consider educational demand, qualification and 
experience of personnel, teacher-student ratio, school facilities and equipment, financial 
situation, property ownership, and so on. On his inspection round, Mr. Inspector went from 
one classroom to another asking questions. Entering a classroom, students raised and greeted 
the inspector salam walekum, and the teacher approached. Mr. Inspector asked the teacher 
about the subject being taught and ordered the Number One Student (top grades) to approach 
the blackboard to write down answers to his questions. While the student wrote down 
answers, the inspector looked through the records checking teacher attendance for the last few 
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months, as teachers drawing salaries while being absent from duty (the so-called ghost 
teachers) is believed to be a common problem with non-government schools. His friend, the 
college teacher, accompanied us the whole time generously praising headmaster, teachers and 
students. The inspector appeared satisfied with condition of facilities, students and personnel, 
but expressed concern about how the school would manage the additional costs of buying new 
furniture for the second floor under construction given its financial situation. His friend 
assured him everything would be taken care of and we left.  
 
Back at the office, the inspector explained his relationship with the college teacher and said 
they had been close friends at school. The teacher had been a brilliant student and was related 
to influential families. The inspector said the school would be expecting the accreditation on 
his friend’s recommendation. He wrote his report recommending the school for accreditation 
and gave it to the chairman for his approval. Without any inquiries and merely asking if it was 
ok, the chairman signed the papers granting the accreditation on the inspector’s request. After 
the inspector had left, I asked the chairman if correct procedures had been followed and was 
told that if not legally correct, then most certainly socially acceptable.  
 
There are many things here that we should not do, but the pressure, the social pressure, we 
have to manage many things that I do not like. Pressure from society. For instance, a student 
should submit all his documents for appearing in the exams. There is a time limit for 
appearing in the exams and the student should give all his documents and papers at a particular 
time. Let’s say somebody is coming after scheduled time, even one month, in that case we do 
not agree, but the people or friends or social leaders they pressure me. Give pressure to take 
the documents.  
And then you cannot say no?  
I can say no, but after some time I shall have to agree – under pressure.  
Do they do something for you or give you any promises?  
No. 
But you have to do it?  
We have to do it. Strong or powerful families they give pressure. 
 
Similarly, a number of procedures are prescribed for starting a school offering SSC and HSC. 
A deputy director grants primary recognition to applicants fulfilling requirements of 
appropriate premises and necessary facilities in cases of educational demand, which means 
that there are no other schools offering the same kind of education within a radius of three 
miles. Primary recognition includes junior high school (grade 6-8). After three years, schools 
may apply to the director general for academic recognition, which is required for applying to 
BISE for accreditation to conduct SSC examination, and the District Education Officer for 
government subsidies.  
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To manage and supervise, non-government schools have SMCs consisting of nine to eleven 
members, including a president, a vice-president and a secretary. Composition of SMCs will 
depend on resources and intentions of the founder, but local political leaders and high-level 
civil servants make popular presidents. Headmasters are usually appointed among recently 
retired college professors.  
 
During the course of fieldwork, I visited several non-government secondary schools. In one 
case, a wealthy businessman with political ambitions decided to establish a school in his 
residential area. A rented building was renovated and refurbished to house the school, and a 
SMC consisting of local politicians, government officials and wealthy neighbours was 
established. A retired college professor, who had also served as member of BISE, was 
employed as headmaster and a few local teachers were engaged to teach the neighbourhood 
children. The school started with only a few classes at primary level, but grew rapidly. The 
founder’s extensive network and ability to engage community leaders and government 
officials in the operation proved effective both for enrolling children of affluent families and 
for obtaining accreditations. In the 2001 parliamentary elections, the founder was elected 
Member of Parliament from his constituency representing BNP. The candidate received most 
votes because establishing a school is commonly seen as a most appreciated communal act. 
Besides, he was a well-connected and wealthy businessman famous for getting things done 
(by whatever means), which convinced people he was right to represent their interests.  
 
At the time of my visit, education was offered both at primary and secondary levels and the 
school was self-sustained on fee income. The headmaster explained that primary recognition 
had been granted and that academic recognition was expected in due time. The combination 
of the headmaster’s long experience in education and involvement of people with political 
influence would see to that. The president of the SMC was also chairman of the local BNP 
and with BNP in power, the school’s network included members of parliament and ministers. 
No, the headmaster expected no problems with formalities.  
 
BISE officials were not alone in mentioning pressure when asked about their work. Chatting 
with the principal of a local college one morning, she mentioned that one of her colleagues, 
knowing they were associated, had requested her to see the headmistress of a renowned 
government high school for girls. The second round of admission was ongoing and the 
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colleague was eager to get a daughter admitted. The principal told me she was not 
comfortable asking the headmistress to bypass procedures and admit the child, but did not 
want to disappoint her colleague either. She tried to get in touch with the headmistress, but an 
office clerk said she was on leave. The principal said that she was probably staying away from 
the school to avoid people approaching her personally for admission.  
 
Later when talking to a higher official, I mentioned what the principal had said about 
headmasters and mistresses of secondary schools being on leave because of the ongoing 
admissions. She said they were not on leave, but that many would work in the office at odd 
hours during enrolment. Although admission was a matter for the principal and the school, 
guardians also tried to ply her for help.    
 
They come to see me and tell me to do something. It is not enough to say that I will try. They 
ask for letters of recommendation or that I call the school. When I say I will try to make the 
call later, they tell me to make the call in front of them. People don’t understand. It is so much 
pressure. I’m not involved in the admission, but people think that I have some influence since 
I’m the higher officer and that I can do something for them. This is very difficult. 
 
She said that people do not understand, but what they do understand is that there are ways 
other than waiting in line to get access. Every year schools have a limited number of 
application papers available for parents trying for admission and enrolment is to be decided 
from applications. Children scoring high on entrance examination, qualify as applicants 
entitling the parents to receive application papers. Children of government officials on 
transfer order are to be prioritised for admission in government schools on the condition that 
they pass the entrance examination with ‘satisfying results’. Remaining seats are to be 
distributed among the most qualified students.  
 
In practice, most qualified is not necessarily the same as most talented. When a 
commissioner’s daughter was admitted to the best government school in town, the 
headmistress was requested to also admit his friend’s daughter. Enrolment was closed and all 
available seats had been allocated. The headmistress explained the situation ensuring the 
commissioner priority whenever a seat was available. In cases of insistent commissioners, 
capacity and timing matters less and schools regularly admit more children than allowed for.  
 
A commissioners’ higher rank implies more authority, meaning lower ranked officials do not 
easily dismiss their recommendations. This being common knowledge is evident from the 
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crowds waiting everyday outside offices hoping for a chance to make their pleas with some 
higher authority. One commissioner told me that as a public servant he tried to keep his office 
door as much open to the public as possible and he proudly explained how he had helped 
numerous families by issuing letters of recommendation. At the very time of our conversation 
he had on his desk a relative’s application to a government school. The commissioner had 
written on top “forwarded for favourable considerations” together with his signature, which is 
usually enough to be selected.   
 
Others confirmed that applications recommended by officers of superior rank usually receive 
special attention and that lower officers’ do comply with requests made by higher-ranking 
officers, or even political leaders. Sometimes applicants bring letters of recommendation 
signed by ministers, but many are dismissed as fake. Other methods of gaining access to 
public services may include threats of violence. The headmistress mentioned above was said 
to stay away from her office in fear of mastans, which are violent groups hired to cause 
damage either to persons or property. A group of young men recognised as mastans had been 
observed outside the school during office hours and the headmistress suspected they had been 
sent to threaten her. Several officials mentioned fear of violence as a factor that could 
possibly influence decisions, but few had actually experienced it. Most of the time problems 
of access and authorisations are dealt with in more peaceful manner.  
 
For instance, a friend wanted to sell a plot of land. He found a buyer willing to pay taka 1,400 
per decimal and went to the Additional Deputy Commissioner of Land (ADC) to have the 
property registered as transferred. Arriving at the office, the assistant asked him to write name 
and purpose of visit on a piece of paper and wait to be called. After waiting for two hours he 
approached the assistant to find out when he would be able to see Mr. ADC, but was told that 
the boss was very busy. Having passed another hour waiting, he decided not to wait any 
longer and politely asked if he could be told when to come back. The assistant said he 
expected the boss to be very busy over the next few days and told him to come back next 
week. A week passed and he went again, approached the assistant, stated name and purpose 
on a piece of paper, and waited. The whole afternoon passed and office hours were coming to 
an end. The assistant apologised pointing out a busy schedule and told him when to be back. 
Showing up for what he thought was an appointment, the assistant said the boss had been 
called for an urgency meeting and would probably be out for the rest of the day. When he 
tried to call the office asking for Mr. ADC, the message was always the same; either the boss 
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was out or he was busy. By this time my friend was growing impatient and realised he would 
have to spend the next few months waiting for a signature on the transfer papers unless he 
changed his strategy. He went to the assistant and told him he was willing to pay some extra 
for his efforts trying to forward his case. In a voice of indignation, the assistant responded that 
all cases were processed in due time, but that the work pressure was immense and resources 
limited. Appreciating the assistant’s answer, my friend engaged a ‘professional’ to negotiate 
the price for having the transfer processed sooner. Four thousand taka was paid as an initial 
payment, but the assistant was asking for a total amount of fifteen thousand. Unwilling to pay 
as much for the transfer, my friend managed to locate a friend he believed was somehow 
related to the assistant and that he had once recommended for a job. Having explained the 
situation, the friend agreed to accompany him to the office and ask his relative for help. Back 
at the office, the assistant promised to see what he could do. A few days later, and without 
further ado, my friend received the signed transfer papers. Being asked by a relative, the 
assistant could no longer refuse.  
 
The bureaucratic rationality allows for no particular considerations and the bureaucrat is at the 
service not of a person but of an objective and impersonal goal, which means he is to conduct 
his office regardless of personal preferences or interests, as described earlier. In Bangladesh, 
the communal spirit is strong and refusing to take personal interest when asked to do so, even 
when on duty, is seen as selfish (shartopor) and without concern or care for others. While 
Vincent is struggling with striking a balance between own interests and social expectations, 
others see no other way than to comply with such requests. The dilemma of choosing between 
rationalities, as seen in the case of the aforementioned chairman and other officers expected to 
bypass formalities on behalf of higher authorities, colleagues, local leaders, or anyone 
personally related to them, are further explored in the following.   
 
The price to pay 
 
“High-class people”, said my friend Alam, “they have got money and they don’t have to care 
about anything. They shouldn’t bother for other things. They have got their own building, 
they’ve got their own car, they’ve got much more money. They shouldn’t bother for samaj 
[society]. If you’ve got money, then goddamn the society. I shouldn’t bother – I shouldn’t 
bother about anybody else even in my position also. If I’ve got much more money then I 
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shouldn’t bother about anybody”. What Alam was saying was not that moneyed people do not 
have to care about others, but that with money you can always pay your way out of things. 
Being a mid-level ‘honest’ officer (one that does not take bribes) earning no more than around 
nine thousand taka a month, resources were limited. Most of the time he managed because he 
was living with his family and could share living expenses with other family members. His 
father owned property and was making money on the stock exchange. His wife was a 
chartered accountant, but working as a teacher in a small private English medium school her 
income was even less than his. He often fantasised about a job with a private company 
offering generous salaries. “Money can solve eighty percent of all problems” he claimed. The 
remaining twenty percent accounted for incurable deadly diseases. On the one hand, Alam 
said he was fortunate enough to be blessed with a family that did not demand much. On the 
other, he knew he was not contributing enough.  
 
If I had money to give them then all mouths would be shut down. This would not move any 
more. You need two thousand; ok I’m giving you five. Then they will say, “oh, he’s a good 
man, my brother is a good man, or my son or husband is a good man”. Like this way you will 
have to manage. So money is the big factor in life… Whenever there is a problem I know 
where the problem is and the solution I know. Solution is that: if I’ve got money then no 
problem at all. My mom – ok. If I give her five thousand, if I give my wife ten thousand, if I 
give my younger sister ten thousand everybody’s mouths will then be shut. They will start to 
say that, oh my elder brother is ok. My wife might be saying that my husband loves me very 
much and then my mom might be saying that my son is very great. He is doing lots for the 
family. Even my parents-in-law sometimes they try to say something. 
 
His in-laws were well off. As the vice-president of a large insurance company in Dhaka, his 
wife’s father was an important man. The company provided car and driver also for private 
use, he owned a modern apartment building in an attractive part of the city, he was well 
connected, and socialised with powerful businessmen and top politicians. Alam had an 
ambivalent relationship with his in-laws because of his own economic situation. Whenever he 
stayed with them in Dhaka he was always reminded of his modest earnings and suggestions 
were made that he apply for employment abroad to make more money.  
 
Alam said most of the time his wife and parents were supportive of his efforts to make an 
honest living and tried not to ask him for more than he could provide for, but he was well 
aware of his poor contributions. Even his friends commented on his situation, accusing him of 
not providing properly for his family.  
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They say that, “he is selfish”. If I only care about my kids and my wife then they start to say 
that I am selfish (shartopor). Even my parents: “oh, he is selfish and self-centred. Only he 
just thinks about his sons and his wife and nothing more. He doesn’t care about us”. 
 
To explain the situation, Alam told me about his wife’s younger sister and her husband. It was 
a love marriage (not arranged) and her parents were against it, he said. Alam reasoned that 
since they had already married, the parents should accept it, but after years of marriage he was 
still not accepted into his wife’s family. When Alam’s wife’s brother, who was working in 
England at the time, lost his job and was having money problems the younger sister’s husband 
gave him 60 000 taka. Alam heard about it and asked his wife how much to give. Alam was 
upset that he had not been informed about his wife’s brother’s financial problems earlier and 
told his wife to ask her parents how much he should give. His wife said he was not expected 
to give anything, but Alam called her parents to ask. His father-in-law confirmed that they 
were not expecting anything from him considering his poor earnings. Alam answered that his 
income was not his headache and that he had already heard about the amount given by the 
younger daughter’s husband. Father-in-law said his son did not need any help and that they 
had turned down the offer from younger daughter’s husband as well. Talking to his wife’s 
mother, she, on the other hand, confirmed the contribution and Alam asked how much he 
should send. The mother-in-law said there was no need and asked him if he had received his 
outstanding salary from the government yet. “This is not your headache”, he snapped back 
asking again how much he should send. “But you see the situation and what is going on”, he 
told me. “My sister-in-law’s husband is not getting entrance into the house and he is just 
looking for some way to enter into the house. When the family fall into the problem, they 
have got the money. Sixty thousand taka is not a matter for them”. Evidently they were well 
off and could more than afford the contribution. Arguing about it with his wife afterwards, 
Alam said he would send some money anyway, but his wife said they could not afford it and 
that money had been given already. “Do you think that I don’t understand anything?” he had 
asked his wife. “He cannot enter into your parent’s residence. Why have your parents taken 
this money from him as they have not accepted the marriage?” 
 
I said that I have never said anything against that boy. He’s intelligent enough. He took 
advantage and hit the right target. He fired and his target was very much exact – exact in 
target. He is ok. He is very much familiar with this society. Moneyed man’s daughter he wants 
to marry and he married. Now he is making money and he is purchasing your parents – and 
you also. Later on you will also say that “oh, he is a very good boy”, but I will never say like 
that. If you give me one million taka also I will not utter this kind of word. Nobody can 
purchase me. Usually I used to say to my workstation that nobody can purchase me – even if 
you can think ten million taka, or twenty million, I cannot be sold out to anybody. 
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According to Alam, the family attitude towards the daughter and her husband changed as a 
result of his economic contribution and he was finally welcomed into the family. Suddenly he 
was seen as a generous person who cared much about his wife and her family. Alam too cared 
and was offended by their attempt to exclude him like that believing he would not contribute. 
 
When another brother-in-law needed help with a visa application, Alam found a way to help 
without having to compromise either at work or at home. The brother-in-law was applying for 
a visa to go and work abroad and the Australian High Commission asked for documentation 
of his finances. Alam wanted to show his support and went to the bank to ask for a loan of 
100 000 taka. Several of his friends were bank employees, but he did not want to involve any 
of them and went to a bank with which he had no prior dealings. He explained his business 
and was handed application papers. The comprehensive procedures annoyed him, but he 
answered all their questions thoroughly. He went back a few days later for the result of his 
application and was told that with his modest earnings he would not be granted the full sum. 
“After being told I would get 72 000 taka only I suggested them to make it a round figure. 
Then the person I was dealing with said he would think about it. Why would he need to think 
about it? Either they have a rule or they don’t”, cried Alam. He finally got 80 000 taka, which 
he gave to his brother-in-law for the visa application. The money was to show his ability to 
support himself in Australia. Alam had contributed and proved his willingness to support his 
wife’s family without it costing him anything, except the time and effort of getting the loan. 
He expected to have the money back to repay the loan within a week or two. 
 
As a bureaucrat trained in the logic of the system, Alam was determined not to take or ask for 
any special favours in the name of his position. As seen earlier, he did not try to make any 
extra money on his position either, or make up for the fact that he was not even getting his 
salary regularly. At the same time, he worried about his reputation as someone who did not 
care for his family. It was a constant struggle for him, which he spent much time and effort 
trying to solve without compromising either job or family. To those around him, though, he 
seemed to sacrifice the latter for the benefit of the former while in reality his loyalty to the job 
seemed to do him little good (cf. previous chapter). 
 
I also met a professor who, like Alam, struggled to balance work ethics with social 
responsibilities. For most of his professional life, the professor had remained in education, but 
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made a career change to administration 1992 when his department opted for a transfer outside 
Dhaka. For major parts of his career he had taught in Dhaka and when he received the transfer 
order he decided to apply for a different position. The professor said his main concern in life 
was to impart quality education to his children, which could only be realised in Dhaka. 
Unwilling to leave wife and children behind to go and work in another district, he started 
looking for a job in Dhaka. When there was an opening for an intra-cadre transfer, the 
professor applied and was inducted to the secretary service as deputy secretary in 1992. In 
1997, he was promoted to joint secretary under the Ministry of Science and Technology, and 
additional secretary under the Ministry of Planning in 2000, from where he retired two years 
later.  
 
In the BCS, new entrants are placed in a particular cadre based on their performance in open 
competitive examination conducted by the Public Service Commission, and their preferences 
of cadres (ranked in order). Once inducted, they become career-long members of that cadre 
(education, administrative, auditing and accounting, agricultural, foreign affairs, health, 
engineering, etc.) until separation by retirement, resignation or dismissal (Zafarullah et. al. 
1997). As part of a strategy to avoid an elite cadre system and to accommodate officers of 
other service cadres to top administrative posts of the secretariat, the government abolished 
the former system of the ‘Senior Services Pool’ in 1989 and introduced reservation by quota 
for the posts of deputy secretary and joint secretary for all cadre services. Intra-cadre transfers 
are therefore possible, but do not occur on any regular basis.  
 
Looking back on the years in the secretary service, the professor said he had enjoyed the work 
but that he could never understand colleagues ‘work ethics’.  
 
There was no single honest and sincere man working for the organisation. In the morning I 
reached the office and I worked till ten at night myself, but I could not get any sincere worker. 
I did my work and I fulfilled my mission, but the unfortunate is this, you see, whatever plan 
you take, as the head of an organisation, it should be reinforced by other people – by your 
colleagues. Then it becomes easier to fulfil a mission and to reach a target – to fulfil a goal. 
These two positions in the Ministry of Science and Technology were interesting, [but] sincere 
and competent workers, as I mentioned to you earlier, is a great cry of the country or our 
society. You will not see competent workers and you will not see sincere workers. This is my 
reading. I headed two organisations in my life and I saw this. As I mentioned, people are not 
willing to make oneself competent for the position he is holding.  
 
Asking the professor what the problem was, the answer was money: “They run after money”, 
he claimed. Apparently, as deputy and joint secretary, he had punished four people in his 
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department on charges of corruption. “As the head of an organisation, if you try, you can 
punish”, he said. The problem was that few dared to do so out of fear of being ‘manhandled’ 
(threats of violence). According to him, the country suffered from ‘disorder’ because few 
would apply rules and procedures available for pressing charges against those suspected of 
corruption. “There are legal matters, you see,” said the professor, “but people do not follow 
these legal rules. Rules framed by the government and procedures laid down by the 
government to be followed by high officials. In most cases they do not follow it and that is 
why there is chaos and confusion. So you see, by applying rules you can bring order in 
disorder”. Another reason mentioned by the professor for why so few apply the rules is that 
the man who is corrupted has money that can be used to pay off bosses or investigation 
committees. According to him, money was all that mattered and nobody cared about how it 
had been obtained.  
 
Yeah, from general view he cannot conceal things. He is a clerk drawing 5,000 taka salary a 
month. Come on! He is to feed a family of five members or ten members and at the end of the 
year he is embracing, let’s say ten lakh taka. So people naturally would take it that the man is 
doing corruption. Otherwise how is he getting money? Unfortunately in our society social 
accountability is lost. Accountability in the eye of law, rules, and regulation, as I mentioned or 
as you see in our country, is not efficient – isn’t that so? Accountability – social accountability 
– is also lost. Earlier when we were young we saw people hating others who were doing 
corruption in the society. Nowadays this is also lost. Rather a man raising a ten storied 
building by doing corruption is being praised by our society… If you have a very nice building 
you have the honour in the society. It is material. Whether you have killed ten people for 
getting the money to raise the building does not matter. 
 
The professor said he spoke from experience and that samaj (society) viewed him not only as 
a poor provider, but as the number one fool also. He was “Mr. Additional Secretary” and an 
additional secretary is the owner of not only one house, or even just one car, but of several. A 
minister friend of his once told him, upon being asked about his tendency to compromise 
rules and regulations, that there was the future to consider. As long as in office, he was well 
provided for and enjoyed full time transportation service and first-class accommodation. 
According to this minister friend, there were two things a former minister could not do. One 
was to travel by rickshaw, and the other to reside in a rented house. In other words, he had to 
obtain both a house and a car while still in office. The professor, on the other hand, by always 
following rules and regulations owned nothing at the time of retirement; he had rented a house 
and used rickshaws for his transportation, which apparently did not go unnoticed.  
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It is in my face when I go by rickshaw people say that “you have been additional secretary and 
you are going by rickshaw or you are walking?” I’ve been facing this for the last two years, 
but I don’t care about this… I cannot steal to buy a car. I cannot steal. I cannot put my hand in 
your pocket. Can I? Absolutely not!  
 
Dwelling on his point of not caring about people’s talk, I asked about his family. Up until 
then, the professor had spoken with much energy and humorously engaged in the 
conversation. Upon mentioning his family, his features turned grave and in a quiet voice he 
said it had been ‘painful’. Among five brothers and two sisters, he was the only one who had 
held a position at that level. Some of his brothers were small-scale farmers in a village outside 
Dhaka and the professor said that he felt their ‘ambitions’ at the time of his promotion to the 
secretariat. He was expected to put his personal relations before his work and bypass rules and 
regulations if necessary, but he had refused.  
 
They expected much of me, which I could not satisfy. Unfortunately they are not at all 
satisfied with me now. They are not at all happy with me now. At the beginning they had great 
ambitions or great expectation from me, but I could not satisfy even a little bit so they are not 
happy. This is the reality. Socially also I have seen some people expecting something – some 
people wanting that I provide his son with a job working with the government. I did not 
provide this and he is not happy. Some people wanted that I would do some managing. This is 
the social attitude and I am aware that this attitude differs from place to place, from country to 
country. This is the attitude of my society because my country is poor – poverty of the average 
people is high. You see I have many relations that are in extreme poverty. So naturally is it not 
unexpected that they will hope for something from me. This is quite natural, but if I cannot 
provide this or offer this they will be dissatisfied. But in developed countries people never 
think like this. You know, the people’s attitude and thinking differs from place to place – 
social conditions have much reflection of thinking of people. 
 
The professor was seen as selfish and without concern or care for others. To those around 
him, his high position meant access to resources they all expected to benefit from, but which 
he denied them. Among colleagues, in addition to being seen as a poor provider, he was 
regarded a fool for not knowing how to make a better living for himself and those around him. 
As with Alam, who said others considered him talented and brilliant but not too smart always 
insisting on legal procedures, the professor said he knew perfectly well how to make money 
from his government job. “It is a matter of choice”, he said, while admitting that always 
insisting on formal procedures had cost him much, socially and professionally.   
 
In 1985, for instance, the professor was the deputy director of a government launched mass 
education project and in charge of buying equipment for literacy centres. His office was 
spending more than two million taka on equipment and his boss wanted to instruct him on 
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which suppliers to choose. According to the professor, his boss was constructing a house for 
himself and needed money, which had been offered by one of the suppliers in exchange for a 
contract. The professor protested firmly insisting on following government procurement 
policies and tender for contracts. His boss was furious and they argued, but the professor 
refused to give in. Shortly after he found a transfer letter on his desk and was forced to leave 
the office within weeks. “You see,” he commented, “if you want to remain on track when it 
comes to rules laid down by the government you will have to suffer much. Sometimes you’ll 
be in Sundarban, sometimes you’ll be in Bandarban”, which are seen as punishment posts 
because of the remoteness from larger cities. 
 
According to the professor, honesty or dishonesty (corruption) in office is a question of 
‘democracy’, as he so acutely put it. “When does a man in an office find himself in a difficult 
position if he wants to be honest?” he asked.  
 
When does that happen? It happens when the condition of the environment goes against him. 
Environment condition goes against him and it is determined by the number of people. The 
number of people is causing his own ideas and thoughts. Say he is dishonest and he is working 
in the environment of fifty people. If there are only two people like him so he will definitively 
find himself in a difficult position. If there are thirty people like him so he will be in a good 
position and he will have a good time. Rather a man who is advocating for honesty he will be 
trouble. So you see in our society it is difficult because most people are on the wrong track. So 
people on the wrong track are in a good position and people on the right track are in difficulty 
because they are less in number – they are less in number. Actually here you can talk about 
democracy – it’s a kind of democracy. 
 
The professor was talking about the work situation, but his way of managing the office had 
also marginalised him socially. On his salary he could not buy a house or a car, and he had not 
used his influence to provide jobs for those who had asked for his help. Insisting on the rule 
of law as a universal principle, people talked of him as selfish and without care for others, and 
he became marginalised. His own family, mainly brothers and sisters, blamed him too for not 
doing anything for them either.  
 
Alam used to say that his children are his building because on his modest income he could not 
even afford to build a toilet. He took pride in his ‘honesty’, but in the eyes of samaj he was a 
failure. The professor also felt the verdict of his surroundings for not taking advantage and 
sharing the fortune of an important job. However, as trained bureaucrats and firm believers in 
the rationality of the system, neither Alam nor the professor saw any other way than following 
formal rules despite much pressure to do otherwise. On the contrary, both acted as agents of 
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state power by putting formal responsibilities before social commitments. The fact that they 
both became more or less marginalised, professionally and socially, says something about the 
rationality of the social and the emphasis on moral responsibilities. In Bangladesh, people feel 
the burden of social responsibilities and important jobs commonly means higher expectations. 
Entering civil service means taking on responsibilities beyond, and even against, official 
duties. Hence, a government job is not merely an individual contract for an interesting job or a 
personal career in state service; it is a potential resource for socio-economic advancement and 
fulfilment of multiple obligations.  
 
The modern state 
 
Assuming Dieter Conrad is right, it was from studying the Indian material that Weber 
discovered the concept of eigengesetzlichkeit, often translated as “lawful autonomy”.59 In his 
modernity studies, Weber talks about “polytheism” to denote the anarchistic predicament 
faced by the individual in having to deal with the demands of different values that are both 
incommensurable and incapable of being ordered in any rational way. Driving towards logical 
consistency, individuals’ values come into irreconcilable conflict because they follow their 
own ‘inherent logics’ or ‘laws of development’. No higher rationality can be invoked to 
overcome the contradictions that inevitably develop between the demands of the autonomous 
spheres. Tracing Weber’s use of the term eigengesetzlichkeit in his studies of Hinduism, 
Conrad finds it first used when he says that priestly power had to recognise that the world of 
politics followed it own laws, i.e. no fusion of political and priestly power. “What seems to 
have struck Weber”, Conrad writes, “is the independent normative rationalisation of various 
spheres of action – an early paradigm for the modern cultural differentiation into various 
spheres regulated by their own rationality” (Conrad 1986:182). That there is not one single, 
canonical form of rationalization was one of Weber’s main intellectual discoveries. In the 
case of India, however, lawful autonomy was used only to describe the relationship between 
different castes within a caste hierarchy and not recognised as a principle causing individual 
predicament as a result of having to choose between equally rational choices: 
 
                                                
59 From eigen = own, proper; getsetzlichkeit = legality, lawfulness. The expression is not translatable to English 
and translators of Weber have therefore generally chosen to paraphrase it according to inclination and context 
(Conrad 1986:180-1).  
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The Hindu order of life made each of the different occupations an object of a specific 
ethical code, a Dharma, and forever segregated one from the other as castes, thereby 
placing them into a fixed hierarchy of rank. … In this way, the caste order allowed for 
fashioning the Dharma of each single caste, from those of the ascetics and Brahmins to 
those of the rouges and harlots, in accordance with the immanent and autonomous laws 
(Eigengesetzlichkeiten, D.C.) of their respective occupations. War and politics were 
also included” (ibid: 182).  
 
According to this, a caste person is not torn by choice and does not suffer from conflicting 
obligations arising from different value spheres because the obligations he must fulfil are seen 
to be unambiguously dictated by the cast position into which he is born. The rationality of 
Hinduism is thus for individuals to follow their caste duty and “leave the rest to god”.60 
Conrad criticises Weber and his understanding of dharma and caste duties for being apolitical, 
but recognises the importance of the analysis for discovering the dynamics of the modern 
state, i.e. differentiation, atomisation, universalisation, and institutionalisation (Sissener 
2005).  
 
While Weber is commonly seen as an evolutionist, others have seen his work as “a theory of 
modernity constructed around a thesis about the unique characteristics and cultural effects of 
western rationalism” (Scaff 2000:102). According to Badie, Weber falls within both by 
empirically contradicting his own theoretical model proclaiming that “everywhere the modern 
state is undergoing bureaucratization”, while paying close attention to “the variety of actual 
patterns of evolution” (Badie 1983:24). Rather than following theorists propounding 
evolutionary models, however, Weber employed an analytical method attempting to work out 
a typological classification (ideal types). Fundamentally, he distinguished between forms of 
legitimate domination; charismatic, traditional, and rational, but only the rational is seen to 
operate through an agency such as the state. Considering only his thesis on different forms of 
domination, no claim is made that the types of domination succeed one another in any specific 
order. “There is no unique law of history”, Badie reflects (ibid:18). On the other hand, “it 
remains true that traditional domination, as the name implies, belongs to the past and is 
incompatible with a modern from of society” (ibid:19), which reflects his universal 
conception of the state (see the introduction). His historical studies, though, are more open for 
variations and complexities.  
 
                                                
60 See also Louis Dumont (1970) arguing that secular power in traditional Hindu society was clearly 
‘encompassed by’ and subordinate to religious values. 
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With the aid of a large number of historical examples, Weber discusses the modern state. 
Typologically, the modern state is the result of a bureaucratisation process institutionalising 
rational-legal practices. “Modern societies”, says Badie, “are characterized by the emergence 
of exclusive legal domination, which is revealed chiefly through the formation and 
development of an institutionalized bureaucracy, literally the instrument of the contemporary 
state” (ibid:20). “The birth of the state”, he continues, “marks the end of patrimonialism: the 
state becomes a distinct institution within society. It differentiates itself from civil society and 
becomes institutionalized” (ibid:21). By investigating the historical conditions in which the 
state rose to prominence as a peculiarly Western form of political power in the wake of a 
peculiarly Western rationalisation process, Weber actually emphasises the uniqueness of a 
particular process of state formation. 
 
Perhaps the several lines Weber wrote about ideal types have been given “a vastly 
disproportionate attention” (Dreyfus and Rabinow 1983:132). Dreyfus and Rabinow claims 
that if one skips from those few methodological pronouncements to his historical analyses, 
“the gap between Foucault and Weber diminishes considerably” (ibid.). As noted at the 
beginning of this chapter, also Foucault has been criticised for drawing an opposition between 
pre-modern and modern power. While Weber used ideal types to organise and explain varied 
and disparate historical phenomena, Foucault sought to isolate explicit programs and produce 
“concrete analyses of specific historical practices” (op. cit. p. 133), not how they were 
intended but how they actually work. Both use history, though, to explain the “problem of 
reason” or “how forms of rationalisation become embedded in practices, or systems of 
practices” (ibid.). 
 
In this chapter I have endeavoured to show how the social is about much more than rational-
legal state processes and how competing rationalities, informing and shaping sociality, is 
challenging the state. While in the case of some officials, such as Alam and the professor, the 
particular state rationality imparted during colonial times lives on as the result of a productive 
socialisation process (agents of state power as discussed in previous chapter), others appear 
less affected by such a rationality. Furthermore, in situations where the state is necessarily 
implicated one way or the other, such as questions of school accreditation and land 
registration as seen in this chapter, or in some similar situations discussed in earlier chapters, 
bureaucratic rationality appears negotiable. On yet other occasions, such as seen in the first 
part of this chapter on village life where people depend on each other for managing daily 
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events, the state is brought in for support only. Thus, the situation with the state and social 
order in Bangladesh, I argue, is much more complex than what can be sensibly captured by 
the use of ‘ideal types’61 arguing for or against rationality of the state.  
 
Following Weber, societies that have been through rationalisation processes where power has 
been institutionalised there is no longer room for discussing values or value choices, only 
more or less rational, making morality almost irrelevant (iron cage: rationality of the 
institution). Foucault, on the other hand, by disconnecting power from institutions, enables the 
analysis of power as a question of not only rational or legal behaviour but also moral 
(biopower: morality of the body). As seen in this chapter, people’s behaviour is not primarily 
affected by the rationality of legal institutions and power does not have to be formalised to be 
effective. In the village, there are some criterion for moral behaviour and those that do not 
measure up risk social marginalisation or even exclusion. These standards, as seen from the 
discussed cases, are not necessarily evident from the structure of the state or the rational-legal 
logic, but appear as embedded in practices (neighbours watching each other, parent’s 
disciplining their children, marriage preparations, communal interaction, family relations 
etc.). When the state is engaged it is not simply for its rationality, but rather for the benefit of 
a favourable social position, that is, as a point of reference for various social ambitions 
realisable through education, positions, earnings, and so on.  
 
In the last and closing chapter immediately following, attempts will be made to follow 
through implications of discussions and arguments about state and power made throughout 
this thesis.  
 
                                                
61 See also Migdal (2001) discussed in chapter 1.  
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6 
In closing 
 
In The Sociology of the State (1983), Badie and Birnbaum describe European situations prior 
to political centralisation processes arguing for a connection between existence of different 
sociocultural systems and developments of modern states.  
 
If it is true that the state arose in answer to crises that threatened the disintegration of 
certain societies in Europe, crises that basically involved resistance to change in social 
formations based on the community, then there is reason to believe that in order to 
explain the state’s rise we must look to the feudal past (Badie and Birnbaum 1983:79).  
 
While it has been argued that the inherent logic of the feudal past was such as to make a 
particularly thorough monopolization of political power quite likely to occur, Badie and 
Birnbaum claims that “the state was not simply a product of the feudal system” (ibid.). The 
reason is that we are simply not dealing with a feudal system, but with different feudalisms. 
In England, for instance, where the influence of feudalism is seen to have been relatively 
slight, processes of modernisation occurred differently from societies in which the influence 
of the feudal past was stronger mainly because of the different role played by the civil society. 
Where feudalism is strong, civil society stands stronger putting up stronger resistance towards 
any kind of changes, especially attempts to disintegrate and reduce its control over political 
power. According to Badie and Birnbaum, states that came into being in the period of 
feudalism by expelling the lords from the political arena, developing autonomous structures of 
government, and intervening in the economy often for reasons of their own, “these states had 
no choice but to strike some kind of compromise with a civil society that was still largely 
dominated by the aristocracy in terms of both prestige and wealth and that was far less 
affected than some have maintained by supposed economic rivalry between the aristocracy 
and the bourgeoisie” (ibid:82). Thanks to a very old tradition in England of representative 
government balanced by society’s willingness to recognize the sovereignty of the monarch, 
who without regard to the feudal hierarchy accepted oaths of allegiance directly from all his 
subjects as early as the eleventh century, and because English society had never suffered from 
the rigidity or fragmentation associated with feudalism, centralisation was possible without 
breaking with past political traditions.  
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This in turn explains why England was able to modernize without differentiating 
political from social roles or developing a state to anything like the degree we find in 
France, for example (ibid:83).  
 
Unlike the Paris Parlement in France, they argue, the English Parliament not only represented 
the economic interests of an aristocracy allied with the bourgeoisie and involved in 
commerce, but also served those interests in a direct political way. In France, where the state 
arose as a separate entity as a reaction against feudalism and in response to the need to 
establish or restore order in the country, pattern of development was necessarily different 
from that in England merely responding to changing circumstances by making minor 
adjustments in their social structure and strengthening the ability of the central government to 
carry out functions for which it had already assumed responsibility (Badie and Birnbaum 
1983).  
 
Thus, if the different histories of social formations in England and France can explain the 
peculiar features of the growth of the state in the two countries, discouraging any inclination 
to talk about the modern European state, why should we not expect the same to be true for the 
development of non-European states? It is on this last point that my own views critically 
depart from those of Badie and Birnbaum as in their view, state formation in postcolonial 
societies “has largely been a matter of imitating models developed elsewhere, in industrial 
societies of either East or West, and artificially superimposed, with or without local consent, 
on economic, social, and political structures shaped by other ways of thinking” (ibid:97). 
 
As discussed in this thesis, foreign interests (first of the explorers and merchants, and later of 
rulers and administrators) supported by local forces marked early developments of the modern 
Indian state. When the British first arrived in the sixteenth century, India was divided into 
princely states and ruled by more or less independent rulers. Due to the British Crown 
granting monopoly over the trade in Eastern Waters, and Jahangir’s permission to trade in his 
domain, the Company was able to establish itself in India. Through Indian intermediaries, the 
Company closed lucrative deals with local producers buying their products thus triggering 
rapid growth and expansion of activities. To secure business, territorial and juridical rights 
were obtained and gradually expanded. Company administrators such as Clive, Hastings, 
Cornwallis and Lord Wellesley were instrumental in developing the organisation and 
strengthening the position of the Company in India in various ways, facilitating 
colonialisation and the establishment of the British Crown as the sovereign ruler. 
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As part of their imperial policy, the British sought to consolidate British rationality by 
imparting their own education system and by creating or permanently settling a landowning 
class. While British education became popular among some Indians (bhadralok interested in 
improving their position), the Permanent Settlement Act (discussed in chapter 2) were of less 
impact than expected as political power, historical status, influence, and other resources 
remained for the most part within the same lineages. Characters such as Rammohun Roy 
(Brahmo Samaj) and Radhakanta Deb (Dharma Samaj), both accomplished scholars and 
influential leaders and supporters of Western education, contributed much to the growth of a 
national consciousness in the subcontinent. Although loyal supporters of the British Raj, the 
bhadralok openly opposed the various kinds of British discriminatory practices against 
Indians by submitting petitions to the British parliament. By applying the techniques of 
modern politics, the bhadralok were successful in imposing many of their demands thus 
actively taking part in the formation of the Indian state and its politics (not merely passive 
recipients or victims of foreign ideas).  
 
To consolidate their sovereign position in India, the British arranged for assemblies inspired 
by the old Indian durbar tradition, but with unmistakably British overtones. Instead of 
following the old tradition of symbolising the complexity of power relations, the British used 
the occasion to introduce a new social and political order (contractual relationship exchanging 
progress and stability for loyalty) thus suggesting a new standard for establishing authority. 
Although a reversed case, this latter can be seen as an example of a known ‘formula’ taking 
on new meanings by being applied to a different situation (adding new meanings to familiar 
concepts). 
 
In another passage, Badie and Birnbaum claims that, 
 
No matter how much local elites may have internalized Western political ideas, the 
truth is that the Western model has only been transplanted in an abstract and formal 
sense and has not worked in third-world societies. It is a model that has been introduced 
artificially, sometimes by force, sometimes voluntarily when traditional forms of 
government have been rejected because of unfair accusations that they were responsible 
for economic and military failures. To this day the “state” is no more than an imported 
artefact in both Africa and Asia, a pale copy of utterly alien European social and 
political systems, a foreign body that is not only inefficient and a burden on society but 
also a fomenter of violence (Badie and Birnbaum 1983:98-99).  
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I will not go into the last claim about ‘fomenter of violence’. The point I want to make is that 
whether the one way or the other (East to West or West to East, or between countries), in 
practice models and ideas are never just absorbed and imitated – no matter how they came 
about. Although Badie and Birnbaum do modify their statement saying that the Western 
‘political technology’, referring to political and administrative systems set up by European 
colonisers, has been less far-reaching in its effects as systems have been established without 
simultaneous consciousness about its functions. In the end, Badie and Birnbaum’s analysis 
seems to rest on a division between the modern West and their political ideas versus the 
traditional ‘rest’ and their local traditions. On the contrary, what I see is a much more 
dynamic process where ideas and models, or images and practices as I have discussed it in 
this thesis, form and develop as a result of the particular situations in which interchanges are 
made. Likewise, I would say, it is a never ending story were images and practices keeps 
(re)forming in accord with changing circumstances. This is the world in which the state exists: 
historical, social, cultural and situational. For South Asia and Bangladesh this means that 
although European in design, very much South Asian and Bangladeshi in product. As Jean-
François Bayart has put it with reference to Asia and Africa: 
 
When the colonialists effectively acted as a demiurge, such as by building [states]… 
they did not do so ex nihilo; and colonial creations were also subject to multiple acts of 
re-appropriation by indigenous social groups. Therefore, these states, which are reputed 
to be artificial, rest in reality upon their own social foundations (Bayart 1991:52-53).  
 
This means that, in addition to the concrete history, the cultural constitution of things, 
commonly studied by anthropologists and often disregarded by other disciplines, is crucial for 
the understanding of modern states. Clifford Geertz recognised this decades ago focusing on 
symbolic forms, classification systems and structures of meaning. His ideas about the analysis 
of cultural life “helped to frame and shape much later work, not only in anthropology, but also 
in history and other academic disciplines” (Krohn-Hansen & Nustad 2005:10). In Negara: 
The Theatre State in Nineteenth-century Bali from 1980, he argued that much political 
analysis had been reductionist because, as put by Krohn-Hansen and Nustad: “it had ignored 
and silenced the importance of rituals, symbols and meanings in the construction and 
reconstruction of states” (ibid.). According to Geertz, the rituals of the Balinese theatre state 
“were what there was” (1980:136) and not means of “representing the state or of masking its 
true nature – they constituted the state” (Krohn-Hansen & Nustad op. cit.). Although my 
analysis does not directly build on Geertz, he is worth mentioning for his stress on the cultural 
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constitution of the state. Another early contributor to the cultural understanding of the state is 
Bruce Kapferer. In Legends of People, Myths of State (1988), where he compares the 
hierarchical-holistic Sri Lanka and the egalitarian-individualistic Australia, modern political 
world-views were examined “on their own terms and in the contexts of their ideas” (1988:xii), 
forcefully bringing out the cultural embeddedness of states and political practices. In my 
thesis, the state is that complex relationship between cultural forms, institutional structures 
and relations of power that are continually formed, reformed and transformed in social 
situations implying both continuity and change. 
 
From chapter 2 alone, I could have argued for the hegemony of bureaucratic rationality, but 
that would be too simple. There are no good reasons to think that even back then the situation 
was as simple as that. Besides, considering what I have discussed in the other chapters of this 
thesis, submitting to that kind of reductionism would make no sense at all. Instead, what have 
emerged is a most varied and complex picture and with rationalities existing side-by-side 
continuously challenging the rationality of the modern state.  
 
In this thesis, I have discussed state and power mainly with reference to Weber and Foucault 
arguing for both similarities and divergences between the two. While Weber used ideal types 
to explain varied and disparate historical phenomena seeing the modern state as the 
embodiment of socio-religious rationalisation processes, Foucault insisted on the body as the 
place in which the most minute and local social practices are linked up with the large-scale 
organisation of power. To both, though, individual freedom is somehow constrained by 
external forces.  
 
According to Rogers Brubaker (1984), Weber presents himself as an empirical scientist and 
not as a moral philosopher, and Brubaker confirms that it “is true that he has no moral 
philosophy in the traditional sense. He elaborates no rules of individual conduct, harbors no 
vision of an ideal society” (Brubaker 1984:91). Even if the standard terms of moral argument 
– moral, right, ought, should – are conspicuously absent from his vocabulary, the whole of his 
scientific work is “informed by a fundamentally moral impulse – by a passionate concern with 
the ‘fate of man’ in contemporary capitalist civilization”, which he says is “embodied in 
Weber’s empirical interpretation of modernity in terms of its ‘specific and peculiar 
rationalism’ and in his moral response to this rationalized world” (ibid.). Thus, in addition to 
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examining Weber’s rationality thesis, Brubaker also has an interesting discussion about 
Weber’s moral thoughts. 
 
Consider two individuals, Brubaker requests, one committed to Zweckrationalität or 
instrumental rationality, guided by reason and unhampered by the constraints of tradition, 
strong emotion, or ultimate value commitments, and the other committed to Wertrationalität 
or value rationality, striving to shape his life in accordance with his chosen ultimate value 
commitments, which individual is freer, he asks.  
 
The first individual, to be sure, is not bound, as is the second, by any ultimate value 
commitments, and is thus completely unfettered in his decisions. But in a deeper sense 
the first individual is less free. For he does not really choose his ends; his agenda of 
ends is in fact determined by his given subjective wants – by his ‘raw’ nature rather 
than his consciously formed personality… Given wants guide the first individual in his 
selection of ends; chosen ultimate values guide the second. Only the second individual 
is autonomous in Weber’s sense (Brubaker 1984:105).  
 
Autonomy to Weber, however, does not “connote the radical ‘freedom from inner bonds’… 
that characterizes pure Zweckrationalität, but rather the capacity of an individual to create his 
own moral personality by committing himself to certain ultimate values and meanings and 
organizing his life around them” (ibid. p. 106). Pure Zweckrationalität, therefore, is morally 
dangerous because it is incompatible with genuine autonomy (ibid.), which explains Weber’s 
ambivalence towards increasing bureaucratisation and his warnings against the ‘iron cage’-
society subjecting individuals to rational-legal control beyond moral reasoning.62  
 
Foucault, on the other hand, saw no individual autonomy to begin with as in his view, human 
action occurs in already defined contexts influencing and directing its subjects in distinct 
ways. Power being something occurring anywhere at all times, Foucault argued for a far more 
diffuse field of power relations. By disconnecting power from institutions, he enables the 
analysis of power as a question of not only rational or legal behaviour but also moral 
(biopower: morality of the body). 
 
In Bangladesh, as discussed in this thesis, human behaviour takes place in the interface of 
modern rationality and the “brotherliness of direct and personal human relations” (Weber 
                                                
62 Weber’s own solution, according to Brubaker, was ‘ethic of responsibility’, a synthesis of Wert- and 
Zweckrationalität. 
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[1948] 1997:155). The power regulating behaviour being at once symbolic, institutional, 
legal, and moral, it takes historical detail and the ‘thick description’ of the ethnographer for a 
more dynamic understanding of the state and the social order, which is what I have tried to 
give here.  
 
Returning to the issue of corruption mentioned in the introduction, and also in the title of this 
thesis, I find it most unsatisfactory to reduce the richness of context to a question of legal 
matters. Instead of evaluating people or practices merely according to some legal parameters, 
applying labels such as corrupted/uncorrupted, what I hope to have achieved in this thesis is 
to show the multiplicity of forces informing and shaping social order also in the context of the 
modern state.  
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List of abbreviations 
 
ACR  – Annual Confidential Report 
ADC  – Additional Deputy Commissioner 
AL  – Awami League 
ASRC  – Administrative and Services Reorganisation Commission 
BCS  – Bangladesh Civil Service 
BISE  – Board of Intermediate and Secondary Education 
BNP  – Bangladesh Nationalist Party 
CSP  – Civil Service Pakistan 
DC   – Deputy Commissioner 
DD  – Deputy Director 
DEO  – District Education Officer 
EPCS  – East Pakistan Civil Service 
EU  – European Union 
EU EOM – European Union Election Observation Mission 
GO  – Government Official 
HSC  – Higher Secondary Certificate 
ICS  – Indian Civil Service 
LTO  – Long-Term Observer 
MP  – Member of Parliament 
NPC  – National Pay Commission 
PCS  – Provincial Civil Service  
PSC  – Public Service Commission 
PM  – Prime Minister 
SMC  – School Management Committee 
SP  – Superintendent of Police 
SSC  – Secondary School Certificate 
SSP  – Senior Service Pool 
UNEAS – United Nations Electoral Assistance Secretariat 
UNO  – Upazila Nirbahir Officer 
VIP  – Very Important Person 
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District maps 
Chittagong 
 
 
Image source: Asiatic Society of Bangladesh, http://banglapedia.search.com.bd 
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Dinajpur 
 
 
Image source: Asiatic Society of Bangladesh, http://banglapedia.search.com.bd 
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